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FOREWORD
This work is a study of the Algerian growth strategy between 1%2 and 1980. 
Central to the analysis, is the Marxian concept of rent. The process of growth is 
dealt with in terms of the oil rent and its appropriation by the Algerian state.
Here the growth strategy is understood, not as a neutral development of the 
forces of production in a social and political vacuum, but as the materialisation 
of open or hidden struggles among various social groups, each group aiming at 
imposing its own social project.
The approach developed emphasises, therefore, what is argued to be the 
decisive and fundamental force of change of any social formation: the class 
struggle in its internal as well as international dimensions.
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SUMMARY
After its independence in 1%2, Algeria experienced a growth process which 
was supposed to bring about qualitative and quantitative changes in both the 
structural features of the domestic economy and its position within the 
international division of labour. To that extent, introversion and integration of 
the economy emerged as basic themes upon which Algerian policymakers 
sought to justify the adopted growth process. This was based on the 
development of heavy industries as a matter of priority. Export of 
hydrocarbons and appropriation of the oil rent by the state were presented as 
the means by which financial constraints would be overcome and a productive 
base erected.
The oil rent could, however, yield an opposite discourse whereby the rentier 
ideology would become dominant and relegate the implantation of an efficient 
productive apparatus to a secondary position. The emphasis, in the official 
discourse, on the development of the forces of production, and the absence of an 
unambiguous social project did, in fact, present the appropriate setting for the 
development of a rentier ideology.
By the end of the 1970s, Algeria exhibited the essential features of a rentier 
economy to the extent that neither the agricultural nor the industrial sector 
could perform without support from the oil rent. Thus, rather than favouring 
the realisation of an integrated economy, the appropriation of the oil rent by a 
state which had no social project, inhibited the search for radical solutions to 
objective problems.
The reduction of the magnitude of the oil rent during the 1980s would, then, 
call into question the inefficient functioning of the domestic productive base. 
The same reduction would require a repositioning of the dominant social groups 
and the development of a new ideological discourse to advance an appropriate 
social project.
INTRODUCTION
After having spent more than a century under French colonial rule and 
seven years of war against the French army, the Algerians gained their 
political independence in 1962.
The French colonisation, however, left two basic features that would shape 
the future of the Algerian economy.
At the economic level the indigenous population had little opportunity to 
accumulate. This fact would explain the non-emergence of a strong indigenous 
bourgeoisie who would dominate (as a hegemonic class) the Algerian social 
formation after independence. The accumulation process was then led by the 
French colonists. However this process had been constantly supported by 
subsidies (from metropolitan France) which may signal the incapacity of the 
colonial economy to reach a self-sustained accumulation process.
At the political level, on the other hand, the indigenous population as a 
whole had been rejected from all official institutions and had no means to 
express its interests. The liberation war, then, constituted the ultimate means 
by which the indigenous population could reach its political independence. The 
war, led by the Algerian petty-bourgeoisie (covering, in the Algerian context, 
small proprietors, artisans, shopkeepers and employees in the state 
administration and education), would nevertheless emphasise the struggle 
against an external enemy as the main contradiction and favour the
2development of a populist discourse to avoid the question of contradictions 
internal to the Algerian society.
The struggle against an external enemy and the rejection of the colonial 
economy (as characterised by its extraversion and dependency on metropolitan 
France) would then, to some extent, pre-determine the growth path adopted by 
Algerian policy-makers. The building of an "independent and national 
economy" would stem from the adoption of De Bernis' theory of industrialising 
industries IPart A - 1 - 5 - 2] and would represent the "anti-colonial economy".
The process by which the Algerian economy would be transformed emerges 
as a sequence whereby:
1. heavy industries (steel and petrochemical industries in particular) 
would be set up to feed downstream activities (light industries and 
agriculture)
2. the agricultural sector, after a restructuring, would then absorb 
industrial commodities (means of production and fertilisers), increase its 
productivity and open up a market for more industrial commodities 
(consumption goods)
3. light industries would then be set up (as a result of forward linkages 
from the heavy industries) to respond to a growing demand coming from 
both rural and urban areas.
The first part of this sequence would, however, have to be supported by 
imports of means of production to erect the industrialising industries' material
3base. Export of hydrocarbons could then constitute the optimal choice for an 
appropriate income which would support the growth process.
However, the price of crude oil on a world scale encompasses a portion, the 
oil rent (Part A - 1 - 31, with no productive labour counterpart (according to the 
labour theory of value) within the domestic economy. This feature, which 
appears as a transfer of resources from the rest of the world economy to the oil 
exporting states, may be grasped as a form of subsidy which may (depending on 
its use) emphasise the colonial structure of the Algerian economy.
The rejection (at least in the official discourse) of the features of the 
colonial economy would nevertheless suggest that Algerian policy-makers 
would use the oil rent as a means of gradually favouring a process of 
autonomous accumulation, hence realising Amin's autocentred model. The 
export of hydrocarbons would, under this latter assumption, be apprehended as 
a temporary necessity which would speed up the building of an autocentred 
economy.
The analysis of the Algerian experience is structured as follows:
Part A develops, in its first chapter, a theoretical discussion about the 
relation between oil and development. After a discussion about the 
determination of the price of oil on a world scale and the introduction of the 
Marxian concept of rent, the relevance of "Dutch disease economics" to the 
understanding of the relation between oil and development is investigated. 
Chapter I ends with a presentation of the theoretical background upon which
4Algerian policy-makers could justify their choice of a peculiar growth strategy.
\
Chapter II, on the other hand, analyses the colonial era and puts the 
emphasis on Metropolitan France’s involvement in the expansion of the 
colonial economy. This involvement would, then, constitute a point of 
reference in terms of a class analysis of the Algerian social formation and the 
growth strategy adopted by Algerian policy-makers after independence. This 
chapter, then, develops an analysis of post-independence Algeria and focuses 
on the favourable conditions which may support the chosen growth strategy. A 
presentation of the Algerian economy in the early 1980s concludes this chapter.
Finally, Chapter III develops an analysis of hydrocarbons within the 
domestic economy. A presentation of the hydrocarbon productive base is 
followed by an investigation of the motivating function ifonction 
d'entrainement) assigned to the hydrocarbon industry. The second function, 
i.e. the financing function (fonction de financement) is then introduced and 
the fiscal linkage it was supposed to bring about is analysed. Being linked to 
the realisation of hydrocarbons within the world market, the analysis of the 
financing function will constitute the appropriate step towards the study of the 
world market for hydrocarbons.
Part B then studies the scene, i.e. the world market for hydrocarbons, where 
the rent is subject to a process of appropriation by various actors.
Chapter IV analyses the so-called Algerian-French privileged relationship 
and assesses the benefits (or the losses) that the Algerian economy incurred
5because of its close links with its former Metropolis.
Chapter V, on the other hand, enlarges the scope of analysis and 
investigates the world oil market. The historical analysis develops a three-part 
periodisation whereby the first period (up to the 1960s) is presented as the 
period where the oil exporting states had been confined to the passive role of 
tax collectors. The second period (the 1970s), on the other hand, is 
characterised as the moment when the convergence of interests among the oil 
exporting states, the oil companies and the strategic requirements of the US 
economy, brought about the so-called energy crisis. Finally, the 1980s, which 
witnessed the fall of the price of oil on a world scale, is understood as the period 
where the previous convergence of interests vanished to be replaced by its 
opposite. The reduction in the oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state would 
then put forward the question of a gas rent as a replacement for the financing 
of the growth strategy.
Chapter VI is then devoted to a study of the international gas industry. After 
a presentation of the gas material base (location of major oilfields) this chapter 
analyses the state of the international gas trade and discusses the existence of a 
gas rent and the likelihood of its appropriation by the gas exporting states. This 
chapter ends with a discussion about the prospects of Algerian gas exports.
Part C, finally, develops an evaluation of the Algerian growth strategy, as 
implemented during the 1960s and 1970s.
6Chapter VII presents an investigation of the agricultural sector as the basis for 
the reproduction of the subjective element (the labour force) of the labour 
process. In this analysis, two aspects are emphasised. The first aspect is 
brought about through a study of the state's understanding of the agricultural 
sector (with respect to the overall growth strategy). The second aspect, on the 
other hand, relates to the peasantry’s (in its various components) strategy with 
respect to the state's policies. Both aspects are, of necessity, analysed in their 
relation to the appropriation of the oil rent by the Algerian state.
Chapter VIII, on the other hand, discusses the process of implementing an 
autonomous accumulation. The implementation of De Bernis' model is then 
questioned and the internalisation of the reproduction of the objective elements 
(the means of production) of the labour process is analysed. In this respect, the 
theoretical relevance of De Bernis' model to the social and political conditions of 
the Algerian scene becomes the essential feature to be investigated. Finally 
this chapter ends with a study of the relations between the characteristics of 
the Algerian growth strategy and the process of internationalisation of capital.
Finally, Chapter IX constitutes an attempt at grasping the evolution of the 
Algerian growth strategy from a political viewpoint, i.e. the class nature of the 
state. In this context the growth strategy is seen as an appropriate extension of 
a state financially secure during the 1970s (thanks to the oil rent) but without a 
social project.
However, the 1980s, which witnessed the fall in the Algerian state's share of 
the oil rent would require a reassessment of the Algerian growth strategy. The 
emergence of the domestic bourgeoisie into the political scene may then 
constitute the first step towards calling into question the strategy of building an 
independent and national economy. A shift towards a more "orthodox" 
approach to development, whereby the domestic bourgeoisie could implement 
its social project (the full development of a capitalist economy integrated within 
the world market) would, to that extent, become the only apparent option.
At that stage the concepts of autocentred economy or independent and 
national economy would be redundant.
8PART A 
CHAPTER I 
OIL PRICE. RENT AND DEVELOPMENT
The 1970s witnessed the emergence of OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) as a new active agent in the world market for oil. This 
emergence, apparently, coincided with a shift from a buyer's market 
characterised by excess oil supply (1960s) to a seller's market exhibiting excess 
demand (1970s).
The environment within which the OPEC organisation had been moving, 
then, changed to the extent that its primary objective (i.e. to avoid a fall in the 
posted price of oil) could be fulfilled while avoiding a direct confrontation with 
the transnational companies operating on the oilfields. In this context, 
negotiations between the oil companies and OPEC took place in the early 1970s 
and schedules for a gradual increase of the posted price of oil were agreed upon. 
The Teheran and Tripoli agreements, then, constituted a general framework 
upon which a five year (1971-76) price pact would link the OPEC states to the oil 
companies.
By early 1973, however, the oil market became so tight that the market price 
of oil surpassed its posted price. From the OPEC viewpoint, money was being lost 
to the benefit of the oil companies and new arrangements had to be 
implemented in order to take into account the new market conditions.
9The October 1973 Middle East war, however, put a halt to the negotiation 
process and from then on the level of the oil price seems to have been 
unilaterally set by OPEC. Thus from $2.28 per barrel (January 1972) the marker 
crude jumped to $7/b (January 1974) and reached $11.65/b by November 1974. 
Furthermore a second substantial jump took place by December 1979 when the 
marker crude price reached $24/b. The price of oil had then been twenty times 
higher at the end of the decade than at its beginning.
With respect to the marginal production cost of a barrel of oil (which is less 
than a dollar in ail OPEC countries) the level of the oil price prevailing within 
the world market and an appropriate export policy on the part of OPEC states 
may constitute an opportunity to pull out of the "vicious circle of under­
development”. Through a fiscal linkage, in particular, the OPEC states may 
diversify their economies and set up a self-sustained growth process.
This opportunity, however, emerges only to the extent that there is a 
substantial difference between the world price of oil and its domestic cost of 
production. This difference actually constitutes the basis upon which the 
existence of oil resources could be related to a development process (hence the 
phrase "oil and development"). And the magnitude of this difference and its 
likely trend requires a study of the formation of the price of oil on a world scale.
1. On the pricing of crude oil: the conventional approach
As a first approximation, crude oil can be considered as an exhaustible 
resource, the price of which would be understood within the theoretical 
framework set by Hotelling^ in 1931 and developed by various authors^ in the
10
1970s to take into account the energy crisis. The rediscovery of Hotelling's 
theory of exhaustible resources by conventional economics, then, constituted 
an attempt to theorise the functioning of the oil market and the price level that 
has been witnessed during the 1970s.
The basic argument which stems from Hotelling's 1931 paper is that, within 
the framework of intertemporal optimisation, the price of an exhaustible 
resource should rise at a rate equal to the rate of interest. In practical terms 
the resource owner faces two alternatives:
1. If the price of his resource is increasing at a slower rate than the 
interest rate, he (the resource owner) should extract his resource as 
soon as possible and invest in assets earning the rate of interest.
2. On the other hand, if the price of his resource is appreciating at a faster 
rate than the rate of interest, then the resource owner should keep the 
resource in the ground.
The formalisation of the resource owner's dilemma could then be considered 
within a mathematical model,3 the responses of which would depend on implicit 
or explicit assumptions.
Within the simplest model developed by the conventional approach, 
extraction costs are assumed away and the initial stock S0 of the resource is 
known. Identifying the rate of extraction fy with the rate of utilisation of the 
resource, the stock of the resource at time t (t>0) is given by:
11
t
$t = so- S Rt dto
where
S t>0 for t >8
In order to determine the price path of the exhaustible resource, time is 
discretely measured in equal intervals of length 0 and the numeraire is assumed 
to be an asset earning a rate of return r* (>0) during the interval (t, t + 8). If pt 
denotes the competitive spot price per unit of the resource at time t, then an 
individual who owns pt units of the numeraire asset at time t is assured 
(1 + rt8)pt units of numeraire at time (t + 8). On the other hand the individual 
can buy a unit of the resource at time t and sell it at time (t + 0) to receive P +^0 
units of numeraire. Under competitive conditions, the individual should be 
indifferent regarding these two options and the arbitrage function will be 
written as:
Pt+0 = (1 * r t8)Pt
At this stage the price path of the exhaustible resource can be determined 
by rearranging the above equation and taking the limit as 8 tends to zero. The 
Hotelling rule then emerges as 
iyPt = rt
From this last equation one peculiar aspect of the economics of exhaustible 
resource can be noticed: an unextracted stock of a resource can yield a return 
to its owner only to the extent that it appreciates over time. Under competitive 
conditions the rate of return on the resource must equal the rate of return rt 
enjoyed by the numeraire good.
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Although this simple model illustrates the fundamental principle of 
exhaustible resources economics, the assumption of zero extraction costs does 
seem rather strong, especially when various oilfields and their locations with 
respect to oil markets are brought into the picture. The simple model can, 
however, be developed in order to take account of positive extraction costs. The 
only new feature which is grasped through this assumption is the existence of 
two prices of the resource instead of one: a price p  ^ for the unextracted 
resource and a price for the extracted resource. These two prices are related 
by the formula:
qt = Pt + dc/dRt 
where
dc/dRt : marginal cost of extraction.
The introduction of extraction costs does not, however, produce any 
substantial change in the price path of the resource under competitive 
conditions. Thus, whereas the rate of increase of the price of the unextracted 
resource is found to be smaller than the rate of return on the numeraire asset, 
the price path of the extracted resource remains unspecified because of the 
impact of two different variables p£ and dc/dty which can move in opposite 
directions.
Finally, to complete the picture of the theoretical handling of the pricing of 
an exhaustible resource by conventional economics, the assumption of 
competitive conditions is to be relaxed in order to investigate the situation 
where imperfect competition may prevail.4 Since imperfect competition is
13
difficult to model, the extreme case of a single resource owner (a monopolist) of 
a resource is investigated instead. Various assumptions are then advanced in 
order to study this new problem: the initial stock S0 of the resource is known 
and the monopolist faces a downward sloping demand function p(R^ t) relating 
the price p at which a flow fy is sold at time t. Furthermore market 
imperfections are assumed away in the rest of the economy. Then if r  
represents the competitive interest rate which is earned by the numeraire 
asset, and extraction costs are assumed away, then maximisation of the present 
discounted value of the flow of profits stemming from selling the resource 
would be formalised as
o
then if m* denotes marginal revenue, that is
d(p(R, t) R) 
mt  --------------
dR
the monopolist will choose the rate of extracton that equalises between the rate 
of increase of net marginal revenue and the rate of interest r, that is
To determine the price path of the resource under monopoly conditions, the 
equation defining marginal revenue is manipulated under the assumption that 
the demand curve shifts uniformly over time (that is pt = f(t) . p(Rfc). This 




f  p(Rt, t)Rtexp(-rt)dt 
%/m^ = r





Then, recalling that under competitive conditions, the price path of the 
resource is determined as:
Pt/Pt = r  1-2
the relationship between the two price paths, under various assumptions, is 
analysed. Under constant elasticity of demand, formulas 1.1 and 1.2 are 
identical, so that there is no difference between the competitive price path and 
the monopolist's one. On the other hand, under variable elasticity of demand, 
the problems at hand become rather complicated and the outcome depends 
basically on whether the absolute value of the elasticity of demand increases or 
decreases as the rate of extraction falls. Finally, when extraction costs are 
brought into the picture and under the assumption of iso-elasticity of demand, it 
is shown that the initial price of the extracted resource is higher under 
monopoly conditions than under competitive ones.
Although referring to exhaustible resources in general, the framework 
developed within conventional economics is assumed to contribute to an 
understanding (at least a better one) of the functioning of the oil market. The 
conventional discourse, and particularly its pertinence, have nevertheless to be 
questioned at two particular levels. Whereas the first level deals with the 
(implicit or explicit) assumptions upon which the discourse develops, the second 
level must address the practicality (in particular the predictive power) of the 
models presented above.
V i - i  W
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Concerning the first level, the conventional discourse rests on very 
restrictive assumptions? the most important of which is the existence of 
forward markets for each date up to the time of complete depletion. The non­
existence of such markets in the oil industry implies that neither future prices 
nor the future level of demand can be accurately assessed. This aspect, by 
itself, precludes any possibility of determining an optimal intertemporal 
allocation of natural resources. By relaxing the above assumption, the whole 
"conventional structure" collapses and the conventional discourse emerges 
more like an abstract mathematical exercise than an attempt at theorising the 
actual functioning of the oil market.
Even when conventional economists relax the assumption of perfect 
competition and assume imperfect markets, the conventional discourse still 
suffers from the assumption of intertemporal optimisation, for there is no 
basis^ for the argument that oil exporters (OPEC states in particular) can be 
attributed a dynamic optimising behaviour -  in other words, that OPEC states can 
be reduced to the "rational producers" of conventional economics.
This reduction, however, allows conventional economics to develop an 
ideological discourse whereby the history of the oil business (the pre-eminence 
of the US economy in shaping the world oil market) and the conflicts of interest 
among transnational oil companies, the OPEC states and oil importing states, can 
be ignored. What is then left are a-historical producers maximising their 
profit over time while facing well-behaved (iso-elastic) demand curves. The 
failure of conventional economics to understand the functioning of the oil
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market basically stems from its a-historical premisses. The latter are, however, 
necessary to justify the ideology of universal harmonies advanced by the 
conventional discourse. In this context conflicts of interest among various 
social groups are set aside in order to determine, in Solow's words, "the optimal 
social management of a stock of a non-renewable but essential resource" 7 (For 
the benefit of mankind?)
Although the conventional discourse premisses constitute an integral part 
of the ideology of universal harmonies, they (the premisses) may nevertheless 
be tested for their pertinence by an analysis of their predictive power. The 
models developed by conventional economics either in the simplistic form 
which assumes perfect competition, or in the more sophisticated approach 
which deals with imperfect competition, have been of little value in terms of 
understanding the historical trend of oil prices and predicting the likely future 
price path. Thus the decline in world oil price during two decades (the 1950s 
and 1960s) and the emergence of OPEC (to stop the decline of the oil price) 
cannot be explained in terms of Hotelling's rule. On the contrary, the inverse 
of this rule may be more appropriate. On the other hand, the price jumps of the 
1970s cannot be related to any rate of interest. Therefore the smooth increase 
of the oil price implied by Hotelling's rule seems to have never materialised and 
the whole framework developed by conventional economies becomes 
questionable in terms of its relevance.
To the extent that it was set to explain the functioning of the economics of 
exhaustible resources and predict the likely trend of mineral prices 
(particularly oil), Hotelling's framework (despite its 1970s revival) remains a
17
pure abstract exercise which produces no tangible results. In this context the 
history oF the oil industry, rather than supporting the theory of exhaustible 
resource, may constitute a resource for the rapid exhaustion of this theory.8
2. On the modelling of OPEC behaviour
Because of the limited value of Hotelling's framework, conventional 
economists went in search of market imperfections that hindered the 
applicability of Hotelling's rule. In the view of the conventional literature, 
market imperfections seem to stem mainly from OPEC behaviour, hence the 
focus on this organisation as the only active agent in the oil business. 
Modelling OPEC behaviour then became the raison d'etre of various 
conventional economists who could not squeeze the oil economy into their 
models of intertemporal optimisation.
Two basic assumptions have therefore been advanced. The first one 
attributes a wealth-maximising behaviour to OPEC and serves as a basis for 
building two competing models: a monopoly model and a competitive one. The 
second assumption on the other hand presents OPEC as a non-wealth maximising 
body and develops two models: the target revenue model and the political model 
(or models).
The first assumption actually remains within the conventional discourse 
although the rate of interest (or some kind of social rate of discount) does not 
seem to play a major role in the determination of the oil price. The two models 
developed on the basis of this first assumption, however, suffer from the same 
shortcomings. Thus whereas Adelman ^ as the proponent of the monopoly
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model, develops the argument that Saudi Arabia acts as a swing producer, the 
data for 1973-1980 contradict this very argument: instead of declining (as 
demand for OPEC oil fails), Saudi's market share increased from 23.9% to 36.5% ^  
of total OPEC output. Furthermore, apart from blaming Saudi Arabia for the oil 
crisis of the 1970s, Adelman offers neither a theoretical understanding of the oil 
industry nor any sound prediction about future oil prices. The author, 
however, expected (in mid-1981) higher real prices in the 1980s. Adelman's 
wrong predictions may then suggest that his frame of reference is of the same 
value as Hotelling's rule.
The second model which relates to the assumption of wealth maximising 
behaviour assumes that oil companies and most governments have different 
discount rates which would imply different rates of output. Thus the 1973 oil 
crisis is understood not in terms of any collusive attitude on the part of OPEC but 
on the ground that the OPEC states have a lower discount rate which implies 
restraining output, thus driving prices up.** The change in oilfield ownership 
in the early 1970s would then constitute the main explanation of the 1973 oil 
crisis. The argument that OPEC states have a lower discount rate does not, 
however, stand up to historical evidence. Thus before the 1970s, OPEC states had 
constantly been pushing the oil companies to produce more output. And after 
the change in property rights, OPEC output did not decrease by any substantial 
amount. Secondly, the second oil jump of 1978-1979 cannot be related to any 
change in property rights since by that time the OPEC states were (at least 
legally) owners of their oilfields. Furthermore, the argument that competitive 
prices prevail in the world oil market cannot take into account the important
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difference between the world price of oil and its cost of production in all OPEC 
countries. Finally, to the extent that the question as to what a competitive price 
is remains unanswered by conventional economics, the focus on OPEC 
behaviour as a way of understanding the functioning of the oil market may 
only signal the speculative character of the conventional discourse.
Whereas the first assumption (OPEC as a wealth-maximising agent) remains 
within the conventional theoretical framework, the second assumption does not 
actually develop any theoretical understanding of the oil market but speculates 
around two alternatives. The first is to assume that OPEC output (or the output of 
the main exporters of OPEC) is dependent on the national budget requirement of 
the countries c o n c e r n e d .12 This assumption, therefore, implies the existence of 
a backward bending supply curve, or in other words it assumes that if an 
investment target is set, a price increase will result in reduced output. The 
target revenue model, however, suffers from various shortcomings: firstly, 
what determines the price increase which triggers the reduction in output is 
left unanswered; secondly, and more importantly, historical facts actually 
suggest the prevalence of a relationship opposite to the one implied by the 
model. On this latter assumption, rather than reducing output, a price increase 
may actually increase it in order to meet new and higher investment targets.
Thus the 1973-74 oil jump allowed the Algerian state to double its planned 
investment for the second Four Year Plan (Part A-III-3) by increasing oil 
exports. Saudi Arabia’s needs, on the other hand, jumped from $4 billion in 
1973 to $88 billion in 1981.13 This instability of OPEC states' budgetary needs 
cannot therefore be used as reference (or as explanatory variable) for the
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determination of OPEC output or of the price of oil. The target revenue model, 
though limited in its scope, does nevertheless indicate that, contrary to the 
conventional approach, OPEC states need not be reduced to wealth maximising 
agents.
The second alternative,^ on the other hand, develops the argument that the
events that had been taking place during the 1970s should not be related to any
I &type of weath optimising behaviour on OPEC's part. On the contrary, this
IA
approach, after noticing the importance of Saudi Arabia in OPEC, argues that 
"an operational code of advancing Saudi Arabia's political priorities while 
minimising hostile external and internal pressures upon the Kingdom, explains 
Saudi behaviour better than the economic optimising model does."*5
Thus in this framework, economic decisions serve broader political goals 
and cannot have a rationality of their own (hence the abstract and limited value 
of the conventional discourse). The political model does not, however, provide 
any means of explaining past prices or determining future ones. All these 
aspects seem to depend ultimately on Saudi rulers' perception of their 
environment. Moran's contribution may nevertheless be understood in terms 
of his rejection of the reductionist view of the conventional discourse and his 
attempt at integrating the political variable into the oil question. The 
integration of the political variable may then be expanded in order to seek the 
economic underlyings (or base) upon which political battles take their full 
meaning.
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The political battle mentioned above would obviously require the existence 
of various "players" and the definition of the object of the "battle". At this 
stage, the conventional discourse with its depiction of the economic system as a 
"one-way avenue leading from scarce original factors of production to goods 
and services utilised in final consumption"^ can apprehend neither the 
players (apart from the ideological notion of producers) nor the object of the 
battle (to the extent that there are no conflicts in the conventional world).
Classical economics, on the other hand, may offer the means to overcome the 
failure of conventional economics. By interpreting "the economic process as 
one of continuous reproduction (and enlargement) of the material bases of 
human societies",*? classical economics points to the existence of a surplus 
above what is necessary for the simple reproduction of the economic system. 
This surplus may then constitute the object of appropriation by various social 
groups which would devise strategies in order to obtain the highest share. It is 
within this context that Chevalier’s argument can be grasped and his 
contribution assessed.
Chevalier,*8 then, argues about the existence of an oil surplus and defines it 
as "the difference between the valorisation price of one ton of crude sold to the 
consumers in the form of refined products and the average cost of extracting, 
carrying, refining and distributing this same ton of crude."*9 The oil surplus 
on the other hand is composed of various differential rents which stem from 
various parameters (see table below) and a monopoly rent which emerges 
because of the peculiar structure of the oil industry.
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quality rents 
+ position rents 
oil surplus = + mineral rents
+ technological rents 
+ monopoly rents
After defining the notion of oil surplus, Chevalier then investigates its 
appropriation by three contending groups: the oil exporting countries, the oil 
companies and the consuming countries. The portion of the oil surplus which 
accrues to each contender is, according to Chevalier, related to a peculiar 
relation of power {rapport de force) which depends essentially on two 
parameters: the cost in evolution ( codten d&reloppement )20 of the production 
of oil and the degree of social consciousness of the oil exporting states in 
particular.
Whereas the degree of social consciousness is no more than mentioned by 
Chevalier, the analysis of the cost in evolution for the production of oil 
constitutes the cornerstone of Chevalier's approach. In this context, Chevalier 
suggests that whereas the period 1859-1970 witnessed decreasing marginal costs, 
the period 1970 onward saw the reverse trend.21 Upon this hypothesis. 
Chevalier can argue that whereas the first period covered a tendency to a fall in 
the oil price on a world scale, the second period witnessed the reverse, that is a 
rise in the oil price. The latter would have the same magnitude as the cost in 
evolution of the most expensive operating field which is needed to satisfy 
demand on a world scale. Furthermore, the rise of the oil price which 
corresponded (according to Chevalier) to the exploitation of marginal fields, 
would allow producing countries (in particular OPEC members) to extract a
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higher rent from the oil companies.
Chevalier's understanding of the oil price as representing marginal cost 
within the oil sphere may constitute an improvement over the abstract 
approach in terms of interest rate. However, Chevalier's argument remains 
limited at the theoretical level while its basic hypothesis does not stand up to 
historical evidence.
Historically the relation between exploitation of marginal (more costly) 
fields and the price level has been the reverse of what Chevalier implies. 
Contrary to Chevalier's basic hypothesis, costlier oilfields (Alaska and the North 
Sea) are exploited because of high prices and not the reverse (see Chapter V, 
Part B). In fact these costlier oilfields would be shut down if a more intensive 
exploitation of Middle-East oilfields took place.
At the theoretical level, on the other hand, Chevalier's approach cannot 
explain why marginal oilfields (the most expensive to operate) do produce a 
substantial rent (see section 3 below). Thus if marginal oilfields produce a rent, 
the price of oil on a world scale does not represent marginal cost within the oil 
sphere. It may, however, cover this cost to which is added an increment that 
would be apprehended outside the oil sphere.
The conventional approach, including Chevalier's thesis, seems to be limited 
in its understanding of the functioning of the oil market. Not having a theory 
of the commodity as a particular category of the capitalist mode of production, 
conventional economics confronts things (goods) and therefore does not
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consider oil as one (among others) material carrier of a more general 
commodity, i.e. energy which has the power to unlock frozen labour 
(machines). Considering oil as a simple material carrier of the commodity 
energy, then, implies that the oil industry may be understood only in so far as it 
is embedded within a broader study of the energy sphere on a world scale. In 
particular the study of the oil sphere and of the energy sphere in general 
cannot be separated from an analysis of the emergence of landed property (in 
particular in the peripheral social formations) and its peculiar relation with 
capital which confronts it in the form of transnational firms.
3. The price of oil and the distribution of the oil rent
To the extent that "landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy 
the monopoly of disposing of particular portions of the globe as exclusive 
spheres of their private will to the exclusion of all others" 22 the analysis of the 
oil sphere may be embedded within the frame of reference developed by Marx 
in his study of ground-rent.
Within a Marxian framework, the capitalist production process involves 
workers who are paid wages. These wages represent the exchange value of 
their labour force. The labour force is, however, capable of producing more 
value than is necessary for its own reproduction. Being generated by surplus 
labour, this surplus product takes the form of profit and surplus profit which 
are respectively appropriated by the capitalist class and the landowning class. 
Whereas capitalists appropriate profit because of their monopoly over the 
means of production, landowners extract a rent thanks to their monopoly over 
the land. Thus in the Marxian context, rent is basically a portion of surplus
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value that is appropriated by the landowning class.
What makes possible the existence of the rent and its appropriation by the 
landowning class is, according to Marx, the existence of a surplus profit which 
stems from conditions of production of peculiar spheres which are not subject 
to the equalisation of the profit rate (agriculture and mining spheres in 
particular). Thus, under capitalist conditions, rent becomes an excess over that 
part of surplus labour which is normally claimed by c a p i t a l .23 The question 
which arises at this stage concerns the bases upon which a surplus profit can 
be generated in peculiar spheres of production.
Differential rent
In the industrial sphere, the surplus profit that an individual capitalist can 
realise may emerge as the consequence of a reduction in production costs. This 
reduction would stem from the application of new, improved and above average 
means and methods of production.24 in this context the rise in productivity 
and the emergence of surplus profit appropriated by the capitalist are 
ultimately dependent upon capital. Competition among capitalists would, 
however, tend to generalise these more efficient methods of production and 
thereby cancel out the basis for the existence of surplus profit. Thus the 
conditions under which the individual capitalist would sell his commodity above 
its production priced (hence gaining a surplus profit) cannot be sustained for 
a long time.
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In the agriculture sphere (and by extension in the mining sphere) and 
contrary to the industrial sphere within which the most efficient processes are 
gradually generalised by driving out less efficient ones, the most efficient 
conditions of production cannot be spread over the sphere. For the 
productivity of labour does not depend entirely on the amount of capital 
injected into this sphere but on particular natural conditions (the waterfall in 
Marx's example) which are monopolised by those who own particular pieces of 
the earth.
In so far as the most efficient conditions of production cannot be 
generalised over the agricultural sphere to satisfy social needs, less efficient 
(less productive) processes are brought into being. Capitalists who use these 
less efficient processes must, however, appropriate at least the average profit. 
Under these circumstances and contrary to the industrial sphere where the 
market price of a commodity reflects the production price of capital producing 
under average conditions (and covering a large part of the market), in the 
agricultural sphere it is the production price attached to the less efficient 
conditions of production that regulates the market price of the commodity 
concerned. In this frame of reference, capitalists who operate the least 
efficient processes will gain the average profit rate whereas capitalists who 
operate the most efficient processes would (in the abstract) appropriate the 
average profit to which is added a surplus profit. The magnitude of this surplus 
profit is determined as the difference between the production price attached to 
the least efficient conditions of production and the one attached to more 
favourable conditions.
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Capitalists do not, however, face a vacuum, but confront the landowning 
class, a category external to the capitalist mode of production. Landed property 
could then prevent capital from utilising the most favourable conditions of 
production unless it extracts a fee, the upper limit of which is the whole surplus 
profit. The appropriation of this surplus profit by the landowners would then 
reflect its transformation into ground-rent.
Ground-rent as the relation linking and opposing the capitalist class and the 
landowning class may be apprehended, as a first approximation, under the 
heading of differential rent. Thus, whereas capitalists who operate under the 
least favourable conditions stick to an average profit, those who operate under 
more favourable conditions would appropriate that average profit but give up 
the surplus profit to the landowners in the form of rent (differential rent in 
this case). At this stage the landowners as a class remain passive agents in the 
emergence of surplus profit. Their monopoly over the land would, however, 
allow them to claim it (as rent) from the capitalists who would be satisfied with 
their appropriation of average profit.
Absolute rent
The assumption that capitalists operating under the least favourable 
conditions do not pay a rent does nevertheless constitute a problematic 
abstraction for there "is in no way a reason for the landlord to lease out his land 
to the farmer for nothing and be so philanthropic to the client as to extend him 
a credit gratuit."26 In actual fact, a situation where the marginal land does not 
extract a fee would merely mean that landed property does not act any more as a
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barrier to capitalistexpansion. On the other hand, it would mean the abolition 
of the landowning class as a category ultimately opposed to the capitalist class 
over the appropriation of surplus profit.
Thus, whereas differential rent exists without the active participation of the 
landowning class, absolute rent emerges as a pure creation of landed 
propertyP  While denoting a peculiar relationship between the landowning 
class and the capitalist class 28 absolute rent also indicates that the very 
existence of landed property prevents the commodity concerned from being 
sold at the general production price (the production price attached to the least 
favourable conditions of production). A fee (absolute rent) must actually be 
added to the general production price. The magnitude of absolute rent, on the 
other hand, does ultimately depend on the power of the landowning class to 
extract a part if not all of this fee from the capitalist class.
The existence of the Marxian absolute rent, nevertheless, rests on the 
assumption that the organic composition of capital in the agricultural sphere is 
lower than the social average.29 Hence agricultural products could be sold at a 
market price higher than their production price (at their value in the extreme 
case). Under these circumstances, capital comes up against landed property 
which (1) restricts investment in particular spheres of production (agriculture 
in this case) and (2) prevents the general equalisation of surplus value that 
brings about the average p r o f i t  30 Agricultural products are then sold at a 
price comprised between their production price and their (higher) value. The 
difference (which represents surplus value produced within the agricultural 
sphere) between these two limits constitutes the object of the struggle between
29
landed property and capital as far as the magnitude of the absolute rent is 
concerned.
Thus within this Marxian framework, spheres of production which are 
immediately dependent on nature (agriculture and mining, for instance) 
exhibit peculiarities which are absent from the industrial sphere. Firstly, the 
market price of commodities produced within the first named spheres is 
determined by the production price of capital operating under the least 
favourable conditions. Hence capital operating under more favourable 
conditions obtains a surplus profit which is transformed into differential rent 
because of the existence of landed property. Secondly, to the extent that even 
capital operating under the least favourable conditions must pay a fee (absolute 
rent) in order to operate, the market price of the commodity concerned must be 
higher than the production price of this capital. This market price may then 
be visualised through the formula:
P = p’ ♦ DR + d 
where
p = market price
p' = average production price in the sphere 
DR = differential rent 
d = absolute rent
The question which arises at this stage concerns the relevance of this Marxian 
framework (developed in nineteenth century England) to an analysis of the 
current energy sphere of which the oil sphere is a component.
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Oil rent within the oil sphere
Of all material carriers of energy, oil, coal and natural gas are the most 
widely used.
Table 1.1: World consumption of energy (10^ t.c.e.)
Year Total Solidfuel% Liquid fuel% Nat. gas% Others%
1929 1713 79.8 14.9 4.5 0.8
1937 1826 75.5 18.0 6.3 1.2
1949 2315 64.0 24.0 10.3 1.7
1959 3966 53.2 30.6 14.2 2.0
1969 6406 36.8 40.6 20.3 2.3
1975 7444.4 30.4 45.7 20.9 3.0
1982 8397.8 32.0 42.1 21.9 4.0
Source: UN Statistical Yearbooks 1960,1970,1982.
The state of the energy market in general and the market price of energy 
within the world market in particular would then be determined by the level of 
the production forces (hence the price of production) of the least favourable 
field in the energy sphere. In this context the coal industry faces the worst 
conditions of production and ought to regulate the market price of energy as a 
whole.
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Table 1.2: Estimated energy production costs* (1979 US dollars)
Source US dollars/BOE**
Indigenous coal (US) 
Imported coal (NW Europe) 
Indigenous coal (NW Europe) 
Middle-East oil 
North Sea and Alaskan oil 
US oil
LNG imports
Synthetic NG from US coal 
Liquids from coal 
Liquids from shale
3 - 5  




3 - 7 
10 -23 
23 - 35 
30 - 37 
15- 35
Source: Eden, R. and others, Energy Economics, Growth Resources and Policies, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.289
* exclude taxation, refining, storage, transmission and distribution costs
** barrel of oil equivalent
Of all primary sources of energy, European coal is the most expensive. Its 
price of production does not, however, regulate the energy market for it is 
generally subsidised by European governments. In fact the nationalisation of 
coal mines in Europe stems from the situation that no profit is generated within 
the industry, hence no capitalist would be willing to invest in it. From the 
capitalist viewpoint (the necessary appropriation of average profit by the 
capitalist) the mere existence of the European coal industry constitutes an 
irrationality. Its actual existence, however, is explicable using political and 
social criteria. Under these circumstances the general market price of energy 
is determined without consideration of the European coal industry.
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At the opposite end, the American coal industry enjoys more favourable 
conditions of production (less ash content and deposits closer to the earth’s 
surface). Hence its price of production must be lover than European coal. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the American coal industry operates under 
"normar capitalist conditions (it does not receive subsidies from the state) it 
must generate an average profit^  (otherwise capitalists would not invest in it). 
However, compared to the oil industry, the US coal industry remains much less 
efficient and can be considered as exhibiting the least favourable conditions of 
energy production. In this context the price of production of American coal 
ought to regulate the energy market and become the general production price 
of the energy sphere.
However, in view of the prevailing productive apparatus and the state of 
technology, coal exhibits a relatively less favourable use value form (oil is less 
expensive to process and provides, in addition, non-energy products). From 
this viewpoint, to compete with oil in all production spheres, coal must be 
liquified. Hence the relevant market price of energy emerges not as the 
production price of coal but as the production price of liquids derived from coal. 
Under these circumstances the price of oil encompasses a surplus profit the 
magnitude of which depends on the difference between its own production 
price and the market price of energy (production price of liquids derived from 
coal).
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Determination of the price of oil
price
Pl
— general market price of 
energy = price of liquids 





Pg = price of production of US coal 
PL = price of production of liquids derived from coal 
P0 = average production price of oil 
SP = surplus profit
The existence of surplus profit in the price of oil then suggests that the 
objective conditions for the existence of differential rent are basically fulfilled. 
Oilfield owners might appropriate this surplus profit (as differential rent) 
while capitalists operating in these fields would obtain the prevailing average 
profit.
However, contrary to the agricultural sphere studied by Marx, the oil sphere 
appears as a multi-stage industry (extraction, transportation, refining, 
distribution). Thus the market price of oil can only be grasped at the final 
stage of the industry, for prices that are exhibited at intermediary stages may 
have no relevance to the market at all, i.e. the posted price> for instance. In 
this context the magnitude of the surplus profit would emerge through the cost 
breakdown of a processed barrel of oil.
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Table 1.3: Cost breakdown of a barrel of average oil sold to French consumers 
(1973) $/barrel
$/b %
Production cost* 0.17 1.1
Freight cost* 0.51 3..4
Refining cost* 0.73 4.8
Marketing cost* 1.01 6.7
Exporting states tax 1.07 11.2
French tax 7.67 50.6
Company profit 3-36 22.2
Total: 15.15 100.0
Source: Chevalier, J. M., The New Oil Stakes, Penguin Books, London, 1975, p.11. 
*Costs encompass a fair rate of return on the invested capital.
Thus, in 1973 (before the so-called oil crisis), 84% of the market price of oil 
represented profit which was divided into three parts.
1. ground-rent for the oil exporting states (11.2%)
2. Tax levied by the French authorities (50.6%)
3. Surplus profit share of the oil companies (22.2%)
The fact that this price structure in France is similar to others prevailing in the 
other OECD c o u n t r i e s ^  sugests that taxes are actually an integral part of the oil 
price on a world scale and are not merely due to arbitrary actions of oil 
consuming countries' authorities. In this context the appropriation of most of 
the surplus profit by the oil companies and the consuming countries' tax 
authorities might mainly be due to the particular history on a world scale of the 
oil industry.
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For the case of the oil rent is quite different from the ground-rent of 
nineteenth century England studied by Marx. Ground-rent represented the 
income of a class (the landowners) already in existence when the capitalist 
mode of production extended its base towards agriculture. Feudal landed 
property was transformed into modern landed property.33 but the landlords 
remained conscious of their class’s interest (cf. the House of Lords in Great 
Britain). The case of the oil rent, however, is rather different. The oilfield 
owning classes (represented by their relevant states) of the peripheral social 
formations have not had an existence of their own but are basically the product 
of capital and as such constitute a pure creation of colonial history (hence the 
multitude of sheikhdoms produced by British colonialism in the Middle East). 
Within this context the domination of landed property by capital, not only 
prevented the former from acting as a barrier to the latter but permitted it to 
appropriate most of the surplus profit. In this context the so-called energy 
crisis of 1973 may be interpreted as a change in the balance of power among the 
various actors in the oil scene.
In particular, the 1973 oil crisis may have shown the metamorphosis of the 
oil exporting states from passive tax collectors to active landlords (or capitalists) 
attempting to appropriate most of the surplus profit generated in the oil sphere 
as differential rent (for a survey see Chapter V, Part B). Thus far the objective 
conditions for the existence of differential rent seem to be fulfilled within the 
oil sphere, i n  his study of ground-rent, however, Marx discussed the second 
type of rent, which stems from the power of the landlords to extract a fee on the 
least fertile land.
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The conditions for the existence of absolute rent in the oil sphere are, 
however, completely lacking. At the objective level, the oil industry exhibits a 
relatively high organic composition of capital. This fact implies that the value 
of oil must be lower than its production price. To the extent that absolute rent 
represents the difference between a high value and a lower production price, 
the only absolute rent that could appear within the oil sphere would be a 
negative one.
At the subjective level, on the other hand, the emergence of the Marxian 
absolute rent derives ultimately from the power of the landowning class as a 
class for itself to confront capital over the appropriation of surplus value 
created within the agricultural sphere 34 Assuming the opposite of what has 
been implied above (that is, a low organic composition of capital in the oil 
industry), there is no sound ground for the argument that energy resource 
owners (coalfield, oil, gas, shale owners) on a world scale would identify each 
other, recognise their class interests and impose a fee (absolute rent) on capital 
for the exploitation of the least favourable energy field.
Thus, whereas under peculiar conditions (see Chapter V, Part B) the oil 
exporting states may appropriate surplus profit in the form of differential rent, 
there is no ground for the existence of absolute rent and their appropriation of 
it. Within this frame of reference the oil crisis of 1973, while increasing the 
magnitude of the differential rent appropriated by the oil exporting states, 
poses the basic problem of the consequences on the various national economies 
of a relatively important financial inflow.
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4. On the impact of a resource boom on a domestic economy
While creating a euphoria on the part of the oil exporting states towards 
industrialisation, the 1973 oil crisis triggered a substantial literature on the 
subject of a resource boom and its impact on the domestic economy. This 
literature has been known as “Dutch Disease Economies" and investigates the 
paradoxical statement that resource booms may lead to de-industrialisation.
In its simplest fo r m ^ 5  the Dutch disease economy is divided into three 
sectors: the booming sector (B), the lagging sector (L) and the non-tradeable 
sector (N). While N may be visualised as services, B and L may represent 
mineral resources (oil for instance) and manufactures (or agriculture) 
respectively.
To study the effect of a resource boom on the domestic economy, a set of 
basic assumptions are put forward: (1) prices in B and L are determined on a 
world scale, (2) prices in N are determined by interaction of supply and demand 
within the domestic market. (3) output in each sector results from the 
combination of factors peculiar to that sector (natural resources, capital 
specific in the short run, and immobile labour) and (4) by a factor (labour) 
mobile between the three sectors 36 All factor prices are flexible (to maintain 
full employment) and the economy's factor stock is fixed (which implies 
international immobility of capital and labour).
Under these assumptions a  boom (in B) is brought into the picture. The 
boom may stem from either of the following causes: ( l ) a  once and for all 
exogenous technical progress confined to this country, (2) a windfall discovery
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of new resources, (3) a rise in the price of sector B product which is totally 
exported. The impact of the boom on the domestic economy may then be divided 
into two parts;
(1) The spending effect
Assuming a positive income elasticity of demand for N, the extra spending 
(by either factor owner or the state) brought about by the boom in B must lead 
to an excess demand (at pre-boom prices) for N. To the extent that prices of L 
are determined outside the domestic economy, the price of N relative to the price 
of L must rise (hence creating a real appreciation). This real appreciation 
would then result in a shift of resources out of B and L into N and a shift of 
demand away from N towards B and L as well.
non-tradeablenon-tradeable
Pn being defined as the relative price of N with respect to L. the boom in B 
would shift demand for N from D0 to Dj (hence Pn increases to restore 
equilibrium in N's market) and draw resource from B and L (under the 
assumption of pre-boom full employment). The transfer of resource from L to 
N would then bring about a fall in L's output, hence a de-industrialisation (or
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de-agriculturation if L represents agriculture).
(2) The resource effect
As a result of the boom, the marginal product of labour in B rises so that if 
wages are expressed in terms of L's output, demand for labour from B will rise, 
hence bringing about a transfer of labour out of L and N into B. This movement 
of labour may be decomposed in two parts: (1) the transfer of labour from L to B 
implies a fall in L‘s output, hence reinforcing the de-industrialisation resulting 
from the spending effect; to the extent that this phenomenon does not involve 
N, it may be called "direct de-industrialisation". (2) At a constant real exchange 
rate (defined as the relative price of N to L) a movement of labour out of N into B 
takes place as well, hence shifting the supply curve of N from S0 to S\ (see 
graph above). This shift creates an additional excess demand from N and 
requires an additional increase of Pn (an additional real appreciation). This 
increase in the real exchange rate would then bring about an additional 
transfer of labour from L to N. The transfer of labour from L to N (brought 
about by the spending effect as well as the resource movement effect) can be 
termed "indirect de-industrialisation". Thus in this Dutch disease model, de­
industrialisation (or de-agriculturation) is bound to happen following a 
resource boom. The fate of the non-tradeable sector N remains, however, 
uncertain. For whereas the spending effect tends to increase N's output, the 
resource movement effect tends to push it in the opposite direction (see graph 
above).
While this “core model" captures the basic features of the Dutch disease 
literature, an additional set of assumptions might increase its complexity but
would avoid its deterministic view about the fate of the lagging sector L. In 
particular the factors immobility assumption can only relate to a short run 
analysis. Its relaxation, however, may uncover different paths for the various 
sectors of the domestic economy.
(1) Resource boom and mobility of capital between L and n3?
Under this assumption, while labour is mobile as in the core model, sectors L 
and N draw from a common stock of mobile capital. Assuming that L and N 
operate under different capital intensities, they could make up a miniature 
Heckscher-Ohlin e c o n o m y ,38 facing a variable supply of labour.
As in the core model, the impact of a boom can be divided into two parts: (1) 
at the initial wage rate, the resource movement effect emerges as an increase of 
Bs demand for labour, hence reducing the amount available to the miniature 
H-0 economy. According to Ryberxyinski's theorem,39 however, and under 
constant real exchange rate, the output of the capital intensive industry will 
expand. Thus if L is more capital intensive, then the resource movement effect 
will provoke pro-industrialisation; (2) through the mechanism of real 
appreciation, the spending effect would, however, tend to offset the resource 
movement effect by moving both capital and labour from L into N. The final 
outcome would therefore depend on the strength of the two effects. The 
assumption of capital mobility between L and N does nevertheless remove the 
inevitability of de-industrialisation.
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(2) Decomposition of the lagging sector and capital mobility between
cpmpofleflteiif tkkaector40
While retaining all the core model assumptions, this case decomposes the 
lagging sector L into two industries of different capital intensities. Under the 
assumption that capital and labour are mobile between these two industries, the 
lagging sector may be visualised as a miniature Heckscher-Ohlin economy. 
Under the impact of a boom, labour would move out of L as a whole. Thus L's 
output must decline. To the extent that the stock of capital is fixed, the 
reduction of the amount of labour in this miniature H-0 economy would result 
(according to Ryberzyinski's theorem) in a contraction of the labour intensive 
industry but an expansion of the capital intensive industry.
(3) International mobility of capital^
Finally, the assumption of international immobility of capital may be 
relaxed in order to take into account a characteristic aspect of "developing 
economies". In this context the three sectors (B, L and N) employ specific 
capitals which are, however, internationally mobile.
Assuming at first the validity of the core model, the impact of a resource 
boom on returns in the various sectors may be stated as follows: (1) returns in L 
must fail because of the sector's contraction, (2) returns in B ought to rise 
(especially when they are measured in terms of L's output), (3) returns in N 
could either rise or fall, depending on whether N's output rises or falls. On the 
assumption that, before international mobility of capital, rents in L fall while 
they rise in B and N, international mobility of capital would result in an outflow 
of capital from L and an inflow of capital into B and N.
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Thus, under the assumption of international mobility of capital, the 
contraction of L would be greater (hence de-industrialisation is emphasised). 
However, the decline in profitability in L would be less pronounced because of 
the capital outflow. On the other hand, capital mobility would tend to facilitate 
N's expansion, thus raising N's output and limiting the magnitude of the real 
appreciation required to restore equilibrium.
Thus far the core model and its variants do basically point to a likely decline 
in the tradeable sector (L) following a resource boom. To that extent the Dutch 
disease approach poses an obvious challenge to the oil exporting states in terms 
of their claimed goal of achieving a diversified economy. Hence, according to 
Dutch disease literature, the phrase "oil and development" ought to be replaced 
(after 1973) by the phrase "oil and (likely) decline".
The Dutch disease discourse, however, remains open to debate in so far as it 
is presented in terms of an "aseptic" three sector model. In this model, neither 
the class nature of the state (its social project in particular) nor the history of 
the social formations concerned appears as relevant to the comprehension of 
the studied realities. Under these circumstances, the relevance of the Dutch 
disease literature may be questioned at two different levels: (1) the validity of 
the basic assumption and (2) its capacity to grasp empirical phenomena and to 
serve as a guide for the transformation of the realities concerned.
One of the basic assumptions advanced by the Dutch disease discourse relates 
to the distinction between a traded good and a non-traded good sector. In so far 
as the analysis is set within a controlled economy (rather than an open 
economy) the dichotomy proposed above becomes questionable. In particular
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the use of tariffs and import quotas by some oil exporting countries (Algeria in 
particular) may actually result in the empirical non-existence of a traded good 
sector. Within this context the resource boom would produce a spending effect 
(with a negligible resource movement effect over the rest of the economy) 
which would behave like the non-tradeable sector of the core model. Thus 
instead of witnessing a decline in the manufacturing sector, the controlled 
economy may exhibit growth in that particular sector as well as in the other 
sector of the economy. In actual fact, an empirical study undertaken by Gelb^ 
for the period 1972-81 showed a negative "Dutch disease index" for three oil 
exporting countries (of which Algeria was one) out of the seven studies.
A second aspect of this discourse concerns the assumption of full 
employment which is crucial to the resource movement effect. If this 
assumption is relaxed (which would put the core model closer to the reality of 
some oil exporting economies) then the resource movement effect may be 
attenuated. In particular the increase in demand for labour from B and N may 
draw from the "unemployed set" thus leaving labour in L at its previous level. 
Furthermore, because of the existence of the unemployed set, the increase in N's 
price (due to the spending effect) ought to be short-lived in so far as N's output 
would increase to the point where real exchange appreciation is completely 
eliminated. Under these circumstances, neither the resource movement effect 
nor the spending effect need follow a resource boom. In actual fact the same 
argument would apply to oil exporting economies (in the Middle East in 
particular) which rely on a foreign labour force to operate in various sectors of 
the economy.
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Thus while the core model and its variants suggest a likely decline of the 
tradeable sector following a resource boom, different (but plausible) 
assumptions point to a different outcome. In actual fact empirical studies 
which attempted to test the validity of Dutch disease economies remain rather 
inconclusive. Apart from Gelb's study which could not find the clear symptoms 
of the Dutch disease for all cases studied, an analysis of other oil exporting 
countries by R o em er^ 3  ended up with the same "abnormal" pattern. Hence of 
six oil exporting countries studied by this author for the period 1970-1981, four 
(Kuwait, Nigeria, Indonesia and Mexico) experienced a growth in 
manufacturing equal or superior to that of the non-tradeable sector. 
Furthermore, for economies which may be closer to the frame of reference of 
the Dutch disease discourse (namely the Netherlands, Great Britain and 
Australia), the impact of a resource boom can hardly be separated from other no 
less important variables i.e. pre-boom structural features of the economy, 
government economic policy in particular.**
In this context, the decline of the British manufacturing sector may have 
stemmed either from the exploitation of North Sea oil or from a deliberate 
government policy to spread "popular capitalism" by favouring the expansion 
of the service sector and reducing the power base of the unions. Thus, 
although Great Britain seems to exhibit Dutch disease symptoms, there is no 
ground for assuming that these symptoms are directly linked to the exploitation 
of North Sea oil.
Finally, rather than being confined to particular economies or historical 
moments, Dutch disease symptoms seem to emerge throughout history. Besides 
the classical example of sixteenth century Spain, Roemer*> quotes the example
45
of 1920sFrance (receiving German reparations), Bangladesh, Turkey and Egypt 
(subject to income remittances from their expatriates) and even the USA after 
1982 (as a recipient of capital flowing from abroad).
To the extent that the Dutch disease may emerge because of variables other 
than resource booms and in so far as a resource boom does not mechanically 
produce the disease, the pertinence of the Dutch disease discourse remains 
questionable. For rather than attempting to theorise evolving realities, the 
Dutch disease discourse tries to squeeze these contradictory realities into neutral 
models where even the state as the "general manager" of the dominant social 
groups is completely absent. Under these circumstances, theoretical 
development and empirical analysis remain almost completely disconnected. 
Hence while the "core model" and its variants investigate the evolution of 
sectors in an abstract setting, empirical analysis emphasises the importance of 
government policy as a basic element in approaching the outcome of a resource 
boom.
In so far as Dutch disease symptoms can be exhibited by a peculiar economy 
experiencing a resource boom, the proper field of investigation becomes the 
impact of the boom on this concrete social formation rather than on the 
"aseptic" economy of the Dutch disease discourse. The focus on the social 
formation class structure and the social project advanced by the dominant social 
groups would then relegate the effect of a resource boom to a mere variable that 
may facilitate or hamper the implementation of the given social project.
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It is within this frame of reference that the phrase "oil and development" 
takes on any meaning. For contrary to the message propagated by the ideology 
of universal harmonies (of which the Dutch disease discourse is an integral 
part) there can be no development in the absolute but only development of 
social projects supporting and supported by relevant social classes or groups. 
Hence rather than speculating about the effect of a resource boom on an a- 
historical reality, the appropriate approach must start with a thorough study of 
the social formation concerned. And to the extent that the Algerian growth 
strategy develops a social project, an analysis of the impact of oil and gas 
exploitation as well as the 1970s resource boom can be apprehended only in so 
far as they are integrated within the social project which the Algerian state has 
been attempting to implement.
5. Theoretical aspects of the Algerian social project
The rejection of the colonial economy as a first step in the newly 
independent Algerian government's understanding of under-development 
required the calling into question of Algeria's close association with the French 
economy. In particular, Algeria's traditional position as an extension of the 
French economy could no longer be accepted by Algeria's nationalist rulers.
In the Algerian context, the growth path that emerged as the path required 
a reformulation of the Algerian economy's position vis-A-vis the French 
economy in particular and the world economy in general. Industrialisation of 
the economy would then constitute the first slogan advanced by Algerian 
policy-makers. On the other hand, the introversion of the economy as a 
strategy, aimed at destructuring-restructuring the colonial economy, 
represented the strategy which would (according to Algerian policy makers)
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change Algeria's position in the international division of labour.
51 On the introversion of an extroverted economy
The introversion of the economy as a strategy for tackling 
underdevelopment could be related to Samir Amin's theorising^ of the world 
capitalist system.
Amin divides the world capitalist system into a centre and a periphery, the 
former being the dominant side and the latter the dominated side of the unity. 
Within this framework, underdevelopment is no longer interpreted as a 
backward stage but is understood as a consequence of the capitalist system's 
expansion (from the centre) towards social formations which were still pre­
capitalist. Hence, according to Amin, the spread of the capitalist system created 
a periphery, the industrialisation and the development of which would only be 
possible through a gradual breaking with the capitalist world market or, in 
other words, with the capitalist international division of labour.
In this respect Amin develops two opposed accumulation models by arguing 
that "whereas in the autocentred accumulation model, external relations are 
subjected to the logic and imperatives of internal accumulation, in the 
extroverted model, on the contrary, external relations determine almost totally 
the rhythm and characteristics of internal accumulation."*7 Through a four 
sectors scheme, Amin, then, develops the two opposed models.
(1) The extroverted model is based on the growth and articulation of two sectors: 
an export sector and a luxury goods sector. The articulation of these sectors 
then realises and is supported by a class alliance between a compradore
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bourgeoisie (particularly involved in the export sector) and an agrarian 
bourgeoisie (producing crops destined for external markets).4** Within this 
framework, capital accumulation (investment decisions, production levels, etc.) 
is determined and dependent on the conditions of the world market, and the 
ruling classes' interests are fulfilled through their obedience to the capitalist 
international division of labour or, in other words, towards transnational firms' 
policies.
(2) On the contrary, the introverted model relies on the development and 
articulation of two other sectors: a sector producing means of production and a 
sector producing mass consumption g o o d s.4 ^ Within this model the 
accumulation process does not obey any longer the capitalist international 
division of labour. On the contrary, classical criteria of capitalist rationality 
(e.g. competitiveness, profit maximisation) are to be disregarded in favour of a 
voluntaristic approach to investment decisions. Hence the accumulation 
process, or in other words the rate of investment, is basically determined by the 
internal (social and economic) conditions of the domestic economy.
Under these circumstances, development through export-led growth or 
import substitution industrialisation are ruled out on the grounds that:
(1) the first policy (export-led growth) is based on sectors that were (in most
cases) created for the benefit of "central economies" capitalist classes. To that
extent production of raw material and consumption goods by the use of a cheap 
labour force have resulted in an increase in the overall profit rate and a
transfer of value through "unequal exchange".50 On the other hand, because 
of their external outlets, export sectors have no motivating effects (forward
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linkages) on the rest of the economy.51 Their development has, however, 
strengthened the power of the ruling compradore bourgeoisie and apparently 
marginalised large masses whose potential demand could not be met because of 
lack of in c o m e .52 Capital accumulation in this model is not actually related to 
internal conditions of the national economy (the articulation beween Marx's 
departments one and two) but depends on capital accumulation taking place in 
central economies.
(2) The second alternative (i.s.i.) has historically been a response to the "dead 
end" of the first one and actually aimed at satisfying the effective d em a n d 5 3  of 
the ruling social groups whose interests are guaranteed by a greater insertion 
into the capitalist world market. In this context, the process of resource 
allocation would be distorted in favour of luxury goods branches and would 
accentuate, as in the previous policy, the marginalisation of the large masses 
through impoverishment and proletarianisation.
Thus, according to Amin's approach, export-led growth and import 
substitution industrialisation constitute obsolete policies in terms of overcoming 
the problem of underdevelopment to the extent that they do not go beyond the 
capitalist international division of labour. The aim of the latter being the 
perpetuation of the centre's domination, the two policies mentioned above can 
only deepen (although with different features) the insertion of the peripheral 
economies into the capitalist world market, thereby increasing their 
dependency towards decision centres which are out of their reach. Within the 
autocentred model, however, the focus on the development of the forces of 
production, while avoiding the question of the class nature of the state, could 
then suit and justify the taking over of power by a nationalist movement, the
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survival of which depends on its continuing the anti-colonial struggle.
Despite its recognition of external contradictions (between peripheral 
economies and the logic of the world capitalist market) Amin's approach does 
not fully apprehend the fundamental question of the class nature of the state. 
Of particular importance, the class structure of the social formation concerned 
and the nature of the dominant racial groups are not explicitly taken into 
account. Within this context Amin's frame of reference leaves room for any 
social group to claim its willingness to implement an autocentred economy. The 
extent to which the Algerian dominant social groups intend to build an 
autocentred economy and perhaps avoid the Dutch disease symptoms remains to 
be tested at two levels: (1) the practicality of their strategy as an actual 
opportunity to circumvent the Dutch disease, and (2) the ability of the dominant 
social groups to lead the claimed growth strategy to its logical outcome.
5.2 Growth through implementation of industrialising industries
The alternative facing a nationalist movement whose leaders tend to 
continue the struggle against colonialism by a struggle against the capitalist 
international division of labour would, then, exhibit a particular emphasis on 
the building of an "independent and national economy".
The building of the latter would require; according to the official view, the 
implementation of a heavy industry, the basic goal of which would be to provide 
the rest of the economy (agriculture in particular) with necessary tools, 
fertilisers, machines, etc. in order to avoid dependency vis-A-vis the world 
market. The choice of a heavy industry actually constituted a "voluntaristic" 
decision to the extent that on purely economic criteria the short and medium
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term profitability of the projects concerned remains highly questionable, 
especially when excess capacities in various heavy industries (petrochemistry 
and steel in particular) on a world scale is taken into account. However, as 
argued by Algerian officials,54 despite its loss making, the mere existence of a 
domestic heavy industry would produce linkage effects which would make it 
profitable in the long term.
Hence, although opposed to the conventional view advanced by the 
comparative advantage th e o r y 5 5  (in its Ricardian or neo-classical form) the 
Algerian policy makers' choice, nevertheless, relies on a certain understanding 
of underdevelopment and the theorising of Professor De Bernis who has been 
theoretically (he is considered as the father of the Algerian growth strategy by 
many French and Algerian scholars) and practically (he participated in the 
studies which started the Algerian planning process in 1967) involved in the 
implementation of the Algerian growth strategy.
De Bernis' theorising has its foundations^ on Perroux' description of 
underdevelopment. The latter argues that underdevelopment "is a historically , 
dated phenomenon, that is to say, it is the product of a history and not a normal 
and natural stage of history, a phenomenon that developed countries have not 
known. Underdevelopment is not a conjunctual phenomenon or a backward 
stage but a structural phenomenon, a growth blockage."57
Underdevelopment then, being reduced to a structural phenomenon, 
appears as a result of the capitalist system's expansion: domination of pre­
capitalist social formations (Amin's thesis) on the one hand and is concretised 
by the disarticulation of the peripheral economies; extroverted sectors, the
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growth of which depends on external conditions, on the other hand. To 
overcome this situation and to restart growth, Perroux develops the theory of 
the propulsive firm (firme mo trice) within a growth pole. This particular 
firm is defined as a production unit which "is relatively large, generates 
significant growth impulses to its environment, has a high ability to innovate 
and finally belongs to a growing sector."58
Considering Perroux' growth pole theory, De Bernis expands it to the 
economy as a whole and develops the theory of industrialising industries^9 
through a basic framework: industry hierarchy within the inter-sectoral 
matrix, the filling in of which would lead to the domestic economy's integration. 
This understanding of underdevelopment leads De Bernis to argue that to 
industrialise, an underdeveloped economy ought to start implementing capital 
goods rather than consumption goods industries because, according to him, 
industries which produce means of production are those which possess the 
greater motivating (linkage) effect {effetd'entrainement ).69
Thus, contrary to Hirsh m an 61 and in accordance with F e ld m a n ^  and 
M a h a la n o b is ,6 3  De Bernis seems to favour forward linkages to backward ones. 
Following De Bernis, capital goods industries must be developed in priority in 
order to avoid the "dead end" resulting from export-led growth or import 
substitution industrialisation policies. Having noticed the existence of a 
hierarchy among industrial sectors,1^  (and making an apparently original 
contribution), De Bernis defines then the motivating industries for the 
peripheral economy as;65
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1. a global sector producing means of production (industrial equipment, 
machine tools, engines, etc.)
2. the chemical industry’s main branches (e.g. sulphur, electro-chemistry, 
fertilisers)
3. the energy sector, the output of which is required for the functioning of 
the whole economy
These industrialising industries are then defined as those "the basic 
economic function of which is to motivate in their historically specified and 
localised environment a systematic filling-in or a structural modification of the 
inter-industrial matrix and transformations of production functions."^ The 
choice of heavy industries is then taken on the ground that (1) their motivating 
effects are greater and should emerge faster than the other industries' effects;
(2) their tendency to fill in the inter-industrial matrix is stronger and realises 
the basic condition of development, namely, integration.
Contrary to other industries (consumer goods industries), industrialising 
industries are, thus, according to De Bernis, capable of restructuring an 
extroverted economy through the creation of firm relations with agriculture by 
modernising it and increasing the living standards of the population on the one 
hand, and producing means of production for light industries on the other.
If industrialising industries seem to have such a strong effect on a 
peripheral economy, they do, however, require the availability of financial 
assets in order to start the industrialisation process, because (1) they are highly 
capital intensive and therefore require from the very beginning imports of
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means of production; (2) being large scale industries, they need a wide domestic 
market, otherwise they could not operate efficiently. The consequences of the 
first requirement are that the industrialising industries cannot emerge 
through a market oriented policy (if profit is the main objective) but only 
within a controlled economy. For the necessary relations among various 
sectors are to be created outside classical management criteria. Private capital 
(if there is any) has, in this context, no incentives for undertaking the task of 
implementing such a strategy.
Secondly, the conditions of a wide market implicitly require a restructuring 
of the economy and especially of the agricultural sector in order to liberate the 
potential demand of the large masses on the one hand, and to increase 
agricultural output on the other. The two conditions (some sort of planning and 
the creation of the market) impose, then, the building of a leading public sector 
and the emergence of the state apparatus as the main entrepreneur on the one 
hand, and the existence of important (potential) financial resources in order to 
meet the heavy investment required, on the other hand.
At first sight the Algerian social project, theoretically supported by Amin's 
and De Bernis’ theorisings, appears as needing a resource boom (to obtain the 
required funding) in order to achieve its claimed goal of building an 
"independent and national economy". Hence, contrary to the message advanced 
by Dutch disease economics (a likely decline of the tradeable goods sector) in 
the Algerian context (and because of the social project presented by the 
dominant social groups), it is the resource boom which constitutes an objective 
(and to some extent necessary) factor for the implementation of a diversified 
economy (of which the manufacturing sector constitutes an element).
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To the extent that the resource boom, in the Algerian case, materialises the 
appropriation of a larger share of the oil rent by the Algerian state, the oil rent 
(its appropriation and its use) becomes the central concept upon which the 
actual evolution of the Algerian growth strategy, on the one hand, and of the 
"original" class structure of this social formation on the otherhand, may be 
understood. The appropriation of the oil rent nevertheless encompasses a 
contradiction, for the logic of the rent may oppose the logic of production: the 
rent produces the ideology of the rentier who can only survive if the rent 
remains an essential social relation.
In so far as the appropriation of the oil rent is understood as a transfer of 
value created outside the Algerian economy, the completion of the social project 
advanced by the Algerian state may then emerge without help from the 
domestic productive sphere. Hence, although the official ideology emphasises 
the discourse of production and attempts to mobilise the nation (presented as a 
non-contradictory unity) for the battle against underdevelopment, the rent 
develops an opposite discourse which calls for a distribution of this "gift of 
nature" for the sake of internal peace.
To that extent, symptoms of the Dutch disease may emerge, for the mastering 
of efficient and growing productive sectors is not a requirement for the 
dominant social groups staying in power. Hence the practicality of the 
Algerian growth strategy depends ultimately on the use to which the oil rent is 
subjected. Inasmuch as its use is controlled by a state which performs the task 
of the general manager of the dominant social groups, a detour into the 
historical process which produced this state may constitute the appropriate first 
step towards understanding the evolving Algerian scene.
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CHAPTER II 
COLONIAL BACKGROUND, OIL RENT AND THE ALGERIAN 
GROWTH STRATEGY
The growth strategy chosen and implemented by the Algerian state can best 
be understood as a consequence of three peculiarities:
1. The official rejections of the basis of the colonial economy (experienced 
for more than a century) which polarised the Algerian society into a 
wealthy population of French origin and an impoverished indigenous 
population.
2. The "Frontist" framework (a unity of the indigenous population against 
the French colonists) which required the negation of an internal class 
struggle for a cohesive national purpose.
3. The existence of a strategic resource (hydrocarbon) which could be used 
to finance a growth strategy without putting the burden of growth on 
any particular class.
The building of an "independent and national economy" then assumed 
implicitly the drive towards industrialisation as the main factor in breaking 
with the colonial structure of the Algerian economy. This latter had 
nevertheless been in a process of transformation before independence (1962) 
when hydrocarbon reserves were discovered in the Sahara (1954).
The colonial background that Algerian policy-makers aimed at destroying 
had in fact been already called into question by the French state through the 
implementations of the Plan de Constantine (section 1-4 below). This plan
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constituted a turning point in capital accumulation within the Algerian scene to 
the extent that it attempted to restart a growth process that colonial capital 
would not undertake and aimed at a growth process which would not disturb the 
colonists' interests (by relying on external sources to finance industrialisation).
The main objectives of the Plan de Constantine would however reappear 
(covered with the appropriate terminology) within the Algerian state's adopted 
growth strategy. This strategy (while developing a nationalist rhetoric) 
claimed 1 to implement a growth process that was lacking during the colonial 
period and develop the level of productive forces by relying on the oil rent for 
the financing of the industrialisation process.
The similarity between the French state policy towards the Algerian 
economy and the growth strategy advanced by the Algerian state suggests that, 
far from being contradictory, both approaches covered the same historical 
moment in the process of capitalist development within the Algerian social 
formation: both approaches constituted an attempt to achieve "primitive
accumulation" (destruction of pre-capitalist forms of production as a condition 
for the expansion of the capitalist mode of production) which started with the 
French invasion of 1830.
1. The implantation of the colonial economy
The implantation of the colonial economy (as a realisation of primitive 
accumulation) took shape through the collapse of the Turkish state apparatus 
(and its replacement by the French state) and the gradual destruction of pre­
capitalist forms of production and their replacement by capitalist social 
relations. The easy collapse 2 of the Turkish state was a result of particular
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features displayed by the prevailing relationship between that alien state and 
the different communities (tribes) composing the Algerian society.
The Turkish state was not involved in the production process that was taking 
place within the tribes' land. Its only role consisted of receiving its annual 
tribute from the different tribes that were not under its direct control. 3 In fact 
the dey * (governor) and his three provincial bey (regional authorities) 
relied upon some privileged tribes to impose and extract taxes from the rest of 
the communities.
The tribes mostly semi-nomadic, on the other hand, owned collectively the 
land they were living on. Within this particular structure, land was neither 
bought nor sold, for alienation of the land would destroy the tribes' unity and 
stop the reproduction of the system.
The weakness of the relationship between the state and its agents on the one 
hand and the other tribes on the other can be thought of as the main cause of 
the easy collapse of the Turkish state when faced with the French invasion of 
Algeria (1830) and of the difficulty (for the French) to penetrate and destroy 
the pre-capitalist forms of production that supported the tribes' economy.
From the tribes* viewpoint, the existence or non-existence of the Turkish 
state did not in any way influence the "routine" of the labour process. The 
submission of the Turkish state and afterwards its destruction as a political 
power were thus irrelevant to the continuation of the labour process on the 
tribes' land. While the Turkish political apparatus collapsed as soon as the
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French army arrived in Algeria, it took a much longer time for the French to 
destroy (although only partially) the pre-capitalist structures of the tribes.
1.1 The destruction of pre-capitalist forms of production
The destruction of the pre-capitalist forms of production can be studied 
through an analysis of the 1830-1880 period. The latter may, in this instance, be 
grasped as the period of primitive accumulation (as the dominant social process) 
whereby pre-capitalist social relations are destroyed in order to create the two 
poles of the capitalist production process: private ownership of the means of 
production and the existence of "free" workers.
a. The means of destruction
The laws applied to Algeria were mostly derived from the French legislation 
and had as a main target the destruction of collective ownership of the land and 
the emergence of private ownership, the latter being the core upon which 
capitalist social relations can exist and under specific conditions be reproduced.
The collapse of the Turkish state apparatus put into the hands of the French 
authorities ail that the former had as prerogatives. In particular the land 
formerly owned by the Turkish state was to be given (rarely sold) to the French 
colonists who benefited then from 653,000 hectares. 6 Secondly the form of the 
tribute was transformed into money-rent after 1846. 7 This decision opened the 
way to a market oriented economy (the peasants had to sell part of their output 
in order to pay taxes) which was to have strong effects on the pre-capitalist 
structures: in particular cash crops would replace food production. Thirdly the 
babous land (owned by religious authorities) was simply seized (7 December 
1830) and given or sold to the colonists. Then on 22nd April 1863, the Senatus
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consulte declared the Algerian tribes, the owners of the territories they 
occupied. But beyond this form of collective ownership it was decided to 
delineate the tribes' territories and set up individual ownership of the land. 9 
This process was developed through the Warrier law (26 July 1873) which 
"permitted settlers to confiscate indigenous farm properties when 
the fallahin (peasants) could not show good title to them" ^
Finally the French authorities confiscated the land of any tribe that fought 
them. Thus from 1871 to 1910, more than half of the real estate occupied by 
colonisation came from sequestrated land that covered a million hectares.^ The 
shrinkage of the indigenous sector and the expansion of the colonist one, then, 
fulfilled the two main conditions of capitalist reproduction.
By 1895 the indigenous sector lost more than 5 million hectares whereas its 
population kept on increasing (see Appendix II.1). The shrinkage of the 
indigenous land then resulted in an overpopulated sector that had to "liberate" 
part of its members in order to survive (the level of productive forces 
remaining stagnant). On the other side, the expansion of the colonist sector 
constituted the basis upon which capitalist production could take place by 
hiring indigenous workers.
b. The consequences
The expansion of the colonist sector thus destroyed the tribes' economy as a 
unity and led to the deterioration of the living conditions of the indigenous 
population. For with the same level of productive forces the indigenous sector 
lost more than 5 million hectares. And in addition decades of colonial war 
ruined most of the indigenous economy through payment of war damages.
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sequestration of land etc.
In this context the 1871 insurrection resulted in: ^
- A loss of 444,406 ha. that were appropriated by the French authorities.
- The payment (by the indigenous tribes) to the French authorities of
64,739,075 gold francs as war damages. The latter figure actually 
represented 70% of the indigenous capital (land and livestock 
essentially).
3. Finally the extreme impoverishment of the indigenous population can be 
visualised through an analysis of the land concentration in the hands of a 
minority and in the emergence of a small peasantry who, deprived of the tribes* 
backing, can only survive as an appendix to the so-called modern sector.
The small peasantry, *3 then, constituted the majority of the Algerian 
peasantry.
Table II-1: Land ownership (1930)
Size Number of holdings % Area %
Indicenous less than 10 ha. 434,500 70 1,738,000 23
10-50 ha. 140,000 23 2,635,000 35
more than 50 ha. 42,935 7 3,188,000 42
Colonists less than 10 ha. 8,877 34 42,500 2
10-50 ha. 7,140 28 21,600 9
more than 50 ha. 10,136 38 2,085,300 89
Source: Statistiques agricole et statistique g6n6rale, quoted from Henni, A. 
(1982) La Colonisation Agraire et le Sous-D&veloppement en Alg&rie, 
SNED, Alger, p.52.
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The division of agriculture into a modern (colonists) and a traditional 
(indigenous) sector does not however confront the articulation of these sectors 
as a requirement for colonial expansion:
- The indigenous sector constituted the material basis upon which the 
modern sector expanded. This process meant that the so-called 
traditional (indigenous) sector emerged with the expansion of the 
modern one.
- The price of the indigenous labour force in the modern sector was 
determined by the living conditions of the traditional sector and was 
held at a relatively low level because of the existence of a "reserve army: 
the wage rate facing the indigenous labour force was on average less 
than half the wage rate of the European labour force working in Algeria 
(1.15F/day for 316F/day in 1914).
- The colonisation's expenditure was in great part financed by the 
indigenous population through war contributions and fines: 70% of the 
colonisation spending over the period 1830-1900 came from ransoms and 
fines paid by the indigenous population.^
- Finally the tax system was obviously biased in favour of the colonist's 
sector.
Indeed the indigenous sector was heavily taxed but did not actually benefit 
from public spending: out of a budget of 356 million francs (1901-1905) the 
indigenous population received 12.04 million (3.38%) whereas its contribution 
through taxes amounted to 217 million (60.9%of total receipts).^
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Thus, far from evolving apart, the traditional sector and the modern one 
were articulated in order to fulfil the requirement of capitalist expansion 
represented by the colonists' sector.
In the Algerian context the so-called traditional sector and its peculiar 
features (in particular small plots of land owned by subsistence farmers) did not 
exist before colonisation but emerged along with the expansion of the colonist 
(modern) sector and represented a necessity for its development. Development 
(of the colonist sector) and decline (of the indigenous sector) were thus the 
opposite sides of the same unity and constituted a particular moment in the 
development of the capitalist mode of production within the Algerian scene.
1.2 The development of agrarian capitalism
The emergence of the modern sector was thus the result of French 
government long term policy insofar as, contrary to its neighbours (Tunisia 
and Morocco), Algeria was from the beginning of colonisation considered as 
part of France. In this respect Algeria was to be a settlement colony in order to 
lessen the internal contradictions of the French society which:
- got rid of its unemployed ^  (between 1848 and 1850, 20,500 unemployed 
individuals were sent to Algeria) to avoid social unrest.
- sent its decadent aristocracy far from Paris (princes and counts received 
thousands of hectares to recreate their domains) ^
- used Algeria as a source of cheap agricultural products and later raw 
materials.
The cheap products would be the result of low cost of production:
- the colonists were offered the land but did not pay any rent
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- the wage rate was lower than the subsistence level since part of the 
reproduction of the Algerian labour-force was borne by the traditional 
sector.
Due to its position as a colony, the Algerian economy would therefore no 
longer develop as an integrated structure but could only be understood as an 
appendix to the French economy. In this context the first decades of French 
colonisation created the conditions for the reproduction of agrarian capitalism 
(private ownership of the land and existence of "free" workers).
Besides the conditions mentioned above, the market widening due to the 
custom union between France and Algeria (16 January 1851) and the increase in 
the expected rate of investment due to a potentially growing demand have 
resulted in the spread of financial 19 institutions that opened the Algerian 
market to metropolitan interests. In fact the spread of these financial 
institutions was to be related to capital accumulation, the realisation of which 
was mainly through vineyard expansion and cereal cultivation.
a. The vineyard expansion
The destruction of the French vineyards by phylloxera (1875) gave the 
colonists an opportunity to develop vineyards in Algeria. Thus whereas 
vineyards covered only 24,000 ha. in 1880 they reached 399,000 ha. in 1939. 20 
Since the amount of wine produced in the metropolis was reduced to less than 30 
million hectrolitres, whereas consumption amounted to about 60 million 
hi/year, 21 Metropolitan France engaged in imports of wine from abroad.
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Imports from Italy and Spain had however been gradually squeezed in 
favour of Algerian wine which represented 70.8% of total French wine imports 
by 1905 (as opposed to 0.2% in 1880).22 Q n  the other hand, by 1900 wine became 
the most important item in the Algerian export structure (50% of total import on 
average). 23 Furthermore, exports of wine to France constituted the main outlet 
of the colonist output.
Table II-2: Output and export of Algerian wine (100 hi.)
Year Output Export % ofExport
1919 6,230 4,352 70
1925 10,141 7,396 73
1927 8,402 7,129 85
1930 12,821 10,939 85
1936-40* 16,070 12,235 76
1941-45* 9,654 3,117 32
1946-50* 11,751 9,436 80
1951-55* 15,608 12,908 83
1956-60* 15,200 12,800 84
Source: Benachenhou, A. (1978) Formation du Sous-Developpement
Algdrie, pp.l99and247 
* annual average.
The colonists' vineyards seem then to have been viable only inasmuch as 
output could be exported to the French market. The flow of wine from Algeria to 
France had however been regulated not by the market but by structural factors 
which stemmed from the colonial features of the Algerian social formation:
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7 The French colonists faced no costs in terms of ground-rent insofar as 
most of their land was simply seized from the indigenous population.
- Secondly, to the extent that the destruction of the indigenous economy 
resulted in the emergence of a reserve army, the colonists faced an 
unlimited supply of labour, hence a lower wage rate than their 
counterpart in Metropolitan France.
- Thirdly, winegrowers (as all colonists in Algeria) had not been subjected 
to taxation until 1918. After the 1918 tax reform, however, they faced 
taxes, but of a lower magnitude than their counterpart in Metropolitan 
France.
Table II.3: Rate of taxation in Algeria and in France (after 1918)
Algeria France
built property 5% 12%
non-built property 5% 12%
agricultural profit 3.5% 7.2%
Source: Violette, M., quoted in Benachenhou, op, ciL, p.153.
- Finally to avoid competition from Spanish and Italian wines, a tariff 
protection was set up against these wines and which were gradually 
driven sout of the Metropolitan market.^
Taking advantage of their privileged position vis-a-vis their counterpart in 
France and despite the regeneration of Metropolitan vineyards (which was 
completed by 1900) the colonists’ wine production became the central feature of 
the Algerian economy and represented 46.3% of total colonists' output by
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1934.25 The expansion of the colonists' vineyard seemed then to have entirely 
depended on the French market and particularly on the French government's 
willingness to accord a special status to its colony.
b. Cereal cultivation
Traditionally, hard wheat and barley were the most common cereals 
produced by the indigenous population. Most of the output however was 
destined to the peasants' self-consumption. The surplus (if any) was either 
stocked (as a security for the future) or exchanged to obtain tools or some other 
agricultural products.
The colonists would not however be satisfied by a production pattern which 
was not geared towards the market. Cereal cultivation was then developed by 
the colonists but was actually aimed at satisfying the Metropolitcan market (as 
also occurred for wine). Thus began an export of cereals from Algeria to 
France.
Table II.4: Export of Algerian cereals (1855-1947)
Year Quantity (quintal) Value (Million Francs) % of cereal in Total export
1855 1.515.000 22 30
1900 2,161.000 37 15
1915 2,083.000 54 10
1930 4,060,000 540 12
1947 81,000 103 0.25
Source: Henni, A., op. tit., p.181.
\
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The dynamism of the export sector, although rewarding for the colonists, 
was nevertheless based on a tariff protection that avoided competition with 
cereals coming from Canada and Australia (the latter were taxed up to 100% of 
their price)2& Despite these favourable conditions and the important 
mechanisation process that took place, cereal cultivation by the colonists 
stagnated both in terms of area (796965 ha. in 1909-1913; 803383 ha. in 1923-28) 
and in terms of output (7.8 million quintals in 2909-1913; 7 million in 1927- 
1928).27
The stagnation of cereal production concerned not only the colonists’ sector 
by the indigenous sector as well. Thus while indigenous cereal output amounted 
to 21 million quintals in 1909-1915 it reached only 19 million quintals in 1927- 
18.28
In this context the stagnation of cereal output coupled with an important 
population growth would result in an internal cereal deficit (on the assumption 
that one person needs one kg/day).






Source: Henni, A., op. tit.. p .182.
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The deficit in cereal production was not unique but represented a pattern 
for all indigenous food demand:
- Sheep population decreased from 9,500,000 in 1875 to 5,412,000 in 1954.29
- Olive oil output fell from 341 million hectolitres in 1911-15 to 227 
millions in 1955-59. 30
- Date output was cut by one third: 1.6 million quintals in 1926-1930 to 
960,000 quintals in 1955-59. 30
The reduction in output of commodities directly linked to the indigenous 
consumption pattern actually points to a process of land concentration which 
served as a basis for commercial agriculture oriented towards the Metropolitan 
market (internal demand was marginal due to a lack of income) and to 
proletarianisation of large segments of the indigenous population (see section 
1-5).
It also suggests that agricultural output was heavily dependent on external 
outlets. In fact whereas the cereal deficit was increasing throughout the years, 
by 1930. the General Government of Algeria introduced measures to limit cereal 
production in order to keep prices up. Cereal exports to France then dropped 
from 30% of total export in 1855 to 0.25% in 1947. Paradoxically, the colonists' 
output was not reorientated towards the internal market but was sold to 
governmental institutions that stocked it to avoid a fall in the rate of profit of 
the colonists. In this context the decree of 15th August 1936 made it mandatory 
for the colonists to sell all their output to SAONIC (a government institution 
created for the purpose) at a price (fixed by the Paris government) which 
encompassed a subsidy amounting to up to 20% of the market price. 31
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The lack of any long term prospects on the part of the colonists and their 
privileged status with respect to the Metropolitan state colonial policy not only 
impoverished the indigenous population but the soil as well. The pursuit of 
maximum profit on the part of the colonists actually imposed methods of 
production which were inappropriate to the Algerian scene.
- The first agricultural revolution (the replacement of the fallow period 
by forage or legumes) did not take place in Algeria. 32 y^e farmer 
would have increased yields through a close association between 
agriculture and stock breeding. Manure and nitrogen from the 
legumes would have prevented the impoverishment of the soil. The 
colonists could not be interested in stock breeding for the latter was 
much less rewarding than speculative agriculture.33 They were 
however involved in the export of the indigenous livestock which fell 
from 9.5 million sheep in 1875 to 5.412,000 in 1954. 34
- After World War I, dry farming and full fallow were introduced in order 
to stop the decline in yield. 35 Both methods relied on several successive 
ploughings of the fallow land. More ploughing actually meant better 
aeration and therefore a greater loss of nitrogen.
Moreover, having lost its carpet of vegetation, the ploughed fallow was 
subjected to more erosion by wind and water. Despite these new methods of 
production and a heavy mechanisation, yields in cereal cultivation kept on 
stagnating between 5 and 6 quintals per hectare. 36
In this context, the colonists' policy led Mazoyer to state that:
" During the last century, without stock-breeding, manure 
or fertilisers, the quest for the highest immediate yields 
followed by attempts to avert the decline in fertility, took 
the form of an increasing over-exploitation of the soil. 37
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The viability of the colonial economy therefore resided in part in the over­
exploitation of the indigenous population and the soil on the one hand and on 
subsidies pouring in from the French state on the other hand. Hence, from the 
French state's viewpoint, the colonial economy represented a burden rather 
than a beneficial enterprise. As a settlement colony, however, Algeria required 
the subsidies in order to avoid the (politically damaging) departure of the 
French settlers.
1.3 The limits to development of agrarian capitalism
The accumulation process that was taking place in the modern sector was 
actually dependent on the policy and objectives of the Metropolitan capital for 
the reason that the only market available to the colonists was the French 
market.
At the level of the production sphere, capital accumulation within the 
modern sector was dependent on imports of means of production that had to be 
bought in France because of the custom union. 38 Colonial activities in Algeria 
did not actually lead to the creation of industrial activities (backward linkages). 
On the contrary it was the metropolitan capital which benefited from the 
colonists' activities through export of means of production (182940 tractors and 
31800 combine-harvesters between 1947-1960),39 fertilisers (in 1959, 14.7% - 
310 million new francs - of French chemical exports were destined to 
Algeria)^* and luxury goods which represented an average of 95% of total 
imports for the years 1910,1920 and 1930.4*
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At the level of the circulation sphere, the market being restricted to the 
French one, the realisation of the colonists' output depended solely on 
conditions that were out of the colonists' control. Vineyards developed not 
because of internal demand but to satisfy the French market. Cereal cultivation 
(soft wheat in particular) developed for the same reason, to fill the Metropolitan 
deficit. This situation actually reflected the dependency of the Algerian 
economy vis-&-vis the French one and of colonial capital vis-&-vis the 
Metropolitan one.
Colonial capital was then limited in its expansion because of:
1. The asymmetric relationship between France and Algeria. For the 1950s 
period, France supplied 75.1% of total Algerian imports while French 
imports from Algeria represented only 7.3% of total French imports. 
From the opposite side Algerian export to France represented 79.3% of 
the total Algerian exports while French exports to Algeria amounted to 
only 15.5% of total French exports. 42
2. The colonial structure of the Algerian economy, the market of which 
was limited because of the skewed distribution of income: the European 
population (11% of the total population) monopolised 40.8% of total 
income in 1953. 43 Moreover, among the indigenous populations 16% 
monopolised 40.7% of income. 43
3. The non-existence of long term prospects on the part of the colonists 
who consumed their savings by buying luxury goods or exported them to 
the metropolis.
In 1954, while total savings reached 49.9 billion francs, private non- 
agricultural investment in Algeria amounted to only 1.125 billion 
(2.25%).44
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4. The metropolitan capital interests in avoiding implementation of 
industrial activities in Algeria in order to;
* preserve its market; colonial activities reinforced metropolitan 
industrialists who processed Algerian raw material (minerals and 
cereals) which, afterwards, were partly sold as finished products in 
Algeria,
* take advantage of the import of a cheap Algerian labour force which
started migrating to France by 1914 and amounted to 350484 in 1962 (16%
of the foreign labour force). ^5
The limits to development of capitalism in Algeria were then the result of 
too close a relationship with the French economy on one hand and the colonial 
nature of its social and economic structure on the other hand. While the 
indigenous population had been impoverished, the colonists' involvement was 
reduced to an over-exploitation of the indigenous population and of scarce 
resources, i.e. the soil.
The metropolis' involvement on the other hand, resided in subsidising the 
colonists' sector in order to expand the colonisation process. That expansion 
however important to the French economy (increase of outputs for French 
industrialists), could not take place because of two basic factors;
1. The colonial structure of the Algerian economy.
2. The indigenous population's refusal to be assimilated with the
French society.
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After World War II, these two factors seem to have been taken into account 
by French policymakers who devised a development policy (for Algeria) which 
culminated in the setting up of the Plan de Constantine.
1.4 The Plan de Constantine
Confronting a stagnation (if not a decline) in most productive sectors and an 
unwillingness on the part of the colonists to invest in Algeria, the French 
Metropolitan government devised a policy whereby Metropolitan capital (public 
and private) would attempt to restore capital accumulation within the Algerian 
scene.
In this context, the French Metropolitan state started an investment 
programme that culminated in the implementation of the Plan de Constantine 
(1959-1964). The latter was preceded by an investment programme (1949-1956) 
which, in view of the Maspetiol report (see note 47), suggests that the 1949-1956 
investment programme did not respond to the French state's expectations which 
advanced that:
"Algeria wants to urge industrialists to use, to the best, local resources, 
to undertake useful and durable production, to seek new outlets and 
to collaborate with the administration for the industrial equipment
of the country, which has been too neglected up to these last y e a r s ' ' ^
The period covered by the investment programme mentioned above 
nevertheless witnessed the emergence of two new elements that were to change 
the French state's perception of the Algerian economy. These new elements 
appeared as the discovery of hydrocarbon (1954) in the Sahara desert and as the 
beginning of the independence war led by the F.L.N. party in the same year.
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This new perception of the French state, then, emerged through its 
thorough involvement within the Algerian scene along the Plan da 
Constantine. The latter was preceded by an assessment of the Algerian economy 
which argued that:
"it is there that lies the tragedy of this country: productive capital 
is hardly extensible;' agricultural investments have, up to now 
at least, cost very much for a fictitious profit.... In these conditions, 
public financing seems essential. The importance of the efforts 
required assume that an appeal must be made for external funds 
(particularly metropolitan ones) and to local savings.
It remains that the mobilisation of the latter and its local use 
require a progressive and large development of the domestic 
market. This perspective is not at present evident and could only
be aroused by a durable action of the political power"^
The Plan de Constantine then translated into the following investment 
structure.
Table II.6: Structure of Anticipated investment in the Plan de Constantine. 
Net investment (oil excluded), million New Francs
%
I Agriculture and irrigation work 3680 19.4
II Energy 1300 6.8
III Industry 3200 17.9
IV Equipment of enterprises 1520 8
V Infrastructure 2010 11.7
VI Education and health 1570 8.3
VII Administrative equipment 670 3.5
VIII Housing and urban development 4980 26.3
Total 18930 100
Source: Benachenhou, A., op. cit., p.310.
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The overall picture of the investment structure actually suggests that the 
basic goal of the French state was to implement the appropriate conditions 
(infrastructure and housing in particular) for capital accumulation which 
would take place after the completion of the plan.
On the other hand the emphasis on these labour intensive activities may 
constitute an attempt to increase employment and reduce the impact of the 
F.L.N.'s call for independence on the Algerian population. In fact, out of an 
anticipated increase in employment of 410,000 (over the period 1950-1964), 
building and public work, services and administration would account for 275,000 
(67%) while agriculture and industry would absorb respectively 4.9% and 28% 
of the increase in employment.^
Despite the French government official commitment to change the 
structural features of the Algerian economy, the productive sectors 
(agricultural and industry) did not seem to have been geared towards absorbing 
the excess supply of the Algerian labour force (see section 1-5). Furthermore 
the evolution of both sectors' (agriculture and industry) output throughout the 
1950s does not seem to have responded to the French state's policy.
The stagnation of the agricultural sector can be visualised through the 
evolution of the output level in the two basic agricultural products (wine and 
cereals). Concerning wine, the level of output kept on declining throughout 
the 1950s despite the implementation of the Plan de Constantine.
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Source: Benachenhou, A., op. tit., p.338.
The fall in total output did not however impede an increase of the colonists' 
income which soared during the same period and reached 115 billion francs in 
1962 (70,65% of total agricultural export) after having been 56.91 billion in 1956 
(48,79% of total agricultural export).49
While partly stemming from an increase in the price of wine, the 
importance of the colonists' income actually reflected the French state's 
commitment to subsidise colonists’ exports by buying Algerian wine at a price 
higher than world prices (1800 to 3000 F/hl as opposed to less than 1500 F/hl.).^9
Concerning cereals, the same trend appears, in particular for soft wheat, the 
output of which declined from 4,288 thousand quintals in 1954 to 3,302 quintals 
in 1962 despite a growing domestic dem and .58
The industrial sector on the other hand witnessed an apparent overall 
growth which was actually hiding the emergence of two basic sectors 
(hydrocarbon and housing and public work) as the main components in 
industrial output.
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Table II.8: Industrial output (Million of 1959 N.F.)
Sectors 1954 1958 1960 1962
Energy 145 165 195 205
hydrocarbon 50 410 1490 1320
Mining 170 135 170 140
Industry 920 1250 1440 865
Housing and Public work 570 520 1145 270
Total 1855 2480 4440 2800
Source: Benachenhou, A., op. cit., p.340.
Tlie growth of the various components of total industrial output which was 
multiplied by 2.4 between 1954 and 1960 did not however stem from an 
autonomous expansion of the industrial base. But on the contrary the overall 
growth of the industrial output and in particular of hydrocarbon basically 
stemmed from an injection of money capital from external sources (France 
essentially). This injection of money capital from Metropolitan sources would 
actually emerge through an analysis of the financing of investments that took 
place in Algeria from 1954 to 1961.
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Table II.9: Origin of the financing of investment (1954-1961), Millions of 
New Francs (N.F.)










Total 1055 1450 60 2465
1957
In hydrocarbon 10 270 60 340
Total 1355 2065 220 3640
1959
In hydrocarbon 240 990 220 1450
Total 2430 2150 80 4660
1961
In hydrocarbon 920 230 80 1230
Source: Benachenhou, A., op. ciL, p.346.
The share of Metropolitan capital in total investment spending grew from 
40% in 1954 to 46% in 1961. On the other hand, investment in the hydrocarbon 
sector increased from 8.5% of total investment in 1954 to 27% in 1961. Although 
Algerian resources seem to have participated in investments in hydrocarbons, 
in fact the figures represented self-financing by Metropolitan oil firms.
The large involvement of Metropolitan capital in the Algerian scene may 
actually support the argument that colonial capital had neither the appropriate 
resources (in particular for investment in hydrocarbons) nor the motivation 
(because of the war) to accumulate domestically. Furthermore the same 
involvement reinforces the argument about the speculative character of 
colonialism in Algeria and the non-existence of any long term prospects from
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the colonists' viewpoint.
In this context the Plan de Constantine constituted an attempt to resolve the 
"Algerian problem" not by calling into question the colonial features of the 
Algerian economy but by focusing upon an employment policy (by increasing 
administrative jobs in particular) which was thought to produce a third force 
opposed to the F.L.N. {FrontDe Liberation NationaJe)strategy.
Although the Plan de Constantine could not be thoroughly implemented 
because of Algeria's independence in 1962, it had nevertheless left its mark to 
the extent that:
1. The agricultural sector's fate was "sealed" by not calling into 
question its colonial structure
2. The hydrocarbon industry emerged as a leading component 
both in terms of investment and output
3. The injection of money capital from external sources reinforced 
the statusquo within Algerian society since the burden of growth 
would be supported by French taxpayers' money
These features on the economic side and the political and social 
characteristics that stemmed from more than a century of colonisation may to a 
certain extent have predetermined the future of post-colonial Algeria. In 
particular the class structure of the Algerian society at the end of the colonial 
period was such that internal (within the Algerian society) contradictions could 
be left aside and the war could be presented as an inter-community war between 
the Algerian society as a whole and the French colonists.
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1.5 On class differentiation
Colonial penetration had therefore resulted in a specific class structure 
characterised by the domination of the French colonists over the whole society.
Class differentiation would eventually concern Algerians among themselves 
to the extent that some segments of the Algerian society were able to take 
advantage of the colonial system to move upward while the majority witnessed a 
deterioration in its living conditions. In this respect 38% of the area held by 
Algerians in 1951 was in the hands of 4% of the indigenous population. 51
Although the economic basis of the indigenous bourgeoisie (owning more 
than 10 ha. each) was relatively strong, it faced unequal treatment from the 
banking institutions which favoured the French colonists.
Table 11.10: Loans to the agrarian bourgeoisie in 1954 (Million Francs)
Colonists Algerian
Amount 35,900 8600
Number of beneficaries 2505 996
Average loans 14.3 8.6
Source: Benachenhou, A., op. ciL, p.362.
Thus whereas the colonists monopolised most of the credit lines, the loans 
provided to the indigenous bourgeoisie were concentrated towards less than a 
thousand individuals (which represented 0.5% of the total Algerian 
bourgeoisie). 51 Despite its relatively secure material conditions, the Algerian 
bourgeoisie could not envisage any expansion under the colonial system and 
would therefore support the liberation war when called upon to do so. Besides
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the indigenous bourgeoisie, a large number of Algerian landowners (70%) 
owned holdings of less than 10 hectares each. 51
The small holdings were in fact the result of the destruction of the tribes' 
economic system and were to constitute the so-called traditional sector. The 
great majority of this part of the peasantry lived at a self-subsistence level 
although it had to market part of its output or its own labour force (as seasonal 
workers) in order to get rudimentary equipment from the market. Facing the 
same problems as the indigenous bourgeoisie but lacking the material base to 
sustain its livelihood this small peasantry had no alternative but to gradually 
move out of the agricultural sphere.
Table 11.11: Social structure of the Algerian agricultural population
Year Owners Sharecroppers Permanent workers Seasonal workers
1930 617544 643000 106000 428000
1938 549395 713000 - 462467
1948 537800 132000 - 483900
1954 503700 60500 112000 459000
1960 373000 147000 274000
Source: Noushi, La Naissaace da Nationalisme Alg&rlea, quoted in
Benachenhou, A., op. ciL, p.355.
The fall in the number of landowners points to a process of land 
concentration hence a possible proletarianisation of the small peasantry. On 
the other hand the drop in the number of sharecroppers after World War II may 
be a sign of the transformation of the forms of production whereby landowners 
became involved as capitalist farmers thus rejecting the sharecroppers as
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elements in the production process.
Finally the relative stagnation of the number of permanent workers and the 
fall in the number of seasonal workers may stem from a process of 
mechanisation that reduced labour demand on the part of the landowners. The 
overall picture emerging from the evolution of the social structure within the 
agricultural scene actually points to a fall in the population of the agricultural 
sector. This fall would mean that an increasing number of agricultural (and in 
general rural) workers had to move out of the agriculture sphere in order to 
ensure their livelihood.
The stagnation of industrial activities in Algeria would however offer 
reduced prospects to the rejected (from the agricultural sector) proletarianised 
peasantry. The latter would then constitute the bulk of the unemployed 
population.
Table 11.12: Structure of the Algerian labour force, 1954
Population Number %
Total labour force 
of which:
3,218,000 100
Non-agricultural labourers 336,000 10.4
small business 123.500 3.8
landowners 503.700 15.7
agricultural labourers 115.100 3.6
sharecroppers 60,500 1.9
unemployed and under­
employed population 2,079,200 64.6
Source: Henni, A., op. tit, p.74; Benachenhou, A., op. tit  p.355.
Most of the non-agricultural wage earners had nevertheless been involved 
in non-productive (administration and services) and unstable (building and 
public works) activities which employed 58.5% of this labour force.52 The 
labour force in industry, on the other hand, amounted to 106700 individuals and 
represented 31.8% of the non-agricultural wage earners total.
Finally the bulk of the Algerian labour force (64.6%) constituted an 
unorganised mass which played no active role in the functioning of the 
colonial economy but gravitated around the latter as seasonal workers or in the 
informal economy.
The colonial structure of the Algerian economy therefore emerged through:
- The destruction of pre-capitalist forms of production which produced an 
excess supply of labour.
- The gradual emergence of agrarian capitalism which was subsidised by 
Metropolitan France.
- The non-emergence of industrial capitalism which might have absorbed 
the growing number of Algerian proletarians.
In this context, the Algerian social formation at the beginning of the 
liberation war (1954) constituted a society made up mainly of "lumpen- 
proletarians". This situation, product of a particular evolution of the Algerian 
social formation under colonial rule, could then be summarised as follows:
"Algeria lived its capitalist phase of development through 
colonisation. But capitalism has only produced proletarianized 
classes, from peasants reduced to misery and emigration to a 
petty bourgeoisie limited in its aspiration towards social and 
economic promotion".54
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This situation sharpened the contractions between social classes and 
particularly between a great majority of Algerians and the French colonists as a 
whole. These contradictions eventually led to a clash between the two 
communities that resulted in the political independence of Algeria (5th July
1962) under the rule of the F.L.N. party which led the war.
2. Oil rent and the Algerian growth strategy
Having fought for almost eight years to obtain their country's 
independence, the Algerian dominant social groups were to view under­
development as a structural phenomenon (disarticulation of the economy), the 
overcoming of which lies in the destructuring-restructuring of the Algerian 
economy. Considering that pre-independence Algeria’s economy was totally 
extroverted (the different sectors were producing for the French market 
without intersectoral relations) the destructuring-restructuring of the 
Algerian economy was to take place through an inward-looking strategy or. in 
other words, its introversion.
The process of introversion would nevertheless cover a period whereby an 
export sector was to support the financing of the rest of the economy (since 
introversion assumed implementation of industries that were hitherto non­
existent within the Algerian scene).
In this context the agricultural sector and the hydrocarbon sector 
constituted the main elements in the export structure (36% and 56% 
respectively) of post-independence Algeria up to 1966. 55 The choice of either 
of these sectors (as a support for overall growth), or both of them, would 
however require an analysis of the internal and external conditions under
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which they could operate. In particular, whereas the hydrocarbon sector had 
been in a process of development since the discovery of oil in 1956, the 
particular (colonial) structure of the agricultural sector put a question mark on 
its emergence as a leading sector in post-independence Algeria.
2.1 The decline of oost-independence agricultural sector
The hasty departure of the French colonists from Algeria in 1962 and the 
involvement of Algerian agricultural workers in the running of the abandoned 
farms pushed the Algerian government into proclaiming (decrees of March
1963) ^  the constitution of a "self-managed" sector in agriculture.
This "self-managed" sector would actually cover an area of 2.7 million 
hectares (divided into 3000 units)5? and represent the domain hitherto 
controlled by the French colonists. Post-independence Algeria then witnessed 
the same division of the agricultural sector (into a modern - self-managed - and 
a traditional sector) as the one that prevailed during the colonial era.
Thus export of agricultural products (to finance industrialisation) could 
only come from the self-managed sector which inherited the production 
pattern of the colonial one. In this framework the self-managed sector could 
respond to the financing needs of the Algerian economy while the traditional 
sector may, under appropriate conditions,satisfy domestic demand.
The evolution of both sectors would, however, be totally dependent on the 
state policy towards agriculture in general and its apprehension of the social 
and political factors peculiar to the Algerian scene.
\
\
2.1.1 The self-managed sector: structures and evolution
The self-managed units were supposed to combine local participation of the 
workers in taking decisions and central government direction in controlling 
their compatability with national policies.
At the level of any estate, the basic body would be the general assembly of 
workers comprising ail permanent workers but excluding seasonal ones.
The general assembly would elect a workers' council that would be 
responsible for membership decisions and long term borrowing. The workers 
would elect a management committee which would be in charge of the daily 
running of the farm. A president would then be nominated by the management 
committee to represent the whole estate before outside institutions (banks in 
particular).
Finally the president would work closely with a director appointed by the
r \
office National de la Reforme A ga ire'ljONRA). 58 director would be in
charge of ensuring that the unit worked within ministerial directives.
Revenue being defined as income less costs (labour cost not included) is split 
into three parts:
1. The first part will go to the state for accumulation purposes
2. The second part will be used for payments of the workers
3. The third part (if any) will be used by the workers' council for internal 
investment
The ideal structure outlined above faced many functional problems.
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The first and basic problem was the workers’ lack of enthusiasm towards 
involvement in the farms' management thus
"according to Ait Amara 43% of respondents in the Mitidja plain
had never attended a general assembly meeting”59
The non-participation of the farm workers in the process of decision­
making stemmed basically from a lack of political consciousness due to the 
absence of a straightforward ideological discourse and from their "dsiliusions” 
towards implementation of self-managed units that constituted the very 
negation of the centralised approach to all government actions. 60
The appointment of a director by ONRA opposed the very meaning of self­
management and resulted (because of the non-involvement of workers) into his 
taking over the management of the unit despite the "facade” of self­
management. It could not have been otherwise, seeing that the lack of political 
consciousness and the illiteracy of the farm workers were barriers against 
their effective involvement.
A second problem which undermined the self-management process was the 
existence of a great number of seasonal workers who were excluded from 
decision-making and profit-sharing. For this category of worker, 
independence did not mean any real change in living conditions.
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Table 11.13: Employment figures in the self-managed sector





Source: MARA Statistique Agricole, serie grise, quoted from Bedrani, S. (1981) 
L Agriculture Alg&rienne Depuis 1966, OPU, Alger, p .58.
The seasonal workers were still working for somebody else. The colonist 
boss was however replaced by a large group of bosses. Identification with the 
estate in these circumstances became rather difficult and this situation affected 
productivity and the level of output of the estates. For all crops combined, the 
production index (the 1957-59 average equalling 100) for the years 1963-1969 
had not gone beyond 90.61
The output of the self-managed sector actually evolved as follows: 62
- Soft wheat output dropped from 2.376 million quintals in 1960 to an 
annual average of 2.094 million quintals for the period 1965-1969.
- Hand wheat output fell from an annual average of 4.236 million quintals 
for the period 1954-1957 to an annual average of 2.829 million quintals 
for the period 1966-1969.
- Finally barley output decreased to 0.54 million quintals (annual average) 
for the period 1966-69 after having amounted to 1.232 million quintals 
for the period 1954-57. .
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- Wine, whose outlet was not the domestic market, nevertheless followed 
the same trend; whereas total output reached 18.619 million hectolitres 
in 1956, by 1969 it amounted to only 8.71 million hectolitres.63
Since authority was diluted within the self-managed estates, workers in 
general and seasonal workers in particular have neither obligations nor 
incentives to work hard on the collectivised land. This situation meant a 
necessary drop in production on the collectivised land and a reduction in the 
state revenue from agriculture in particular.
Besides these structural problems, the self-managed sector suffered from the 
government's lack of policy towards agriculture (at least until 1971 ).64
The obligation imposed on the estate to utilise state marketing channels on 
the one hand, and to seek credit through ONRA on the other, emptied the self­
management concept of its whole substance; for two crucial moments of the 
reproduction process (financing and marketing) were not controlled by those 
primarily concerned.
ONRA's attitude towards the self-managed sector looked rather ambiguous, 
for instead of improving the working conditions of the estates, ONRA seemed to 
have done the opposite. Thus, in March 1964, at the peasants' congress, some 
delegates stressed the need for decentralisation of responsibilities and argued 
that:
"the reactionaries who are impeding our revolution in the highest
spheres of the administration must be swept aw ay" 65
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By the reactionaries, the delegates meant basically ONRA's personnel who 
comprised many individuals who gained experience with the French 
administration. Thus as a group these "bureaucrats" maintained and developed 
ideological values that did not suit the socialist transformation of the 
agricultural sector. 66
In the absence of a clear F.L.N. ideology, ONRA employees could not go 
beyond the methods and attitudes of their bosses, they were then more 
interested in securing their jobs (through clientelism) and strengthening their 
own power than helping the farm workers gain control over the labour 
process.
2.1.2 The state's lack of policy towards agriculture
The case of ONRA was not a problem of inefficiency or incompetence for 
beyond ONRA was the government who could not or was not willing to 
undertake a clear and effective policy towards agriculture. The government's 
actual policy towards agriculture in general and the self-managed sector in 
particular did not reflect the official position that stressed the need for a real 
agricultural development.
Concerning the self-managed sector, actual investment did not even renew 
equipment but fell well behind what was necessary for a simple reproduction. 
Thus according to its own financing institution (Banque Nationale d'Algerie) 
the self-managed sector received on average 38% of the investment required to 
renew its productive apparatus between 1966 and 1974.67 ^  process of
disinvestment had then been taking place within a sector which could have
%participated in the export market. This situation exemplifies the minor role 
given to agriculture in the Algerian growth strategy and unveils one of the 
causes of agricultural stagnation.
Despite the problems facing the self-managed units they nevertheless 
constituted the privileged part of the agricultural sector as a whole since 
average per capita income was more than twice that of the private sector (55 
pounds as opposed to 25 pounds). In fact for the impoverished families (see 
table below) living on privately owned land, independence had not changed 
their conditions since inequality in land ownership was still blatant.
Table 11.14: Structure of land ownership in the private sector 
North Algeria, 1964
Dimension Number of units % Area %
less than 1 ha. 134,780 25.6 59,180 1
1 to 10 ha. 228,490 43.4 1,260,445 21.6
10 to 50 ha. 147,043 27.9 2,967,545 50.8
more than 50 ha. 16,530 3.1 1,552,490 26.6
Source: Statistiques Agricoles No. 5, juin 1968, amended from Raffinot, M. and 
Jacquemot, P. (1977) Le Capitelisme dEtat Alg&rlen , MaspSro, Paris, 
p 313.
The existing structure (small holdings in particular) was obviously 
inappropriate for modernisation and the government invested only 30 million 
dinars during the 1962-65 period whereas total public spending was around 4500 
million
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Starting in 1966, the Algerian government set up a more systematic policy 
towards the agricultural private sector through individual equipment loans.
Table II. 15: Equipment loans to the private sector (thousand dinars)
Year Planned (1) Actual (2) 2/1 (%)
1966 120,000 84,974 70.8
1967 115,000 112,923 98
1968 118,000 109,965 93
1969 110,000 102,138 92.8
1970 90,000 54,025 60
1971 60,000 45,027 75.7
Source: Tutelle, S.A.P., quoted in Benachenhou, A. (1979) L Exode Rural la  
Alg6rie, Presses De l'ENAP, Alger, p.86.
Because of legal limitations only 15800 landowners benefited from the loans 
in 1966.70 Thus 75% of the landowners were not concerned by the government 
action. This government's policy mostly benefited the big landowners, most of 
whom were already out of the agricultural sector, accumulating in the cities 
through businesses and wholesale markets 7 * They then diverted the loans 
acquired towards more lucrative businesses and kept agricultural output as it 
used to be. 72
The level of agricultural output then stayed low while home consumption 
increased due, in particular, to population growth (see Appendix II. 1). Export of 
agricultural products, then, was gradually squeezed until Algeria became a net 
importer from 1969 onward.
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Table 11.16: Algeria's Trade balance in foodstuff (million dinars)
year Import (1) Export(2) 2/1 (%)
1966 713 931 131
1967-69 731 717 98
1970-73 925 736 80
Source: SEP, Annualre Statistlque de lAlgOrie ,1970-1975.
Agriculture could not then be relied upon to finance industrialisation. Apart 
from climatic conditions, which were objective constraints, the economic and 
political conditions of post-independence Algeria represent pertinent 
explanatory variables as well.
On the economic side, agricultural output could not compete within the world 
market (in particular within the EEC as the closest potential market). Since 
agriculture had been subsidised by the French government before 
independence, the continuing of Algerian agriculture exports were mainly due 
to decisions contained in the "Evian agreements". These decisions could not 
however be sustained for a long time since Algerian wine (the major 
agricultural export) would not receive preferential treatment while facing 
French or Italian wines which were flooding the European market.
The political power of the colonists having vanished with Algeria's 
independence, the French government had to reduce preferential treatment 
accorded to countries (Algeria among others) outside the EEC. Thus while 
France imported 48938 hectolitres from Italy and 6,710,000 hi. from Algeria in
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1964-65, by 1971-72, the figures were reversed since 6,480,251 hi. were imported 
from Italy but only 133,878 hi. came from Algeria.
On the political side, it was easy and workable for the Algerian government 
to attack foreign interests in the industrial sector and to implement an 
industrial strategy. This action could moreover be regarded as the continuation 
of the anti-colonialist struggle.
It was, however, more difficult to set up an agricultural strategy, for foreign 
interests had vanished when it came to decide upon a growth strategy. In fact 
any effective agricultural strategy would have created dissensions among 
Algerians, since modernisation of agricultural in general and of the private 
sector in particular would only be possible through agrarian reform. But this 
was not feasible politically since many big proprietors and those whose land 
might be limited had either connections with the state bureaucracy or were 
themselves inside the state apparatus. ^  On the contrary, an industrial strategy 
was feasible since only foreign interests would confront the power of the 
Algerian state. The enemy was not Algerian and the notion of "national 
solidarity" would be used to hide the internal class struggle.
Due to the non-existence of any strong Algerian bourgeoisie, the state 
(acting as the representative of all social classes) would invest as the first 
entrepreneur to industrialise the economy. The industrialisation path would 
furthermore attempt to implement a process of introversion of the economy (in 
accordance with Algerian policy-makers' rejection of the colonial economy).
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2.2 Industrialising industries and the internal conditions
The absence of the Algerian bourgeoisie^ as well as the Algerian 
proletariat 76 fr0m the political scene created a vacuum that was to be filled by 
the most politically advanced elements of the petty bourgeoisie whose declared 
aim was the building of an independent and national economy often obtaining
independence 77
The Algerian petty bourgeoisie basically comprised two social groups. The 
first one engaged in small production or small business; artisans, services and 
shopkeeping, while the second social group encompassed a set of Algerians who 
received some form of education and were employed in various sectors (state 
administration, i.e. the lowest positions, private sector, and in education in 
particular).
Because of the colonial history, the first social group was condemned to 
stagnation or decline. For no other accumulation field was open to the 
indigenous population (the industrial sector was embryonic and largely 
dominated by the colonists).78 The second social group, on the other hand faced 
a more "frustrating" situation. While the French school taught the ideology of 
the colonial power about "liberty, equality and fraternity", the colonial 
structure rejected them from the economic as well as the political life.
Under these circumstances the Algerian petty bourgeoisie had no option but 
to call into question the colonial power via the war. The building of an 
independent and national economy after independence became, then, the 
leitmotiv of the petty bourgeois leadership. 79
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The leading elements of the petty bourgeoisie who represented various 
political tendencies possessed the political power (due to their involvement in 
the liberation war), the strengthening of which required the emergence of a 
strong economic base on the one hand and the spread of a socialistic ideology 
that would mobilise the vast majority of the Algerian population on the other.
The building of an independent and national economy through a strategy of 
national unity, then, was meant to stress the development of the forces of 
production while avoiding conflicts among social classes. To this extent the 
industrialising industries' strategy was well adapted to the social conditions that 
prevailed in Algeria. The leading petty bourgeoisie could therefore implement 
a growth process that was to fulfil most of its aspirations, for in practice:
1. The building of a heavy industry under state control would strengthen 
its political power through its domination of the key elements 
of the productive apparatus.
2. The stress on the development of the forces of production would, in the 
abstract, be welcomed and supported by all social classes (each and 
everyone is supposed to be better off through this process) and will 
allow the negation (within the dominant ideology) of the class struggle 
within the Algerian social formation.
3. Finally the challenge to the prevailing international division of labour 
would be considered as a continuation of the struggle against colonialism 
through the so-called anti-imperialist struggle. By these actions the 
leading petty bourgeoisie would gain the justification of its controlling 
the state apparatus and mobilise the whole nation against an external 
(although not clearly defined) enemy: i.e. imperialism.
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The social conditions were therefore adequate for implementing the 
strategy of industrialising industries. The economic conditions were 
appropriate as well. Indeed Algeria possessed the necessary inputs8** for the 
building of a heavy industry, in particular:
- Steel industry could be backed by many iron-ore deposits (Beni saf, 
Zaccar Timerzrit, Ouenza and Gara-Djebilet.
The last two were the most promising:
1. The Ouenza deposit currently exploited holds an amount of one billion 
tons of ore containing 57% iron and is situated in the east of the country.
2. The last is situated in the south-west and holds around 2 billion 
tons of ore containing 52-57% of iron.
Iron-ore deposits have been exploited before the petroleum era (1956) and 
since 1964 the level of output has been around 2.5 million tons per year.
- Non-ferrous minerals, of which zinc, copper and lead exist in important 
quantities too and were exploited before independence. Several 
deposits are known, of which the one of El-Abed near the Moroccan 
border is the most important.
- The chemical industry would be backed by a deposit of phosphate at 
Djebel Onk (340 km from Annaba), exploited since 1960 and containing 
between 200 millions and 500 millions tons of ore.
- Finally, antinomy, tungsten, manganese, mercury and uranium 
constitute other exploitable mineral resources that would either be exploited (to 
obtain foreign currency) or used as input for Algerian industries.
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Industries that are backed by the input mentioned above would then 
constitute the materialisation of the concept of industrialising industries. Being 
highly capital intensive, they necessarily require imports of means of 
production that are to be financed through export of agricultural products (the 
basic export of the colonial economy) or mineral products. Given the sheer 
volume of investments required for the implementation of the strategy, exports 
of minerals would only be marginal in meeting the demand for foreign 
currency. On the other hand agricultural products (wine essentially) are 
neither strategic to the functioning of the European economies (potential 
customers) nor adequately valued (because of competition) to earn the 
necessary financial resources. The only alternative left was the export of 
hydrocarbons.
Discovery of crude oil occurred in 1956 and exploitation on a commercial 
basis began in 1958. Most of the deposits are situated near Hassi-Messaoud in 
Central Algeria and near the Libyan border at Edjeleh.
In 1967, this proved reserve of oil was estimated at 950 million tons. Gas 
reserves however amounted to 2-3 billion cubic m e t e r s . H e n c e  while Algeria 
may be considered as an oil producer of average importance, its gas reserves 
represented the world's fourth largest gas field, the bulk of it being situated at 
Hassi R’mel (400 km South of Algiers).
The role of the hydrocarbon industry within the Algerian growth strategy 
could then be divided into two major functions:
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1. The first one is related to the internal impact on the Algerian economy
through linkages (motivating function).
2. The second function places emphasis on export of hydrocarbons as the
main source of foreign currency (financing function).
- Within the Algerian economy the hydrocarbon industry could be 
developed in order to meet the demand and motivate the development or 
creation of:
a. other industries (as a source of energy)
b. petro-chemical industries
c. agriculture (fertilisers, plastic equipment)
d. industries producing means of production for the hydrocarbon 
and other industries.
The hydrocarbon industry could then be the basic motivating industry 
within the set of industrialising industries through backward and forward 
linkages.
- On the other hand hydrocarbons considered as strategic to the 
functioning of contemporary economies would be (and are currently) the basic 
means for financing the heavy investment implied by the growth strategy 
adopted by Algerian policy-makers.
The two functions (motivating and financing) fulfilled by the hydrocarbon 
industry may nevertheless produce contradictory effects. If the motivating 
effect could realise (through planning) the claimed goal of introversion and 
integration, the financing function (by developing exports) actually pushes 
towards the extraversion of the industry and may accentuate the dependency of 
the economy vis & vis the world market. The development of the hydrocarbon 
industry therefore conceals a contradiction that has to be overcome in practice.
2.3 The Algerian growth strategy in historical perspective
According to the development ideology advanced by the Algerian state, the 
growth strategy chosen by Algerian policy-makers was original on the one 
hand and called into question the prevailing international division of labour on 
the other.
1. The Algerian growth strategy was presented as original to the extent 
that (at least officially) it rejected both policies experienced by Latin-American 
countries (Import/ substitution industrialisation and export led growth) and 
planned to implement a growth model stressing a priority for the setting up of 
upstream activities (the so-called industrialising industries).
A2. On the other hand the calling into question of the international divisbn 
of labour took shape in;
a. a nationalisation of foreign interests within the domestic economy 
(thus implying a rejection of direct foreign investment).
b. the emergence of the state as the main entrepreneur whose aim was 
to build an integrated economy which would not comply with 
specialisation within the international divison of labour.
The process by which a colonial economy was to be transformed into an 
integrated economy would materialise through the export of hydrocarbons. The 
latter (export of hydrocarbons) was seen as a temporary necessity insofar as it 
would speed up the process of building an independent and national economy. 
Thus from 1967 (beginning of the planning process) to 1980, the Algerian 
economy experienced a thorough transformation sustained by three 
interconnected elements:
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1. The concepts of introversion and industrialising industries at the 
theoretical level.
2. The use of the oil rent as a financing means at the practical level.
3. The spread of a populist rhetoric at the ideological level.
These three aspects would bring about the 1970s "euphoria" concerning 
Algeria leaving the set of underdeveloped countries by the early 1980s.
At the quantitative level, the Algerian economy seems to have jumped from 
the mainly agrarian economy of the colonial era to a new stage where the 
industrial and service sector emerged as the main components of G.D.P.
Table II. 17: Algerian G.D.P. (106 dinars) and structure in %
1958 1963 1967 1969 1973 1977 1980 1983
Agriculture 21 20.4 13.1 12.5 8.7 6.6 7.9 7.1
Hydrocarbons - 11.8 17.2 16.3 18.7 29 31.4 26.6
Mining 4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4
Energy-water - 1.9 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 9.8 10.8
Industry 11 9.4 12.3 12.9 138 14.2
Building and P.W. 6 4.6 4.7 5.6 11.6 8.3 12.4 13.7
Services 58 52.8 50.8 50.9 45 40.2 38.5 41.8
G.D.P. 12100 13130 16230 20529 34487 81446 162867.5 234034
Source: 1958 Statistical Yearbook (1965) p.554.
1963-67-69, BSnissad, ME. (1982) Economie du d6veloppement de 
l'Alg6rie, Economica, Paris, 2nd ed., p.53.
1973, SEP, L Alg6rie en QuelquesCbiffres 1977.
1977, SEP L Aig&rie en Quelques Chiffres 1979.
1980-83, Annuoire Statistique de fAlg&rie.
1983-84, ed. 1985, No. 12, pp.318 and 320.
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From 1963 to 1980, G.D.P. had increased twelve times. This increase, however 
important, did not actually alter the overall structure of G.D.P. since the only 
tangible change appeared as a switch of positions between the agricultural 
sector and the hydrocarbon one. In this context, the replacement of the 
colonial export oriented sector (the agricultural sector) by the current export 
sector (the hydrocarbon sector) suggests that as far as the integration of the 
domestic economy is concerned, the Algerian growth strategy did not go beyond 
the G.D.P. structure inherited from the colonial period.
In fact, in both periods, an extraverted sector dominated the G.D.P. structure 
and in both cases the income generated by these sectors encompassed a portion 
that had no productive labour counterpart:
1. During the colonial era, the agricultural sector benefited from subsidies 
flowin g fromthe metropolis and took advantage of a protected market.
2. The income from hydrocarbon exports, on the other hand, had been 
mostly made up of the oil rent which does not have a counterpart 
within the domestic economy.
Within this framework the similarity between the colonial structure and 
post-independence Algeria (with respect to the importance of an external 
source of financing for accumulation) may allow the Algerian growth strategy 
to be interpreted as a mere continuation of the neo-colonial project set up 
during the last years of the independence war (see the Plan de Constantine 
section A-II-1-4).
The replacement of French subsidies during the colonial era by the oil rent 
(after Algeria independence) in the financing of the Algerian economy had
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actually emphasised the colonial structure of the Algerian scene to the extent 
that from a mono-exporter of agricultural products (wine essentially), Algeria 
gradually became a mono-exporter of hydrocarbons.
Table II. 18: Algerian balance of trade (million dinars and percentage)
1958 1963 1967 1969 1973 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Export 2050.2 3748 3572 4611 7472 25020.5 52648 62837 60478 60722 63758
Food 80.5 30.7 16.2 20.14 11.7 2.3 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.5
ICG* 1.05 0.5 0.9 1.06 0.6 0.05 - - - - -
!G** 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.1 0.01 - - - - -
Raw
Mat. 15.85 9.8 8.4 5.9 3.6 1.44 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.8
Energy
Prod. 1.9 57.8 72.9 71.4 83 96.2 98.3 98.2 98.2 98.5 97.7
Import 4788 3437 3154 4981 8875 34428 40519 48780 49384 49782 51257
Food 21 22.3 26.3 13.2 13.7 14.6 18.8 18.7 18.8 19.4 17.1
{CG* 34.5 32.3 25.6 21.4 7.7 5.2 17.4 15.2 19.2 16.7 14.6
JG** 19.5 17.7 21 30.4 39.8 48 31.2 33.8 33.2 32.2 30.4
Raw
mat. 25 27.7 27.6 35 38.8 32.2 32.6 32.3 28.8 32.2 37.9
Inter-mediary
products
Balance -2750.2 +311 +418 -380 -1403 -■9407.5 +12129 +14057 +11094 + 1 10940 +12501
industrial Consumption Goods; ** Investment goods.
Source: 1958: Mazri, A. (1976) Les Hydrocarbons dans tEconomic AIg&rienne, SNED, Alger, 
p.64.
1963 to 1978, Bemissad, M.E. op. cit., pp. 189 and 191.
1980 to 1984, AnnuaireStatistl'quedeI‘Alg6rie 19831984. ed. 1985. pp.260,261.
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The Algerian trade balance experienced an important deficit at the end of 
the colonial era. That deficit basically stemmed from the involvement of the 
Metropolitan government in the revival of the Algerian economy after the 
discovery of oil in 1956.
The first years of independence, on the other hand, saw the opposite trend 
(a trade surplus) which may be explained not in terms of a particular policy but 
as a result of the French colonists' departure (around one million) which 
decreased the level of effective demand for imported commodities.
The period 1967-1978 which witnessed the implementation of successive 
plans reversed again the previous trend and was characterised by a growing 
deficit stemming particularly from imports of: investment goods, raw material 
and intermediary products and food products.
Finally the Algerian economy experienced a trade surplus in 1980. This year 
however constituted a peculiar year insofar as: export earnings had been 
boosted by the second oil crisis (1979) and the growth strategy started being 
called into question and the accumulation process had been slowed down.
As far as the Algerian growth strategy was concerned, the analysis of both 
G.D.P. structure and trade balance does not support any trend towards 
introversion and integration:
- The only growing sector (the hydrocarbon sector) may only have a 
limited impact on the domestic economy since most of its output had been 
directed towards the world market.
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- The stagnation of the agricultural sector on the other hand suggest that 
the connection sought between industry and agriculture had not come about.
- The importance of the service sector within the G.D.P. structure may 
actually constitute a burden upon the productive sphere (agriculture and 
industry) and impede the accumulation process by diverting resources towards 
non-productive activities (in 1980 the service sector employed 37% 11,185,648] of 
the total employed population) &
- The export sector's mean feature emerges as the replacement of
agricultural exports by hydrocarbon exports as the major component but on a 
larger scale (by 1980 exports outside hydrocarbons were insignificant)
- The import structure, on the other hand, indicates the high rate of 
investment that had been taking place through imports of means of production. 
The share of investment goods, raw materials and intermediary products in the 
import structure nevertheless suggests that the process of integration of the 
domestic economy had not yet taken place. The increase of food in the import 
structure confirms the stagnation of the agricultural sector and its inability to 
feed the Algerian population.
- Finally the only positive aspect of the evolution of the import structure 
appears to be the disappearance of industrial consumption goods. While 
suggesting a process of import substitution industrialisation, this aspect may 
only be considered as marginal in terms of the chosen growth strategy.
In this context, the failure of Algerian policy-makers to implement the 
claimed growth strategy had materialised in a thorough dependence of the 
Algerian economy on one particular sector (the hydrocarbon sector). Besides 
the G.D.P. and trade balance structures, the gradual importance of the
I l l
hydrocarbon sector could be grasped through its role in the financing of gross 
accumulation under the Algerian state control.
Table 11.19; Hydrocarbon resources in Public Gross Accumulation (lO^dinars)
1963-66 1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978-80
Public Gross 
Accumulation (1) 3.9 9.1 36.3 121.2 164.2
Petroleum Tax (2) 1.5 3.3 10.4 59.1 81.5
% (2/1) 38 36.3 28.4 48.8 49.6
Source: SEP DSCN, quoted in Ecr6ment, M. (1986) Independence Politique et
Liberation Eonomique: un Quart de Siecle du D£ veloppemen t en Alg£rie 
1962-1985, ENAP/OPU/PUG, Alger, p.57.
Hence instead of decreasing through time, the share of hydrocarbon 
resources in the financing of gross accumulation kept on increasing in 
absolute terms. In percentage terms, the high figures for 63-66 and 67-69 
should be related to the relatively small amount of gross accumulation, while 
the low figure for 1970-73 may represent the Algerian policy-makers' initial 
attempt to limit their dependency on external factors (the world oil market in 
this instance). The first oil shock had nevertheless given more leeway to the 
Algerian policy-makers who felt secure enough to increase the share of 
hydrocarbon revenues in the financing of investment.
The importance of the oil revenues or more precisely of the oil rent in the 
financing of gross investment after 1973 may however support the argument 
that, besides the hydrocarbon sector, no other sector of the domestic economy 
had been capable of generating a surplus.
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The latter statement suggests that the whole growth process that had taken 
place within the Algerian scene may be reduced to:
- A specialisation of the Algerian economy in hydrocarbon exports 
coupled with
- Implementation of inefficient industries (the so-called industrialising 
industries in particular) which required
- More exports of hydrocarbons or an increase of foreign borrowing (see 
ch.Ill section 3 below).
In this context the contrast between the claimed aim of building an 
integrated economy and the apparent specialisation (in hydrocarbon exports) 
of the Algerian economy could be understood through consideration of the 
hydrocarbon industry as the pillar of the Algerian growth strategy.
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CHAPTER I I I  
THE HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY WITHIN THE 
DOMESTIC ECONOMY
The history of the Algerian hydrocarbon industry may best be understood as 
the continuation of the anti-colonial struggle by a nationalistic state whose 
claimed objective was to control the basic lever of the domestic economy.
Insofar as the hydrocarbon industry was the only dynamic industry by the 
end of the colonial era, its control by the Algerian state became vital to the 
implementation of any autonomous social project. Hence as early as December 
1963 (one year after independence) Sonatrach (the state oil company) was 
created with a first objective of marketing oil (the weakest link in the 
hydrocarbon chain).
Sonatrach's entry into the hydrocarbon chain gradually widened to the 
extent that, by 1966, the Algerian company became involved in all stages of the 
hydrocarbon industry. Then following the February 1971 nationalisation 
Sonatrach was able to control the whole of the hydrocarbon industry in 
Algeria. To the extent that the nationalisation of the hydrocarbon industry 
meant that Sonatrach would appropriate a surplus profit hitherto appropriated 
by foreign oil companies, the domestic control of that industry implied a more 
substantial share of the oil rent. This greater share could then be used to 
implement the chosen growth strategy.
Under these circumstances, Sonatrach's control over the domestic oil 
industry would favour the implementation of the two basic functions assigned
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by Algerian policy-makers to this industry, i.e. the motivating function 
(fraction d'entminement) and the financing function (fraction de 
finan cement).
1. The hydrocarbon industry productive base.
As the export of crude oil and natural gas does not represent a process of 
industrialisation as such, processing of these raw materials was to constitute the 
ultimate step towards the building of an integrated industrial structure.
Thus, in accordance with a growth pole approach, four main industrial 
zones* were then connected to various industrial plants spread throughout the 
country (see Appendix III-l).
Of the four main industrial zones two are situated in the South:
1. The Hassi-Messaoud zone which covers the largest oilfield in the 
Algerian Sahara.
2. The Hassi-R'Mel zone which holds the fourth most important gas field 
in the world.
The Hassi-Messaoud and Hassi R'Mel zones then represented by 1979:
- 1015 oil wells
- 109 gas wells
- 2 natural gas treatment plants
- 2 liquified petroleum gas (L.P.G.) extraction units
- 1 refinery
The two other main industrial zones, on the other hand were located in the 
North along the coastline:
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1. The Skikda industrial zone (East) comprised:
- 1 liquifaction complex
- 1 petrochemical complex
- 1 15 million ton/year refinery
- 1 gas and oil terminal
2. The Arzew industrial zone (Vest) on the other hand encompassed:
- 1 2.5 million tons/year refinery
- 1 ammonia fertiliser complex
- 3 liquifaction complexes
- 1 methanol and synthetic resin complex
- 2 gas and oil terminals
Finally added to these main industrial zones and having in view a policy of 
regional equilibrium, various plants had been erected in various parts of the 
country (plastic material processing at Setif, El-Chlef, Draa El-Mizan, Medea, 
M'Sila and Batna; a fertilisers complex at Annaba).
Within the hydrocarbon productive base, processing plants would constitute 
the core and the realisation of the industrialising industries' concept. The 
implementation of the hydrocarbon industry covered two decades (1960s and 
1970s) and was spread over three essential branches (the oil, petrochemical and 
gas branches).
The oil industry (for technical information see Appendix III-2)
The first refinery to be built in Algeria was the Hassi Messaoud r e f in e ry ^  
which started production in 1961 with a capacity of 100,000t/year. It acted
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essentially as a support base for the oil companies operating in the Sahara 
desert and did not disturb the Algerian market which was supplied through 
imports from France.
The Algiers refinery 3 on the other hand, with a 2.5m.t./year (million 
tons/year) capacity, went on stream in 1964. Its capacity was relatively 
important with regard to domestic consumption which did not exceed one 
million tons/year until 1967.4
The Hassi Messaoud and Algiers refineries were however built under 
French supervision when Algeria was still a colony. As such they cannot be 
related to the Algerian growth strategy or to the building of an independent and 
national economy.
The implementation of Arzew5 refinery, on the other hand, resulted from a 
sovereign decision taken by the Algerian government. With a capacity of 
2.5mt/year, this refinery went on stream in 1972 (when the two existing 
refineries could hardly satisfy domestic demand which amounted to 2.7 
mt/year6 in 1972). In view of the structure of extracted products the Arzew 
refinery seemed to respond to a new demand structure. In particular, the 
relative importance of naphtha (387,000 t/year) as a feedstock to the 
petrochemical industry points to the new emphasis on integrating the economy.
Finally whereas the previous refineries may have been responding to the 
motivating function (fonction d'entralnement) through forward linkages with 
the rest of the economy, the Skikda refinery? seemed to aim at the realisation of 
the second function (financing function) by considering the world market. 
The Skikda refinery was to treat 15 mt/year of crude oil from Hassi Messaoud
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and 277,100 tons/year of imported reduced crude. The choice of a 15 mt/year 
was not however a straightforward one. For in 1974 Temmar^ had presented the 
future refinery as a 2.5 mt/year unit. Then Mahiout^ had mentioned a 7.5 
mt/year unit. Finally Sonatrach decided on the building of a giant refinery. 
The indecision of Sonatrach’s planners may, in this context, be related to the 
1973 oil crisis which saw the posted price of Algerian oil jump*^ from 
$3.555/barrel in January 1972 to $12.75/barrei in October 1974. Sonatrach's 
planners, apparently, saw an opportunity to enter the world market of refined 
products and increase the Algerian state’s share of the oil rent.
With respect to the domestic market, however, naphtha (23.6% of total 
output) and aromatics (benzene, toluene, par&xylene etc.) may constitute 
feedstocks for a petrochemical industry that would emerge as the final stage of 
the hydrocarbon industry.
The petrochemical industry.
Because of the specificity of its products, the petrochemical industry, can be 
regarded as the most promising industrialising industry. Indeed, it can provide 
agriculture with fertilisers and plastic film and serve as a supporting industry 
for light industries (plastic material).
The domestic fertiliser industry* * had emerged through the 
implementation of two complexes. The first one. in the Arzew industrial zone, 
produced nitrogenous fertilisers. Its overall capacity at design amounted to 
1.717 mt/year. The second complex, on the other hand, was built near Annaba 
and went on stream in 1972 (three years after the Arzew complex). At full 
capacity level this complex was to produce 1.815 mt/year of phosphate fertilisers. 
Initial spending on the fertiliser industry was estimated at 2,293 billion dinars
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but in 1978, due to completion behind schedule, the cost of these projects jumped
to 3.289 billion dinars (+43% of initial cost). Finally in 1979 two new projects 
12were scheduled -. The Tebessa unit was to produce 280,000 t/year of 
superphosphate and the Annaba II unit was to produce 2.3 million t/year of 
phosphate fertiliser..
The plastic industry,^ on the other hand, was to realise three objectives:
1. To replace imports of so called strategic products such as ethylene and 
polytehene
2. To feed downstream industries with inputs
3. To internalise exploitations of hydrocarbon resource.
The basic petrochemical industry emerged as a synthetic resin and 
methanol complex situated near Arzew. This complex went partially on stream 
in 1976 and was designed to produce 267,000 t/year of various feedstocks. 
Because of delays the final cost of the project amounted to 429 million dinars 
instead of the anticipated cost of 202 million.
The second complex situated near Skikda went on stream in 1977. This 
complex was designed to produce 380,000 t/year of various feedstock. According 
to Mekkideche the final cost of the Skikda complex amounted to twice the 
anticipated cost. The Skikda complex nevertheless served as a backing industry 
for downstream plastic transformation (plastic bags, PVC sheets, plastic film) 
which emerged in Setif in 1976 and El-Chlef in 1979.
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Because of their size, oil and petrochemical industries were to market part 
of their output within the domestic market whereas the rest would be realised 
within the world market. On the contrary the bulk of the gas productive base 
seemed oriented towards the world market rather than the domestic one.
The gas industry.
In the export of natural gas two paths compete:
1. Export through liquifaction of natural gas (LNG path)
2. Export through pipeline (pipeline path)
Having inherited a liquified gas plant codenamed GL4/2 at Arzew. Sonatrach 
seemed to have favoured (at least until 1980) the first path and, in so doing, 
several liquifaction plants were programmed ^  and setup along the coast.
By the early 1980s, the productive base for the liquifaction of natural gas 
amounted to four liquifaction complexes the combined capacity of which was set 
by design at 30.5 billion cubic meter (bcm) per year. Three of the complexes 
codenamed GL4/2, GL1/2 and GL2/2 were situated within the Arzew industrial 
zone and were to process 1.5, 10.5 and 10.5 bcm of natural gas respectively 
while the fourth complex built near Skikda (codenamed GL1/K) would process 9 
bcm/year. The implementation of the liquifaction complexes had been plagued 
by delays (at least 3 years for the GL1/K and GL1/2 complexes) and resulted in 
costoverun that amounted to 3 3 billion dinars for the GL1/2 complex.
The second option envisaged by Sonatrach emerged as the implementation 
of the trans-mediterranean p ip e l in e ^  joining Hassi R'mel in Algeria to Italy 
via Tunisia and Sicily. The pipeline would carry 12 bcm/year to Italy and its 
capacity could be increased to 18 bcm/year through the addition of the
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compression stations.
Algeria had obviously set up an important productive apparatus within the 
hydrocarbon industry. The declared aim of this policy was to reinforce the 
productive capacity of the domestic economy and to bring about a "snow-ball 
effect" that would fill in the inter-sectoral matrix.
The hydrocarbon industry was then visualised by Algerian policy-makers as 
the motivating industry within the Algerian growth strategy. The realisation of 
its output, however, depended to a great extent, on conditions prevailing within 
the world market and put into question the ability to motivate and the viability 
(as an introverted sector) of an industry which was more oriented towards the 
world market than the domestic one.
Under these circumstances, the impact of the hydrocarbon industry on the 
domestic economy may be grasped through two basic functions (motivating and 
financing) assigned to this industry by Algerian policy-makers.
The motivating function would then bring about linkages:
- Backward linkages by stimulating upstream activities such as steel 
industry and construction work
- Forward linkages by favouring the creation of downstream activities 
such as light industries and the development of agriculture
The financing function, on the other hand, would emerge as a fiscal linkage 
and participate, through the use of the oil rent, in the erection of a productive 
apparatus by imports of means of production and know-how. This import 
(considered as temporary by Algerian policy-makers) would represent the basis
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upon which an integrated economy would emerge (through the filling in of the 
inter-sectoral matrix).
2. The motivating function of the hydrocarbon industry
According to this function, hydrocarbons can be viewed either as a source 
of energy or as a feedstock to petrochemical industry. As a source of energy, 
hydrocarbon products' utilisation would be spread over all sectors of the 
economy if the potential demand is met by an appropriate prices policy. As a 
feedstock to the petrochemical industry, hydrocarbon products could participate 
in the development of agriculture (fertilisers in particular) and plastic industry 
the products of which range from detergents to synthetic fibres.
2.1 The price policy of the refined markets
Up to 1968, Sonatrach was not involved in the domestic market. The latter 
was shared among foreign firms (BP, Esso, Mobil.etc.) which divided Algeria 
into eleven price zones. The "zero zone" comprised Algiers, Oran, Annaba and 
Skikda where petroleum products were stocked. The market price was the lowest 
in the zero zone and increased (transport differential) along the distance from 
the zero zone. This policy penalised the hinterland and accentuated the 
regional disparities (to the extent that a polarisation effect towards the coastal 
regions was inevitable).
Sonatrach's involvement in the domestic market started by its buying BP's 
network in January 1967*6 and the nationalisation of American interests in 
June 1967. Finally by May 1968 foreign capital was totally nationalised and 
Sonatrach became the only operator in the domestic market of energy 
products*?. The 12th June 1968 decree, then, introduced a new price structure
which was to stimulate the growth of the more backward regions by 
cheapening all petroleum products.
Table III.l. Domestic price reductions after nationalisation (AD/hi.)
Lowest Price Highest Price New Price
Premium 99.10 110.59 97
Petrol 89.20 99.60 89
Paraffin Oil 34.60 45.00 32.95
Diesel 59.60 71.03 44.70
DFO 20.30 31.73 19.30
LF0(AD/R) 16.45 30.06 16
Source: Amended from Mazri, H. (1975) Les Hydrocarbures dans JEconomie ed.
SNED, Alger, p.99.
Although all regions benefited from the price reductions, the backward 
ones (the hinterland) benefited most.
Liquified gas followed the same path since from an average price of 16 
dinars/bottle, a unique price was set at 10 dinars/bottle^.
Despite the fall in their market prices, energy products were still heavily 
taxed after the nationalisation of the network.
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Table III. 2. Energy products, prices and taxation (AD/h.)
Products Market Price Taxation % Taxation
Premium Petrol 97 71.16 73.36
Petrol 89 66.08 74.25
Paraffin Oil 32.95 11.74 35.6
Diesel 44.70 40.35 90.27
LFO 16 0.47 2.9
Source; Amended from Mazri, H., op. cit\ p. 98.
Premium and petrol were the most expensive. The heavy taxation 
encompassed in their prices allowed the government a possible income 
redistribution from well-to-do categories (owners of private cars) to other less 
affluent ones. Paraffin oil and diesel on the other hand were relatively less 
expensive (although the latter was heavily taxed). Paraffin oil was used to 
improve the living conditions of the rural population (lighting) and diesel to 
stimulate the development of transportation means (lorries and buses in 
particular).
Finally LFO (light fuel oil) being a feedstock for industrial activities, its low 
price and negligable taxation was to improve the competitiveness of the 
industrial sector through low cost energy. This policy led De Bernis^ to argue 
that, by having at its disposal a low priced energy source, the national industry 
could compete effectively at the international level and favour the implantation 
of downstream activities which would fill in the intersectoral matrix.
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Sonatrach’s price policy developed along the same logic since while oil prices 
jumped in 1976 in the world market, the shock was not passed on to the domestic 
one.
Table III.3- Trend of average prices* in the domestic market (selected products)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Butane 100 100.9 104.5 104.4 104.4
Premium 100 153.6 153.6 154.5 154.5
DFO 100 100.3 100.3 99.3 99.3
Diesel 100 99.02 99.02 98.4 98.4
LFO 100 100 100 99.6 99.6
TSP (fertiliser) 100 99.08 99.08 99.2 99.2
DAP (fertiliser) 100 127.8 127.8 126.2 126.2
Source: Sonatrach, Division, organisation et planification, juin 1979. Quoted in 
Mekkideche, M. op.cit, p. 249-250. Base period 1974:100.
DFO: Domestic Fuel Oil. LFO: LightFuel Oil.
The table above shows a fall in real terms of most of the products (in 
particular DFO, Diesel and LFO). The price increase of premium relates to the 
heavy taxation which is integrated in the price structures.
The disconnection of domestic prices from world prices nevertheless had 
two contradictory effects:
- On the one hand Sonatrach's policy could meet the potential demand of 
either the productive section (forward linkages) or the private
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households, thus motivating downstream activities and improving their 
competitiveness (through low energy costs) and improving the living 
conditions of the population (thus triggering a multiplier effect)
- On the other hand, the same policy may result in a wastage of financial 
resources (see section 2-4 below) whereby overconsumption of some 
petroleum products would constitute a loss of foreign currency earnings. 
This loss would then reduce the impact of the fiscal linkage on the 
domestic economy as a whole
2.2 The domestic consumption of energy products
The existence of domestic energy sources constitutes a necessary condition 
for energy product utilisation on a large scale but not a sufficient one. The 
price policy (presented above) and investment on infrastructure were to 
generate an effective use of hydrocarbon products.
According to Sonatrach, expenditure on infrastructure during the first four 
year plan (1970-73) fell short of demand which soared due to the price fall of 
1968 and the investment programme of the plan. The marketing network was 
characterised at the end of the p l a n ^ O  by:
- A total disequilibrium in terms of stocking tanks between the coastal 
regions and the hinterland, hence shortages of petroleum products were 
chronic outside the coastal belt
- A lack of transportation means despite the acquisition of 500 tank-trucks
- A loose allotment of selling points outside the coastal regions
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The infrastructure left by the colonial power and developed by Sonatrach 
during the first four year plan could hot back up the energy demand. Hence 
Sonatrach had to devote part of its investment in the hydrocarbon industry into 
covering the whole territory by a dense network of stocking and selling points.
During the second four year plan (1974-77) the stock and distribution 
network received an investment of 1306 million dinars (6.7% of the total 
investment in the hydrocarbon industry). This network and the low price of 
energy formed then the basis upon which Sonatrach could contribute to 
spreading the use of energy products within the domestic economy. The 
potential demand of the developing sectors became effective and energy 
consumption was multiplied by six between 1965 and 1980.
Table III.4. Energy Consumption (1965-1980) in t.o.e. (ton of oil equivalent)
1965 1969 1973 1977 1980
1515 2594 3953 6018 9460
Source: MEIP, Alger 1978
1980: UN Statistical Yearbook 1981.
Sonatrach's actions permitted on the other hand a reshuffling of energy 
sources in favour of hydrocarbon products.
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Table III.5. Energy Consumption S tructured)
Source 1967 1969 1973 1974 1980
Coal and wood 19 13 7 0 o
Coke 0 3 3 2 4
Crude oil 0 0 0 1 1
Refined products 49 49 59 56 45
N.G. 8 9 8 15 21.4
L.P.G. 5 7 7 9 8.9
Electricity 19 19 16 17 19.7
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Source: MEIP, Alger 1978
1980: own computation based on UN Statistical Yearbook data (1981)
The noticeable feature of the table above is the disappearance (from 1977) of 
coal and wood as a source of energy whereas their consumption amounted to 19% 
of total energy consumption in 1965. The increase in natural gas consumption, 
on the contrary, constituted a by-product of the gas export programme which 
allowed gas consumption to grow from 8% in 1965 to 21.4% in 1980. Households 
in urban areas actually switched on to natural gas while those in rural areas 
replaced coal and wood by gas, oil and liquified petroleum gas. The switch from 
wood and coal to refined products actually meant a halt to forest destruction 
which reached a peak during the independence war.
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2.3 On the production and consumption of petrochemical products
Contrary to crude oil and energy products the production of petro-chemical 
products basically aimed at satisfying the domestic market. Their contribution 
to integrating the economy is more straightforward in that their very existence 
implies a qualitative improvement of the forces of production within the 
economy.
But despite the going on-stream of the Arzew complex (nitrogenous 
fertilisers) in 1969 and the Annaba complex (phosphate fertilisers) in 1972, the 
consumption of fertilisers could not be met by domestic output. Although 
installed capacity was, at the time of conception (1966), five times the level of 
consumption, Sonatrach had to rely on imports to meet domestic demand.
Table III.6. Domestic output and import of fertilisers (103 tons)
Fertilisers 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
N .Fertilisers^) 
Production 77 117 85 109 52 75 67 89 85.4 34.1
Imports 60.7 92.2 176 59.4 110.7 152.7120.4 87.4 78.2 117.3
P. Fertilisers^) 
Production 82 139 91 107 77 113 106.3 82.7
Imports 100.7 214.5 118.5 47.7 100 20.1 74.3 40.3 10 6
(-27.7)3
(1) Nitrogenous fertilisers (2) Phosphate fertilisers (3) Export
Source: MPAT, service des douanes, Sonatrach, quoted in Molina, I. (1983)
"La politique agraire: integration inter-sectorielle et evolutions 
structurelles", in Les Politiques Agraires en Algerie, vers 
L Autonomie oula Dgpendance, CREA, Alger, p. 291.
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Actual domestic output was well below the theoretical capacity, since both 
complexes had never gone beyond 50% of installed capacity.






1972 18 15 1977 18 37
1973 22 48 1978 17 46
1974 10 41 1979 7 32
1975 15 35
1976 14 41
Source: Sonatrach, quoted in Bedrani, S., 1'Agriculture Alg6rienne face au marchS 
mondial, in LesPolitiquesAgraire, .op.cit,, p.93.
After eight years of "practice", the "collective worker" could not master the 
production process for reasons that seem to have been beyond its control, in 
particular:
1. The gigantism of the installation which was supposed to generate 
economies of scale
2. The inadequacy of the environment at an economic social and technical 
level
By choosing large complexes. Algerian policy-makers sought to realise 
economies of scale, but their choice ultimately resulted in the emergence of an 
experimental field for the concerned transnational firms.21 Thus the Annaba 
complex was at the time of construction one of the biggest of its kind. Its 
sulphuric acid unit (495,000 t/year) was in fact the biggest^ while its 
phosphoric acid unit (165,000 t/year) ranked among the eleven largest (of
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which 5 are situated in the USA). The same argument would apply to Arzew 
complex since its ammonia unit (300,000 t/year) had twice the capacity of any 
other unit built at the same time. 23 These units however never reached their 
designed capacity.
The gigantism of the installations and the sophisticated technology^ used 
resulted not in economies of scale but in an increase in the number of 
breakdowns that could not be handled by Algerian technicians. Besides the 
technical problems facing the fertilisers complexes, the environment in which 
they were evolving was not appropriate for an optimal use of the equipment:
- The maintenance of sophisticated equipment generated a flow of foreign
technicians (usually from the conceiver or the builder) and of spare
parts from abroad that, due to delays (bureaucratic among others) had
25resulted in chronical stopping of the complexes
- The high turnover of the domestic labour force on the other hand 
impeded any building up of know-how and resulted in a quasi-idleness of 
Algerian technicians.^
- Finally, due to the complete lack of specialised firms in their 
environment, the complexes had to create and manage activities that 
were outside their scope: plumbing, electricity, masonry,
transportation, labour force training.etc
The complexes have actually been built along "advanced" economies criteria 
whereas the Algerian scene lacked the appropriate environment. To reach
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their optimal level, these complexes might have needed to be totally integrated 
not with the Algerian economy but with the world market and in particular 
with their conceivers or builders. Direct links between the latter and the 
complexes would have suppressed the problems mentioned above. This solution 
however would have put into question the building of the so-called national and 
independent economy.
Concerning plastic petrochemistry, its aim was;
1. To provide the domestic market with the basic products:
- Olefins (ethylene, propylene, butadiene) and methanol
- Aromatics (benzene, toluene, xylene)
that would serve as feedback for downstream processes (see Appendix III-3) 
Whereas methanol and olefins production became effective in 1976 
and 1977 respectively, aromatics production only emerged with the going on- 
stream of the Skikda refinery (1980)
2. To provide feedstocks (from the first objective) for downstream activities.
The second aim was not fulfilled during the period under investigation (1962-
1980) and has not materialised during the fifth year plan (1980-1984). Sonatrach was 
then left with output that could not be absorbed domestically. Only 20% of CPI/Z 
methanol complex output was utilised by the El-Asnam units whereas the rest (80%) 
had to find outlets within the world market. Part of ethylene output (the Skikda 
complex) was exported while polyethylene (48,000 t/year) was used up within the 
domestic market 27. Finally, because no steam-cracking of naphtha had been built, 
the latter produced by the Skikda refinery was exported whereas as a feedstock it 
could increase olefin output.
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Contrary to fertiliser industry, plastic industry needed more investment in 
downstream processes in order to complete the petrochemical chain which 
could emerge through production of (see Appendix III-3):
- Thermoplastics (polyethylene, polypropylene, dystyrene)
- Synthetic fibres (polyester, acrylic)
- Elastomere (synthetic rubber)
- Chemical products (pesticides, herbicides, cosmetics)
Implementation of downstream activities seems, moreover, to have been 
thwarted by external factors, in particular the market size constraint which 
implies consideration of two possible alternatives^:
An internal option: satisfaction of domestic needs
- An external option: satisfaction of domestic needs and export of excess 
output
The first option implies less investment (14 billion dinars) but higher 
production costs. Moreover it assumes the possibility of forecasting future 
domestic demand with a greater reliability. The second option, on the other 
hand, requires heavier investment (29 million dinars) but lower production 
costs (economies of scale). Both options nevertheless necessitate borrowing 
from foreign institutions which may impose restrictions that do not suit 
Algerian policy-makers. 29 Finally the second option poses the question 
regarding the availability of foreign markets to absorb Algerian output in a 
situation where excessive capacity in the European petrochemical industry has 
existed since the early 1970s.30
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Thus whereas the fertiliser industry could not respond to domestic demand, 
the plastic industry was still in the process of being built. The contribution of 
plastic industry to the integration of the domestic economy and to the 
materialisation of forward linkages does not, then, seem to be substantial. On 
the other hand, the fertiliser industry, which was supposed to direct its output 
towards the agricultural sector, had not been able to respond to domestic 
demand.
The linkage effects which would stem from meeting the requirement of the 
domestic market were not, therefore, fully operational. In this context the 
motivating function assigned to the hydrocarbon industry does not seem to have 
materialised to the extent that:
- Backward linkages emerge outside the domestic economy and reinforce 
the Algerian economy dependency on imports of a complex technology
- Forward linkages are hampered by the fact that the fertiliser 
industry cannot respond to domestic demand despite its 
theoretical capacity, whereas the plastic industry is still to be 
fully implemented
If the absence of the first type of linkage seems to have been inherent to 
the growth strategy adopted by Algerian policy-makers, the second type of 
linkage, however, may have been domestically dealt with by additional 
investments in the plastic industry and a more palpable involvement of 
Algerian technicians in the labour process. For, potentially, Sonatrach 
exhibited the same ratio of qualified personnel to the total workforce as a 
comparable oil com pany30 in the advanced capitalist countries. The 
involvement of Algerian technicians in the labour process and a direct
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confrontation with the imported technology seems, however, to have been 
hampered by the particular circumstances upon which the Algerian growth 
strategy evolved (see part C, Ch. II).
2-4. Sonatrach's policy and the domestic market
Availability of hydrocarbons then constituted an asset for the 
implementation of an integrated industrial framework. Although representing 
an essential means for spreading the usage of refined products, the adapted 
price policy had limitations that were neither explicit nor advantageous to 
Sonatrach as a firm. Prices handled by Sonatrach were set by government 
decrees and represented "political prices" rather than market ones. In fact 
Sonatrach was subsidising the rest of the economy through prices set below 
costs of production. Thus in 1979 total loss due to the price structure imposed by 
the government amounted to 1168.10  ^ dinars and was split into the following 
items:







N..G. D/103m3 12.5 43.5 31 103 106
L.P.G. D/ton 669 753 84 56 106
Fuels D/ton 882 1045 163 549 106
Fertilisers D/ton 424 1239 587 478 106
TOTAL 1186 106
Source: Sonatrach, Division PGR 1980,quoted in Mekkideche, M., op. a t, p. 255.
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This situation was furthermore appropriate for a wasting of resources which 
could have otherwise been exported (thus gaining foreign currency).
According to its "PGR division" Sonatrach was indirectly losing money 
through an overconsumption of premium petrol and lubricants within the 
domestic market. Losses stemming from opportunity costs (import of premium 
petrol and lubricants to satisfy demand) represented a rather important drop in 
foreign currency earning: 63 million dinars in 1979 and 72 million in 1980.
Instead of exporting these products, Sonatrach had to import some quantities 
at world prices and sell them at a loss within the domestic market. This situation 
constituted an obvious wasting of non-renewable domestic resources and a loss of 
earning for the economy as a whole. On the other hand, the direct loss due to the 
price structure imposed upon Sonatrach could improve (as De Bernis would argue) 
the competitiveness of other sectors of the economy and constitute an asset for 
implementing industries that could not be built in other circumstances.
The low cost of energy and petrochemical products (for agriculture in 
particular) would have improved the cost structure of downstream activities and 
brought about the erection of such activities as the first step. The latter would 
then have been followed in a second stage by the replacement of hydrocarbons as 
the main export item when downstream activities became competitive (through a 
process of learning by doing) within the world market. In fact the development 
of hydrocarbon exports which had soared from 32.48 tce.(tons of coal equivalent) 
in 1964 to 101.32 tee. in 1980^ 1 and investment in hydrocarbon industry (see 
section 3 below) points to the inability of downstream activities penetrating the 
world market and reaching a self-sustained accumulation process.
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Despite its growing mechanisation and the use of fertilisers, agriculture had 
not been able to respond to domestic demand, since the import of foodstuffs kept 
on increasing and absorbed part of the hydrocarbon receipts.
Table III.9. Import of foodstuffs and export of hydrocarbons (109 dinars)
1963 1967 1969 1973 1977 1980
I 0.766 0.8 0.6 1.8 4.4 8.0
X 2.168 2.6 3.1 7 24.4 51.379
l / l 35% 30.8% 19% 25.7% 18% 15.6*
Source: 1963 and 1980: Benissad, M.E. (1982) Economic do Developpemcnt do 
EAlg&ric, OPU , pp. 189 and 191.
1967-1977: MPAT, Synthcse du Bilan.,. Economiquo ot Social do la 
D6connio 67-78, Mai 1980, Alger, pp..300 and 301.
Furthermore, whereas in 1967,72% of cereal consumption was met by domestic 
output, in 1978, the latter satisfied only 34.57* of total consumption.32 The same 
pattern appears for all agricultural products.
The industrial sector, on the other hand, did not fulfill Algerian policy­
makers' expectations. For despite its relatively important share in investment 
spending (see section 3 - 1  below) its contribution to GDP kept on d e c l i n i n g 3 3  along 
with efficiency. (See Table III.10 below).
The incapacity of either the agricultural sector or the industrial one 
(hydrocarbons excluded) to either meet domestic demand or be competitive within
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the world market actually resulted in a relative hypertrophy of the hydrocarbon 
industry.
Table III.10 Efficiency of capital and industrial output per head of the Algerian 
industrial sectors (1966-1977)
(excluding hydrocarbons and public works) in constant 1969 dinars




1966 3289.5 0.416 35596
1969 3400.0 0.364 -
1973 4752.5 0.319 23409
1977 6363.6 0.210 21518
Source: DSCN - SEP quoted from Palloix, C., Industrialisation et financement lors 
des deux plans quadriennaux (1970-77) in Revue Tiers-Monde T.XXI, 
No.83, p .542.
3. Hydrocarbon industry and the financing function
The productive capacity installed within the hydrocarbon industry, in fact, 
exceeded and was to exceed demand from the domestic market. The second basic 
function (financing) is to explain this non-correspondence between supply and 
domestic demand. Algerian policy-makers had always argued that export of raw 
materials constituted a basic feature of an under-developed economy.
Export of crude oil had therefore to be disregarded in favour of export of 
refined products, for in the Algerian policy-makers' view:
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"It is by a systematic processing of our national resources, by setting 
up of a basic industry providing the indispensable foundation of 
industrial processes... that the complete transformation of national 
economic conditions will be realised .,.."34
Having taken the hydrocarbon industry as the basic foreign currency earner 
for the chosen growth strategy, Algerian policy-makers had to devote part of 
investment spending to this industry in order to:
1. Create the basic industry (motivating function through forward and 
backward linkages)
2. Maximise foreign currency earning (financing function through a 
fiscal linkage)
Through its financing function, the hydrocarbon industry became the pillar 
that would shape the whole Algerian economy.
3.1. The development of the hydrocarbon industry
Having equated development with industrialisation and accepted De Berni's 
industrialising industries model, Algerian policy-makers had focused on the 
development of the industrial productive basis (as opposed to agriculture). This 
development was, however, biased from the very beginning to the extent that 
industry in general would absorb most planned investment, hydrocarbons 
attracting most of that investment.
The growth of industry, and of the hydrocarbon industry in particular, 
followed a trend of growing share in total investment after having been 
negligible during the colonial era and the first years of independence.
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Table III.l 1. Planned investment (total and in industry) lO^dinars
1963-66 1967-69 1970-73 1974-77
Total investment (1) 3.929 9.06 27.75 110.22
Investment in 
Industry (2) 0.81 5.4 12.4 48
2/1 (%) 20.6 59.6 44.7 43.55
Source: 1963-66: De Bernis G.D., Deux strategies pour l'industrialisation du Tiers- 
Monde, in Revue Tiers-Monde, No. 47, Juillet-Septembre 1971, pp. 562 et 
563.
1967-77: Synthese du Bilan..., op xiL pp.7et23
The share of industrial investment in total investment rose from 20.6% (1963- 
66) to an average of 49% during the three consecutive plans whereas the share of 
agricultural investment dropped from 13.9% in the period 1963-66 to 10.8% in the 
second four year plan.35 By contrast, from being negligible during the first 
years of independence, the hydrocarbon industry had monopolised most 
industrial investment since 1967.
For the three plans, planned industrial investment was to reach 66 billion 
dinars, of which 26.4 billions (40%) would be invested in the hydrocarbon 
industry. In fact actual investment amounted to 99.86 billion dinars while the 
hydrocarbon industry received 48.3 billion (48.4%). (See Table 111-12 below).
But while investment spending (in monetary terms) went beyond what was 
planned, in actual fact it did not generate the expected material base. In order to 
achieve the different plans 9.06 billion dinars had to be spent for the first plan,
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15.68 billion for the second plan and 92.61 billion for the third one. Thus from an 
expected investment of 66 billion dinars (for the three plans) the completion of 
the planned projects was to need 217.21 billion dinars. The cost of all the projects 
included in the different plans represented more than three times the anticipated 
cost.
Table III.12. Industrial investment (10  ^current dinars)
1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978-80
Total investment 5400 12400 48000
Planned investment
Invest in hydrocarbons 2300 4600 19500
Total investment 4890 20820 74150 116735
Realised investment
Invest in hydrocarbons 2500 9800 36000 38700
Total investment 35.05% 57.04% 44.46%
Rate of realisation
Invest in hydrocarbons 54.34% 61.25% 56.60%
Source; Amended from MPAT, Synthese du Bilan..., op. tit., p.22 
1978-80: Benissad, M.E. (1985) StrategiesetExperience de 
D&velopppement, OPU, Alger, p. 192.
Hence the period 1978-80 covered a non-planned period which allowed a 
partial completion of delayed projects,36 In this period industrial investment
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represented 56.1%3? 0f total investment while investment in the hydrocarbon 
industry represented 33.2% of industrial investment.^ The discrepancy between 
planned and actual investment may stem from the fact that Algerian planners 
had to work with variables that were not in their control and suggests that the 
planning process lacked coherence.
Among factors that generated cost overrun, the external ones could be 
synthesised in the major role granted to transnational firms (in conceiving and 
building projects) and correlatively in the minor role (if any) played by Algerian 
technicians.
Formulas like "key in hand" or "product in hand" actually covered the 
disengagement of Algerian technicians from any active process in favour of the 
full involvement of the transnational firms (see section 3-3 below). The latter 
had therefore enough leeway to inflate their costs since their Algerian partners 
were not in a position to control the veracity of their claims. On the other hand 
internal factors were also at work in the emergence of cost overun.
Of particular importance was the multitude of projects starting at the same 
time and creating competition among scarce resources (qualified labour force and 
some raw materials). This competition penalised (through delays in particular) 
industries that were not financially strong enough or did not possess the required 
"capital of relations".39 Furthermore, resort to international indebtedness 
(guaranteed by hydrocarbon reserves), necessitated by the huge investment 
programmes, was to push costs up (through payment of interest in particular). In 
fact the effects of both external and internal factors suggest that the investment 
programmes of the plans over-estimated the absorptive capacity of the economy.
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Investment in the hydrocarbon industry was furthermore disconnected from 
domestic demand since it basically aimed at the world market. The actual target 
(the world market) would then explain the unevenness of investment within the 
industry, since investment on exploration and petrochemical industry went 
respectively from 24.7% and 14.6% in 1967-69 to 10% and 8.8% in 1974-78. On the 
contrary investment on the LNG path jumped from 0.3% in 1967-69 to 14.2% in 
1974-78.40
The LNG path was developed on the assumption that the export of natural gas 
would gradually replace export of oil as a foreign currency earner. The 
financing function in this context would be devoted to natural gas whereas the oil 
industry would be internalised. Investment in the hydrocarbon industry then 
went beyond the need of the domestic economy and aimed at maximising the 
financial capacity of the economy.
3.2 On the financing function of the hydrocarbon industry
The investment needed to materialise the growth strategy chosen by the 
Algerian policy-makers had to be backed by financial resources drawn either 
from the export of hydrcarbons or international loans. Hydrocarbons have 
steadily risen from 57.8% of total exports in 1963 to 90% in 1975*1 onward and 
represented a main source of external financing of the successive plans. On the 
other hand international loans guaranteed by the existence of hydrocarbon 
resources constituted the second source of foreign currency.
The share of external financing (hydrocarbon receipts and loans) in the 
investment structure of the different plans followed the same trend as 
hydrocarbon exports. During the first four year plan external financing backed
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32.7% of total spending while it backed 62% during the second four year plan.*2
The growing share of external financing in the investment structure then 
resulted in the opening of the Algerian economy towards the world market 
(through the financial and commodities markets). This opening may however 
represent a contradiction to the claimed aim of building an introverted economy 
and constitute a new form of dependency which would jeopardise the possibility 
of an autonomous accumulation process. Due to the investment programmes of 
the different plans and to the speed with which Algerian policy-makers were 
implementing the industrial base, Algeria ranked in 1980 among the five most 
indebted countries of the "developing world".42 With a debt estimated at 20 
billion dollars, the debt service monopolised a growing share of export receipts.
Table III.13. Ratio of debt service to exports (%)
Year 1967 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Ratio % 4 8 15 15 14 13.7 16.1 17.1 22.3 38.3 31.4
Source: Benissad, M.E.C1982) Economic du Developpement de lAlgbrie, OPU, 
Alger, p.251
MPAT, Syn these du Bilan..., .op. tit., p .286.
1980: own computations based on MAPT, DGS, L Algerie on Quelques 
Chiffres, Alger, 1982, p.23; and OECD (1981) External Debt o f Developing 
Countries, Paris, p.19.
The ease with which Algerian policy-makers had been obtaining loans from 
international consortia may suggest that far from being opposed to international 
capital, the Algerian growth strategy was developing in accordance with the long 
term strategy of the latter. International loans along with hydrocarbon exports 
actually constituted the materialisation of a fiscal linkage between the
149
hydrocarbon industry and the rest of the economy.
The financial contribution of the hydrocarbon industry would then be 
grasped through a study of the foreign currency balance sheet of the state oil 
company (Sonatrach).
Table IIL14. Balance sheet of the hydrocarbon industry (10^ dollars)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Receipts:
Exports 4.5 4.1 5.2 5.9 6.2 25.9
Borrowing 0.9 1 1.2 1.3 2.2 6.6
TOTAL 5.4 5.1 6.4 .7.2 8.4 32.5
Spending:
Investment 0.96 1.33 1.93 3.22 3-4 10.84
Debt service 0.3 0.2 0.33 0.42 0.6 1.85
TOTAL 1.26 1.53 2.26 3.64 4 12.69
Balance (R-S) 4.14 3.57 4.14 3.56 4.4 19.81
S/R 23% 30% 35% 50.5% 47.6%
Source: Sonatrach, Planning divisions 1980, quoted in Mekkideche, M., op. ciL 
P 324.
The hydrocarbon industry had been obtaining foreign currency through two 
channels: export and borrowing which added up to 32.5 billion dollars for the 
period 1974-78. Investment in the hydrocarbon industry, however, kept on 
increasing throughout the period, since from a share of 23% of total receipts 
(1974) it monopolised around 50% by the end of the period. Moreover, for the year
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1978, out of a total amount borrowed of 4 billion dollars, more than 2 billions were 
due to finance projects in the hydrocarbon industry.43 This policy led to a 
relative hypertrophy of this industry since its share in GDP rose from 17.2% in 
1967 to 32.1% in 1980.44 The whole concept of the hydrocarbon industry as the 
motivating industry seemed to have covered a self-sustained accumulation within 
this industry instead of the expected growth of the other sectors of the economy.
Table III. 15. Hydrocarbons output
Products Unit 1967 1969 1973 1977 1978
Crude oil and 
condensate 106t 39 44.6 50.8 53.4 57.1
NG lO r^n^ 2.9 2.9 4.8 7.9 13.2
LNG 109m3 1.3 1.8 2.5 4.2 6.6
Refining 106t 1.9 2.0 47 4.1 4.4
LPG 106t 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7
Source: MPAT, Synthese du Bilan .... op. c/t. p .65.
The growth of the hydrocarbon industry was then reflected in the adopted 
policy of maximising output, the bulk of it being directed towards the world 
market. Investment in the hydrocarbon industry could however generate a 
higher flow of hydrocarbons since idle-capacities constituted a basic 
characteristic of this industry. (See Table 111.16 below).
These sterile over-capacities may suggest that Algerian policy-makers 
anticipated a higher level of export for both oil and gas. Whereas higher gas
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export seemed appropriate with the gas reserves (see section 2-2, chapter II) 
higher oil exports would signify the end of any oil production in less than 15 
years. The actual fact that over-capacities existed must be related to the lack of a 
long term policy on one hand and poor forecasting on the other.
Table III .16. Idle-capacities in the hydrocarbon industry
1967 1978
Gas extraction 16 109m3/year 20 109m3/year
Gas transportation 11 109 " 13.8 109 "
LNG - 10 109
Oil transportation 11 1()6 ton/year 17 10^ton/year
Source: MPAT, Syn these du Bilan... , op. c it. p. 66.
The lack of long term policy is exemplified by the over-capacity in the oil 
industry. For if ail the installed capacity (74 million tons in 1978) were used, by 
1990 Algeria would have had to import oil and face the world price of oil instead of 
a domestic cost. The whole growth strategy would then be put into question. Poor 
forecasting is related to the optimistic view about the capacity (or the 
willingness) of “advanced" economies to absorb gas output (in particular liquified 
natural gas).
The over-capacity present in the hydrocarbon industry actually constituted a 
loss of resources for other sectors of the economy. The deterioration of the terms 
of traded and the "incapacity" (as shown by the state of mono-exporter of the 
Algerian economy) of the other sectors of the economy to finance their own
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investment may partly justify the over-spending on the hydrocarbon industry. 
Facing this situation and having to fulfill the requirement of the chosen growth 
strategy, the hydrocarbon industry had to expand through a network (the world 
market) where conflicting interests had to be dealt with.
3.3 The impact of international relations on the hydrocarbon industry
Due to an apparent deficit in domestic human resources which amounted, 
according to Sonatrach, to more than 4000 highly qualified personnel (engineers 
and workers) in 1979 and more than 7000 for the early 1980 d e c a d e , 45 the setting 
up of the hydrocarbon industry implied the emergence of links between 
Sonatrach and transnational firms which monopolised the technology and know 
how. The contractual relationships between Sonatrach and foreign operators 
went through several stages.
Before 1974 signed contracts were of the type "key in hands" (turnkey 
contracts) or "product in hand". This type of contract reproduced plants already 
in existence elsewhere. In both cases the transnational firm would agree on an 
estimated cost of the concerned project and carry out the investment based on A 
fixed and non-revisable price. Sonatrach's role was, in this context, reduced to a 
distant supervision of the whole process. These types of contract however
suppressed (for the Algerian firm) the task of managing several contracts but
/
implied the absence of its labour force (in particular/5at the engineering level) 
within the realisation process of a given project. For the transnational firm on 
the other hand the contracts mentioned above did not make provisions for sudden 
perturbations within the world market, i.e. the jump of the oil price in 1973. In 
fact this jump made obsolete both contracts in that forecasting the cost of any 
projects was no longer possible for the transnational firm (forecasting the trend 
of a crucial variable (the oil price) seemed no longer feasible).
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The "cost plus fee" contract then came into being and ensured a substantial 
profit to the transnational firm whatever the cost of the project. According to 
this contract, the foreign operator carries out an investment, recovers its 
spending and is attributed an agreed fee. To control the foreign operator 
spending and to avoid inflated costs, Sonatrach then hires a foreign firm to do 
s o *
Being absent from the engineering process and aiming at being competitive 
within the world market, Sonatrach was reduced to accepting the technology 
imposed by the foreign operators. The lack of domestic technical skill, on the 
other hand, made it difficult if not impossible for Sonatrach to control the 
adequacy of the technology chosen (or more precisely imposed) by the foreign 
operator.
Furthermore, the need to avoid dependency on one partner pushed Sonatrach 
into diversifying its relationships but created a multitude of processes which 
could hardly be mastered over a short period of time by the domestic labour force. 
In the refining activities eleven processes were utilised while in the liquifying 
ones four processes existed.47
The lack of domestic skills, the type of contracts developed by Sonatrach with 
foreign operators and the multitude of processes used in the hydrocarbons 
industry required, for every project, the emergence of a downstream 
relationship: the so-called technical assistance. This latter took different forms 
in response to specific problems:
1. From the very beginning of its activities, Sonatrach hired technical 
assistants on an individual basis. This formula however was worthwhile
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neither to Sonatrach nor to the foreign operator. These assistants were 
not generally skilled for the specific process utilised by the latter and 
represented a loss of earnings for the foreign operator who would prefer 
to place its own staff
2. The shortcomings of the above formula resulted in the setting up of a 
partnership through a mixed management structure. Sonatrach would 
then create an association with a foreign operator motivated (usually as a 
customer) by optimal performances of the installation^
Although the mixed management formula might ensure an optimal production 
level, it contradicted (at least in the short and medium term) the financial 
function assigned to the hydrocarbon industry, for in the above formula the 
share in management represented a share in the oil rent too. The internalisation 
of the financial surplus assigned to Sonatrach was therefore partially offset by 
foreign operators' involvement in the management of the complexes. This 
involvement through the so-called technical assistance developed through the 
years instead of declining. For the whole Algerian economy the cost of technical 
assistance grew from one billion dinars in 1973 to 8.6 billions in 1978 and 
amounted to 28.8 billions for the period 1973-78. Of the total cost of 28.8 billions, 14 
billions were disbursed for the hydrocarbon industry.49
Although technical assistance was (or should be) conceived as a momentary 
phenomenum which would create the conditions of its disappearance it actually 
surged into every stage of any project from feasibility studies to management of 
the complexes. The non-existence of co-ordination among Algerian companies 
generated duplications of identical studies and hindered the capitalisation of 
know-how by Algerian technicians who were constantly pushed outside technical
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activities and into administrative work. The financial ease (based on the belief 
that the reserves of hydrocarbons were unlimited) and the myth of the foreign 
expert (who was assumed to know more than any Algerian technician) allowed, 
then, a constant rebirth of technical assistance.
Although Sonatrach's claimed aim was the domination of the motivating 
function over the financing one, the incapacity of other sectors of the economy 
to reach a self-sustained accumulation and the cost of implementing and 
operating the hydrocarbon productive basis seem to have pushed the 
hydrocarbon industry outside the domestic economy.
The externalisation of the hydrocarbon industry constituted, nevertheless, a 
necessity which could not be avoided in view of the requirement of the Algerian 
growth strategy. This externalisation of the hydrocarbon industry would, 
however, be beneficial to the Algerian economy only in so far as Algerian policy­
makers could:
1. Negotiate their integration into the world market (for oil in particular) 
and maximise the receipts of hydrocarbons from exports
2. Gradually divert the internationalisation of the capital process (of which 
peripheral economies in general and Algeria in particular constitute 
moorings) into a self-sustained accumulation process
Whereas the first condition emphasises the role of the financing function, the 
second condition favours the realisation of the motivating function. Mastering 
domestic hydrocarbon resources and appropriating a larger share of the oil rent, 
represented then the challenge and the essential means for implementing an 
integrated economy. The integration of the economy, however, goes beyond a
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purely economic problem and requires conditions (political conditions in 
particular) which the very appropriation of the oil rent may oppose (see Part C).
The world market for oil must nevertheless constitute the first battlefield (the 
second field being the domestic one) upon which the struggle over the 
appropriation of a larger share of the oil rent would take place.
The struggle over the appropriation of the oil rent, however, started before 
Algeria's independence and involved the French government and the major oil 
companies (dominated by US interests) which monopolised Middle-East oil (see 
Part B). As a petroleum economy, Algeria did not actually constitute another 
oilfield for the oil cartel but was to evolve at first along with the French 
government's policy in its search for secure sources of energy.
The first phase of the history of Algerian oil may then be grasped as the 
history of the erection of an enclave economy oriented towards the French 
economy. This phase was to spread from the first discovery of oil to the year 1969 
when Algeria joined OPEC.
The second phase, on the other hand, actually started in February 1971 when 
the Algerian government, through Sonatrach, took a majority control over the 
Algerian oil industry. The latter was then to play a leading role in the 
implementation of a growth strategy which was assumed to put into question the 
prevailing international division of labour.
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The first phase in the history of the Algerian oil industry took place after World 
War II which constituted the catalyst for starting research in the Sahara desert.
Having realised that control of oil resources represented an objective condition 
for its economic and military might, the French government could not be satisfied 
by its dependency on Middle-East oil. Thus in October 1945, the French government 
set up the Bureau de Recherches Petrolieres (BRP), the task of which was to direct a 
research programme in the Metropolis and its colonial dependencies.*
By 1952 the Societe de Recherches Petrolieres en Algerie (SN RepaDand the 
Compagnie Fran^ aise des Petroles (CFP) received concessions covering 240,000 
km^. The conceded surface kept on increasing and reached 600,000 km^ in 1954 and 
800,000 km^ in 1960.2 These two companies were joined in 1953 by the "Companie 
des Petroles d'Algerie" (CPA) controlled by Royal Dutch Shell and the Companie de 
Recherche et d'Exploitation du Petrole au Sahara (CREPS) controlled by the French 
government.
As early as 1954 the CREPS discovered a deposit of dry gas at Djebel Berga (South 
West of In-Salah). Although gas was not what the oil companies were looking for, 
its discovery nevertheless confirmed the existence of hydrocarbons in the region. 
In January 1956, the CREPS finally discovered the exploitable deposit of Eddjeleh 
(near the Libyan border) and other deposits in the same region. In June of the 
same year joint research between CFPA and the SNRepal led to the discovery of the
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Hassi-Messaoud deposit (the most important ever discovered). Finally in November 
1956 the SN Repal discovered the important humid gas deposit of Hassi R'Mel.
After a few years of research, the oil companies fulfilled the French 
government's expectations by reducing the Metropolis dependency on Middle-East
oil. To convey oil to its market (the French one), a first six inch diameter pipeline 
was laid down between Hassi-Messaoud and Touggourt (200 km) from which oil was 
carried by tank-wagons to the port of Skikda. Meanwhile a second, 24 inch 
diameter pipeline linking Hassi-Messaoud to Bejaia (662 km) was under 
construction and started carrying oil in November 1959. Finally a third pipeline 
(24 inch diameter) linking Edjeleh to the Skhirra (Tunisia) (772 km) began 
conveying oil by September 1960.
The discovery of oil in the "French" Sahara, obviously attracted non-French 
firms which could n o t, a priori, carry out the French government policy. To keep 
the Saharan oil within the French influence (both economic and political) a set of 
legislation (known as the Saharan oil code of which the ordonnance of the 22nd 
November 1958^  constituted the basic text), was promulgated.
1. From the Saharan oil code to the Evian Accords
The Sahara oil code4 stated in its preamble that:
"Metropolitan France, basically interested in safeguarding security of 
supply in the Franc zone, hereby wishes to show that she is not interested 
in a heavy taxation arising from the exploitation of Sahara oil resources."
The code, then, embodied two main objectives:
1. To ensure French administrative control over oil activities in the Sahara.
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2 To attract capital investment through more favourable terms than those 
prevailing in the Middle East
At the juridicial level, operating firms had to be constituted under French law 
and French nationals were to predominate their boards of * directors. In the case of 
conflicts of interests between a company and the conceding authority, the French 
Council of State was the only body entitled to make a decision. Against this close 
administrative control, the oil companies were nevertheless confronted by a more 
liberal fiscal policy than the one prevailing in the Middle East.
Concerning the pricing of Saharan oil, the code (article 33) stated that: "Selling 
prices (posted prices) of crude or finished products must be the current prices of 
the international market which are set according to the modalities of the 
convention type." These were then defined as those prices which allowed Saharan 
oil to reach the consumption regions at the same level as prices of oil coming from 
other regions (article C33 of the convention type).
Due to its proximity to the French market, Saharan oil had then to be 
overpriced to comply with article 33 of the code. The oil companies could then 
realise a surplus profit that would not be taxed since taxation was calculated on the 
basis of the "realised price" which was lower than the posted price.
Taxation, on the other hand, amounted to 50% of net profit (article 65). But 
royalty (12.5% of the value of oil at the field) was not considered as cost to the 
producer but was actually tax deductible.
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Finally, companies were authorised to set up a "provision for reconstitution of 
the oilfield" (depletion allowance) which amounted to 27.5% of the value of oil at 
the field. The depletion allowance was tax free for five years but had to be used in 
exploration expenditure (not necessarily in the Sahara).
The tax system provided by the Saharan oil code, then, offered more favourable 
terms to the operating oil firms than those confronting them in the Middle East (see 
chapter V below). On the other hand, the role of the French government as tax 
collector was marginal. Its policy, however, was to strengthen French oil 
companies in their competition with the "majors" and to increase the amount of 
"Franc oil" in France's oil consumption.
The Evian Accords (which led to the independence of Algeria) nevertheless 
stressed the continuation of the Saharan oil code after Algeria's independence and 
stated that: "Algeria succeeds France in its rights, prerogatives and obligations as a 
conceding public power in the Sahara, for the application of the oil and mining 
legislation".5
What the Evian Accords did not mention was the fact that the Saharan oil code 
was greatly revised (especially about the relations between oil companies and the 
State) a few weeks before the signing of the Accords in order to increase the 
autonomy of the oil companies vis-a-vis the conceding authority i.e. the Algerian 
State. The main changes to the Saharan oil code were included in two decrees (16 
and 17 February 1962)6.
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The decree of 16 February 1962 suppressed the state's involvement in fixing the 
oil price, thereby allowing the oil companies to decide upon the level of taxation 
they should be subjected to. The same decree reduced from four years to one the 
time given to the tax authorities to question the calculations of the selling prices of 
oil leaving the field.
The decree of 17 February 1962, on the other hand, authorised companies 
operating in the Sahara to revalue their assets even if they had been already 
amortised.
The increased autonomy of the oil companies stemming from the revision of the 
Saharan oil code meant that the Algerian State’s supervision of the oil industry (as 
implied by the Evian Accords) looked more nominal than actual. In the same 
context, the Evian Accords developed a discrepancy between Algerian 
independence and French involvement in the oil industry.
The Accords set up a body called the "Organisme Saharien” wherein French and 
Algerian interests were equally represented. The Organisme’s role was to supervise 
the development of hydrocarbons and protect the rights of the oil companies as 
defined by the revised Saharan code (paragraph 9 of the declarations).
Since the Organisme’s directorate was shared equally between the two 
countries, any decision taken by the Algerian authorities had to have the approval 
of their French counterpart. Furthermore the Evian Accords imposed preferential 
treatment for French interests in general and French oil companies' interests? in 
particular:
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1. Oil and gas sold to France had to be paid in French Francs
2. For six years (after independence), preference would, subject to tender, be 
granted to French companies over concession of mining rights
3. Finally, the Evian Accords took away the arbitrational authority of the 
French Council of State but transferred it to an international arbitration 
tribunal rather than to the Algerian Supreme Court.
In 1962 and despite Algeria's independence, the oil industry was more connected 
with the French economy than the Algerian one. While the oil companies kept 
control over the whole production process and the price level at which they 
transferred Algerian oil to Metropolitan France, the Algerian State was reduced to a 
completely passive role in the oil industry.
The confrontation over the appropriation of a larger share of the oil rent had, 
nevertheless, to be postponed insofar as the Algerian state lacked both the financial 
and human resources to take over the oil industry. The creation of a state oil 
company (Sonatrach) in December 1963, and the building of a third pipeline (with 
the help of a British firm, C.J.B.)8 against the provisions of the Saharan oil code9' 
constituted a first step towards a greater involvement of the Algerian State in the 
oil business. From the Algerian viewpoint, transport of crude oil constituted the 
weakest link in the hydrocarbon chain and represented a technologically 
masterable "springboard" for expansion towards other phases of the oil chain.
The calling into question of the Saharan oil code by the Algerian government 
was again confirmed by the decision of 16th July 1964. The latter stated that 
companies holding concession titles had to keep at least 50% of their Algerian 
turnover in Algeria, while foreign service companies could transfer abroad (if
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authorised) at most 35% of their turnover.
Having been confined to the role of a tax collector by the Saharan oil code, the 
Algerian State had no means to setup an oil policy that would realise the objectives 
drawn up in the official texts. The two decisions mentioned above showed, 
nevertheless, the Algerian State's commitment towards the appropriation of a 
larger share of the oil rent and served to speed up negotiations (which lasted 
eighteen months) with the French State about exploitation of Saharan oil. By July 
1965, France and Algeria reached an agreement which set up a new type of 
relationship between consumer and exporting countries.
2. The 1965 A greem en t^
The 1965 agreement actually constituted an original framework for co­
operation between exporting and consumer countries. Its originality basically 
stemmed from two hitherto unknown clauses* * concerning the oil industry:
1. The agreement was signed by two sovereign states which stated that the 
former was conceived in order to favour the development of Algeria on the 
one hand and to ensure France with a continuous flow of oil on the other. 
A joint body, the "Organisme de Co-operation Industrielle" (O.C.I.), was 
then set up in order to carry out surveys and implement industrial projects
2. The second clause created a co-operative association (ASCOOP) in which 
Sonatrach would be fully operational in association with SOPEFAL 
(controlled by the French firm ERAP). ASCOOP's purpose was to organise 
exploration and production of oil over an exclusive area (180,000 km^) 
which included the most promising sites
\
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Within this framework Sonatrach would emerge as an active participant in the 
oil industry whereas Middle-East countries were still struggling as tax collectors. 
The active role that Sonatrach was to play could then be backed by two institutes 
that would respond to Sonatrach's demand for a qualified labour force:
1. The Institut National des Hydrocrabures et de la Chimie (I.N.H.C.) was 
created in 1964 with the help of the Soviet Union
2. The Institut Algerian du PStrole (I.A.P.) was part of the 1965 agreement 
package
Both institutes were to produce engineers and technicians for the different 
phases of the oil industry.
The tax system, on the other hand, was partially revised in order to meet some 
Algerian demands. Hence the reference price was no longer set up unilateraly by 
the oil companies but involved the French and Algerian governments. Taxes would 
be calculated upon a weighted average of three different reference prices which 
differed from the posted prices set up by the oil companies.
Table IV-1. Posted and Reference prices in 1965




Source: Mazri H. Les hydrocarbures dans l'economie Algerienne, SNED, Alger 
1975 p. 80 and 81
168
While reference prices were lower than corresponding posted prices, the tax 
rate on French firms' profit was to increase to 53% for 1965-67, 54% in 1968 and 55% 
in 1969. Non-French companies were, however, to pay their taxes on the basis of 
the higher posted prices. The fiscal privileges accorded to the French companies 
may be related to the credit facilities offered to the Algerian party through the
O.C.I. 12 On the other, hand the abolition of the depletion allowance and the 
adoption (by the French oil companies) of a linear depreciation system allowed the 
Algerian government to appropriate more revenues. In the same context the 1965 
agreement recognised the validity of the 16th July 1964 decision (concerning 
capital transfer). This agreement, then, constituted a new framework for oil 
exploitation in the Sahara.
On the one hand the French government safeguarded a continuous flow of oil, 
relatively underpriced and still payable in French Francs. The Algerian State, on 
the other hand, increased its earnings from oil taxation (see Appendix IV.l) and 
entered, via Sonatrach, into the oil industry scene. It increased its participation to 
50% in SN Repal, which was integrated in ASCOOP, controlled 11.8% of crude oil 
production and owned 107o of the Algiers refinery .^  Although the 1965 
agreements emphasised the privileged Algerian-French relationship in the 
exploitation of Saharan oil and left the non-French oil companies with an 
uncertain future, Sonatrach set up service companies in association with non- 
French firms (mostly American) which provided the technology but accepted 
Sonatrach majority control (see Appendix IV.2). The control of upstream activities 
and the mastering of the technology involved, then, constituted another step taken 
by Sonatrach in order to comprehend the oil exploitation process. The 
abandonment of the rule of parity in the mixed companies' management may,
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nevertheless, suggest that the undermining of the spirit of the 1965 agreement on 
Sonatrach's part was under way.
This undermining., however, avoided a direct confrontation with French 
interests but concentrated on improving Sonatrach's position with (or against) 
non-French partners. The latter were gradually nationalised and increased 
Sonatrach's assets in the oil industry (see Appendix IV.3).
The move against non-French interests, however, took place at the same time as 
the erection of a totally new type of association between Sonatrach and a foreign 
partner. In October 1968, Sonatrach and Getty Oil (USA) signed a contract which 
stated that Sonatrach would control the association (51% share) and be the 
operating partner.^  Getty Oil, on the other hand, agreed to invest 7 ,000  
dinars/km^ over a five y e a r * 5  period and keep 75% of its turnover in Algeria.*6 
Finally Getty Oil was to pay a tax of 55% of net profit (royalty being a cost to the 
producer) based on a reference price of $2.28/bP
The Sonatrach-Getty association actually constituted a breakthrough into the 
general pattern of association between exporting countries and foreign firms. 
Moreover it put into question the content of the 1965 agreement which constituted 
(from the Algerian point of view) a compromise that had to be renegotiated (article 
27 and 52 of the agreement) in the light of events taking place in Algeria and 
within the world oil market.
Events that had taken place in Algeria can be visualised through Sonatrach's 
development from a marketing company (decree of December 1963) to a thoroughly 
integrated oil firm. By 1969, through purchase and nationalisation, Sonatrach was 
to control:
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- 56% of the research permits***
- 25% of total crude oil production
- 52% of the transport sector (pipelines)
- 56% of the refining sector
- 100% of the domestic distribution network
- 20.5% of crude oil export*9
Sonatrach's involvement in the oil industry at Anglo-American expense was 
furthermore matched by an "on the job" training of previously unskilled workers 
under Soviet experts' direction. By 1969, the Sonatrach labour force amounted to 
8860 individuals of whom more than 20% were qualified engineers or m a n a g e r s .^ 9
Sonatrach's dependence on French firms expertise vis-d-vis the exploitation of 
Saharan oil was no longer absolute. On the contrary the use of rivalries among oil 
firms (in particular between French and American ones) resulted in the 
emergence of Sonatrach as an autonomous company which could confront the still 
dominant French oil companies over the appropriation of the oil rent (see 
Appendix IV .4)
At the international level, market conditions were to reinforce Sonatrach’s 
claim towards a renegotiation of the 1965 oil agreement.
Due to peculiar events^* within the international scene the price of crude oil 
(in particular the Mediterranean one) started increasing after 1967 (having been 
stable since 1962). The closure of the Suez Canal (June 1967) favoured all 
Mediterranean exporters (Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) except Algeria. Whereas
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the former increased the price of their crude by 7 cents (freight differential or 
Suez premium) Algeria was still bound by the 1965 agreement. The closure of the 
Tapline, on the other hand, which carried 17% of Saudi Arabia's output to the 
Syrian port of Sidon in 1969 represented a loss of 25 million tons per year. This 
closure brought about an increase of 20 cents per barrel for Iraqi crude exported 
from the Syrian port of Baniyas and the Lebanese port of Tripoli. Finally in 
September 1969, the Sanoussi Monarchy in Libya was overthrown by a military 
junta who nationalised the marketing companies a year later (1970), imposed a rate 
of taxation of 54% (instead of 50%) and raised the posted price of oil by 30 cents.22
The evolution in the Libyan scene could hardly be overlooked by Algerian 
policy-makers since the Libyan oil (in terms of quality and proximity to the 
European market) was very similar to the Algerian one. Sonatrach's relative 
autonomy and the increase of crude oil prices in the world market constituted an 
objective reason and an appropriate evolution for the Algerian State to require the 
renegotiation of the 1965 oil agreement with its French counterpart.
To strengthen its bargaining position Algeria finally joined OPEC in July 1969. 
The terms of the 1965 oil agreement and the French-Algerian privileged relations 
could no longer continue. The first contradicted the OPEC system (in particular the 
taxation system) whereas the second did not prove worthwhile to Algeria's 
development (see section below). The struggle between Algeria and France over 
the appropriation of the oil rent became effective by the year 1969.
3. The 1971 nationalisation as the domestic control o f the oil rent
In January 1969 the Algerian government notified the oil companies about the 
provisional character of the reference prices which had to be renegotiated in
172
accordance with article 27 of the 1965 agreement. Formal negotiations however 
started at a later date (24 November 1969) but were suspended in June 1970. The 
Algerian demands during the negotiations can be summarised in four points:^3
1. Posted prices should be increased to their 1962 level, i.e.
2.665 $/b FOB Arzew 
2.650 $/b FOB Bejaia 
2.610 $/b FOB LaSkhirra
2. Taxable profit should be calculated on the basis of the posted price and 55% 
of net profit should be appropriated by the Algerian state
3. Royalty must be considered as cost to the producer (as in the OPEC system)
4. The above demands should be applied retroactively from January 1969
Not only did the French party not accept an upward revision of the reference 
price but argued that the latter should be cut by 4 cents/barrel. Later, in January 
1970, the French proposed a scheme whereby the reference price would be set at 
$2.16 /b for 1969 and gradually increase to $2.31 /b by 1975.^ 4
In view of the market conditions in general and the pricing of Mediterranean 
oil in particular, the French offer was rejected by the Algerian authorities, for it 
implied that the 1975 price of Algerian crude would (in monetary terms) be inferior 
to its 1960 price ($2.65 /b).
From the Algerian State's viewpoint the renegotiation of the 1965 oil agreement 
was to result in an increase in its share of the oil rent. This increase would, 
furthermore, not only update the taxation structure along with the OPEC system but 
would bring about an end to the privileged Algerian-French relationship. The
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latter through ASCOOP, did not seem to bear the anticipated success in the 
relationship between an exporting country and a consuming one (at least from the 
exporting country's viewpoint).
In actual fact ASCOOP did not seem to have responded to the Algerian party's 
expectations. Over a five year period (1966-1970) ASCOOP had produced less than 10 
milllion tons of oil from a discovered proved reserve of 50 million tons.25 SOPEFAL 
(the French partner in ASCOOP), on the other hand, had spent an average of 675 
Francs/km^ over that period,^ These expenditures however represented only one 
tenth of what "Getty Oil" agreed to invest within its own perimeter.
In this context the Algerian party was to consider that its French partner was 
not investing enough in the exploration stage but was relying on the already 
discovered oil (inside and outside ASCOOP perimeter) to respond to the French oil 
policy of diversification of oil sources. The French companies seemed, then, to have 
responded to the French Fifth Plan (1966-1970) which envisaged a levelling off of 
oil imports from Algeria to one third of total imports.27
Hence, whereas the Algerian State's interests lay in a thorough development of 
the oil industry to back its "development plans", its French partner's goal was to 
spread its influence over other exporting countries. In this context ERAP 
expansion had likely been based on Algerian oil exploitation since the latter 
represented 80% of ERAP total output^ in 1969.
According to M a d e l in ,^  for the period 1966-1970, ERAP profits transferred 
abroad had been estimated at 750 million Francs while exploration expenditure
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outside Algeria amounted to 350 million Francs. ERAP expansion outside Algeria 
objectively represented a loss of earnings for the Algerian economy in general 
(lack of linkages) and for the oil industry in particular (stagnation of the output 
level).
On a comparative basis, the loss of earnings suffered by the Algerian State 
stemmed not only from the foreign firms' involvement in the oil industry, but from 
the privileged status accorded to French firms under the 1965 agreement. Thus, 
whereas the Algerian State's receipts stagnated at 73 5 cents/barrel, other oil 
exporting states had experienced a substantial increase in their income since 1964.
Table IV-2. Payment per barrel (selected countries) cents/barrel
Year Kuwait S. Arabia Iraq Libya Venezuela
1964 76.9 82.0 80.1 62.9 95.4
1966 78.4 83.4 81.3 87.0 95.8
1968 80.5 87.8 90.7 100.7 101.4
1970 82.9 88.3 94.2 109.0 109.2
Source: Petroleum Press Service Vol. 38 (1971) p. 327
The magnitude of the reference price agreed upon in the 1965 oil agreement 
($2.08 /b,) and the position of the royalty as tax deductable, should have (from the 
Algerian viewpoint) been compensated for by a French involvement in developing 
the oil industry in general and oil resources in particular. If the latter stagnated 
because of strategic reasons (cf. French Fifth Plan) the former could not emerge 
since Sonatrach was requiring a majority control 30 The clauses of the 1965 
agreement, then, contributed to a loss of earnings of about 36 cents/barrel (see
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Table IV.3 below).
For the period 1965-1968, the loss of earnings (for the Algerian State) stemming 
from the non-application of the OPEC formula amounted to about 400 million dollars. 
The recovering of this loss, however, could not result from the fulfilment of 
Algerian demands which were not accepted by the French party.
Table IV-3. Alternative Earnings of the Algerian State ($/b)
1965 Agreement Formula OPEC Formula
Reference price 2.08 Posted price* 2.65
Royalty ** 0.2875
Cost 0.75 Cost + Royalty 1.0375
Taxable profit 1.33 Taxable profit 1.6125
Tax 0.8062
Earnings of Algeria 0.735 Earnings of Algeria *** 1.0937
Source: Mazri H. op.at. p .86
* When Middie-East prices stabilised in 1961 Algeria's oil was posted at 
$2.65/b
** Royalty = 12.5% of $2.30 (price of oil at the field)
*** Earnings of Algeria = Royalty + tax
Hence on the 20th July 1970, the Algerian Energy Minister unilaterally 
decided to increase the reference price of Algerian oil from 2.08 dollars to 2.85.3* 
The figure $2.85/b, chosen as the new reference price, actually corresponded to a 
posted price of $2.65/b in the OPEC system and was directly related to the price of 
the Libyan crude ($2.53/b). While rejecting the Algerian decision, the French 
government proposed the opening of overall talks between the two governments. 
The talks started on 5th October 1970 and were to concern not only the oil problem
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but Algerian emigration to France, the marketing of Algerian wine and French co- 
operation in the Algerian educational system.
These negotiations, which were supposed to update the 1965 agreement, could 
not however produce any compromise, and on 24th February 1971 the Algerian 
government a n n o u n c e d ^  that Algiers was taking a majority control (51%) in all oil 
firms operating in the country (see Appendix IV.3). Sonatrach, as the state 
operator, was designated as the new majority shareholder. In the same 
announcement the Algerian authorities proclaimed the complete nationalisation of 
natural gas fields and of all natural gas pipelines within national boundaries. On 
the other hand the Algerian government promised an appropriate indemnification 
to the oil companies concerned (see Appenndix IV.5). The 1971 nationalisation 
then, put an end to the privileged French-Algerian relationship. Hence, while 
Algeria supplied France with around 30% of its oil import between 1965 and 1970, by 
1975 the figure dropped to 5-5%^.
By recovering control over its oil and gas resources, the Algerian policy­
makers could appropriate more of the rent attached to oil exploitation. Hence they 
had the means to finance and implement the growth process decided upon in 1967 
(first year of the planned period). The rent appropriation, however, had to be 
derived not through a bilateral struggle (French versus Algerian interests) but 
within the world market for oil where conflicting interests emerge as the 
continuous struggle over the appropriation of the oil rent by three main actors i.e. 
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CHAPTER V 
OPEC STRUGGLE AND THE LOCALIS ATION OF THE OIL RENT
The 1970s, during which the Algerian growth strategy was fully 
implemented, witnessed a dramatic increase in the posted price of crude oil.
This apparently unilateral decision of OPEC constituted a turning point in 
the sharing of the oil rent between the actors concerned in the oil scene. The 
fourfold increase (from $2,898 to $11.651 /b) of the posted price of the marker 
crude as of January 1974 may be understood (as a first approximation) as a 
deliberate action by OPEC to appropriate a rent which already existed in the 
price structure of the refined products sold to final consumers (see Part A, Ch. I, 
Section 3).
The history of OPEC oil may then be grasped as the history of the struggle 
over the appropriation of the oil rent. The existence of the latter stems from 
the fact that oil is no ordinary commodity. As a source of energy and in view of 
the prevailing technology, it has the ability to "unlock frozen labour 
(machines) at the least cost".
Under these circumstances, the market price of oil depends, not on 
conditions of supply and demand within the crude oil market, but on conditions 
reflecting the state of the energy sphere as a whole, and on the relationship of 
power (rapport de force ) prevailing among the three main actors on the oil 
scene, i.e. the oil exporting states, the transnational oil companies and the states
_©f i r o p o ' T t i o ^  C C U h t v i f c S
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1- The oil industry before the 1970s
To the extent that discovery of oil in the Middle East happened while the 
region was under colonial rule, the world oil market took shape without any 
active participation from the oil exporting states. Hence the use of the 
Sherman Act to dismantle Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company in 1911, and to 
split it up into thirty-three independent companies, constituted an internal US 
affair and did not prevent the reconstitution of the oil cartel on a world scale 
and its domination over Middle East oilfields.
In actual fact, up to the 1950s, seven oil companies (the seven sisters) 
controlled 98.3% of the oil production supplying the world market^ (excluding 
the Eastern block and the USA). The emergence of the cartel took place 
through joint venture and tacit collusion whereby the seven sisters were to 
control the flow of oil (and its price) to major consumer areas. The control of 
oil on a world scale, then, emerged as the control of Middle East oilfields and the 
division among the cartel's members of the marketing network for refined 
products.
a The control of Middle East oilfields and the marketing network
Advocating the "open door policy''.^ American companies were able to enter 
into a scene (July 1928) hitherto dominated by British interests. The Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC), formerly shared between BP and Royal Dutch Shell, 
became a multinational company jointly owned^ by 





After entering IPC, the American companies, however, lost interest in the 
so-called open door policy which was actually transformed into its opposite. 
Provisions'* were set up in order to ensure that no independent company could 
receive concessions from the Iraqi Government and no single company from 
the consortium develop a concession on its own.
Domination of Saudi Arabian oilfields followed the same pattern. Although 
Socal discovered oil in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and could have competed, in 
association with Texaco against Exxon and Mobil, by providing crude oil to 
independent companies, it was finally forced into entering a joint venture with 
Exxon and Mobil (1946)5 Aramco was then shared among Socal (30%) Exxon 
(30%), Texaco (30%) and Mobil (10%).
While Saudi Arabia's oilfields came under the cartel domination, Kuwait, 
which was outside the "red line area", was divided on a fifty-fifty basis (1934) 
between Gulf and BP which entered into contract to supply crude oil to the rest 
of the majors (Shell, Exxon, Mobil).
Finally, in 1933, Iran came under the complete domination of BP6 which 
entered into negotiation with crude-short majors (Exxon and Mobil) in order to 
find outlets for the Iranian source of supply. A set of rules? concerning the 
marketing of oil was laid down in order to maintain the stability of the world 
market for oil. After the overthrow of Mossadeq (1952), the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company faced a new shares distribution. While BP kept 40%, Shell received 
7%, the five other sisters received 7% each, CFP 6% and American 
"independents" (Organised as Tricon) received 5%.
\
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The Middle East oilfields were then completely controlled by the oil cartel 
through joint ventures. Oil supply from the Middle East could then be regulated 
in order to balance supply and demand on a world scale.
Control over Middle East oil by the cartel was paralleled by an agreement8
(the Achnacarry Agreement of 1928) which specified each company's share 
within the marketing scene ("as is" principle). The principles agreed upon in 
the Achnacarry meeting amounted to six:9
1. Accepting and maintaining as their share of markets the status quo of 
each member
2. Making existing facilities available to competitors on a favourable basis 
but not at less than actual cost to the owner
3. Adding new facilities only as actually needed to supply increased
requirements of consumers
4. Maintaining for each producing area the financial advantage of its 
geographical location
5. Drawing supplies from the nearest producing area
6. Preventing any surplus production in a given geographical area from 
upsetting the price structure in any other area
Through this collusion the oil cartel was able to predetermine the overall 
growth of oil supply coming from the OPEC countries.
From 1950 to 1972, oil supply from these countries grew at an annual rate of 
9 . 5 5 % . Output from different countries, however, showed a steady rate of 
increase (Saudi Arabia, Iran), slower rate of increase (Venezuela, Kuwait and 
Iraq), precipitous rises in some other areas (Libya up to 1970) and occasional 
decline (Iran 1950-54, Iraq 1957,1967,1972, Nigeria 1968).
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The cartel strategy therefore considered OPEC members as an oilfield which 
was to be exploited, not in accordance with the different countries' needs but in 
relation to the consuming countries' demand. On the other hand the cartel 
developed a price matching policy which avoided any price war among the 
companies concerned.
b The prices policy of the cartel
(1) Up to 1944, the Achnacarry Agreement provided a unique price of crude oil 
within each market. Oil became a homogeneous commodity, the price of which 
bore no relation to its production cost. Thus the price of oil (whatever its 
origin) in any market would be determined as the sum of the posted price of 
Texas crude oil and the transport cost to the market concerned (the system was 
known as the Gulf plus system). A phantom freight was then included in the 
Middle East oil price paid by European consumers.
In fact, the Middle East oil price had no market price at all, since the major 
oil companies were completely integrated and transactions outside their 
integrated framework were very rare.**
Since Middle East production costs were relatively lower than US costs,^ the 
cartel was able to appropriate a surplus profit through its control over Middle 
East oil. The adopted price policy responded to the interests of both the cartel 
and the US economy.
By considering the US Gulf as the reference point, the cartel could keep on 
exploiting its domestic (US) resources which would compete with low-cost 
Middle East oil on the one hand, and on the other, improve the US security as a
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world power. 13 A high price of oil would then allow investment in exploration 
(to increase proven reserves) and the survival of marginal producers (to fill in 
the energy balance).
The high price of Middle East oil, however, did not benefit the host countries 
which were politically and economically irrrelevant to the functioning of the 
oil industry. Ground-rent was more of a bribery than an integral part of the oil 
rent. In fact, up to 1950 no framework existed for the payment of the ground- 
rent to the host country. It was actually left to the cartel to decide upon the 
level of the royalty.^
Thus Article 10 of the W. D’Arcy concession of 1901 stipulated that the 
Iranian Government would receive £20,000 in cash and £20,000 in shares. Saudi 
Arabian authorities were to receive bonuses totalling £140,000, of which 
£100,000 would be paid after discovery of oil. The other Middle East countries 
shared the same fate (but at less expense to the cartel) as Iran and Saudi Arabia.
(2) It was then left to European countries, and in particular to Britain, to 
challenge the price structure imposed by the cartel. Although the British 
Government objected to paying phantom freight for fuel purchased by its navy 
from a Middle East refinery, and asked for its removal, the fact that the British 
Navy had been mainly supplied by Abadan refinery under British control and 
that negotiations took place with Aramco, suggests that the British 
government's initiative (at the end of the war) was actually aimed at preventing 
American interests from taking over British ones.
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While "sterling crude" could easily be developed from Iran and Iraq, where 
BP was present, "dollar crude" needed (through Aramco in particular) 
important investments in order to develop oilfields under American 
i n f l u e n c e . 5^ Thus, on British initiative, the Gulf plus system was abandoned in 
favour of a system of two basing points: the Texas Gulf and the Persian Gulf.
By the end of the war, the price of the representative crude (36° API) was set 
at 1.05 dollars per barrel in both gulfs. Under these conditions, crude oil 
coming from both gulfs reached the same CIF price near the Italian coast.
The new system was, however, temporary. For after the war. reconstruction 
of Europe on the one hand, and the deficit in the American oil balance on the 
other, were to put a heavier burden on Middle East oil production. By 1947, 
Texas crude was posted at $2.75/b while Middle East crude was quoted at $2.22/b. 
The difference in posted prices pushed the neutral point westward to 
Southampton (Great Britain),
Finally, as the US oil deficit kept on increasing, the opening up of the US 
market to Middle East oil required a further drop in the latter's price. Thus in 
July 1949 the price of Arabian light was setat$1.75/b.
The new price structure whereby crudes from three different regions 
(Venezuela, Persian Gulf and US Gulf) reached the same CIF price at New York 
was to last for a decade (see Appendix V-1).
The relative decline in the price of Middle East crude decided by the cartel 
may. however, be explained not in terms of an unlikely competitive market,I6
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but as an outcome, or more precisely as a compromise, between the search for a 
maximum surplus profit by the cartel and the long term interests of the 
American economy in its emergence as a world power.
In the supply of Europe, the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA)^ 
played a leading role. This amounted to saving as many dollars as possible out 
of the dollar bill paid by European importing countries with US taxpayers’ 
money. Pressures had (directly or indirectly)^ been put on the cartel to lower 
its Middle East price.
On the other hand, the latter could not fail beyond the limit which would put 
the US domestic oil industry into jeopardy. The equalisation at New York of CIF 
prices of crudes of all origins constituted the ultimate reference for the setting 
up of various posted prices. Under these conditions the oil companies could 
increase their surplus profit by supplying a market which was expanding at a 
rate of 10% annually.^ European countries could import crude oil at a 
relatively cheaper price than the USA. Finally, the latter could import Middle 
East oil to fill in their deficit without damaging their domestic industry.
This price structure was made possible because of two hitherto basic features 
of the oil industry:
1. The existence of the oil cartel which could regulate the oil market and 
determine the oil price
2. The convergence of interests between the oil cartel and the US 
authorities
The emergence of nationalistic feelings in Europe and the oil exporting 
countries could, however, constitute a challenge to the supremacy of American 
interests in the world market.
187
c The erosion of the cartel domination
The 1950s actually witnessed the gradual decline of the cartel domination 
over the oil market through the appearance of newcomers (state-owned and 
independent companies). The latter took advantage of the existence of a rent in 
the price of oil to offer more favourable terms to the host countries.
In France, as early as 1944, the "Institut Fran^ais du Petrole" (IFP) was 
created. Its aim was to produce oil specialists for all stages of the industry. 
Then, in 1945, an institution called the "Bureau de Recherche Petroliere (BRP) 
was set up in order to supervise oil activities in France and its colonies. By 
1976, finally, oil had been discovered in the Algerian Sahara, which was 
withdrawn from the cartel influence through a set of legislative measures (see 
PartB, Ch. IV).
The Italian authorities followed the example of the French and set up a 
national company, ENI, in 1953. Its first task was to stop Exxon and Gulf from 
exploiting natural gas discovered in the Po valley. Then, from 1955 onward, ENI 
became an international company holding concessions in Egypt (1955), Iran 
(1957) and North Africa (1958). Furthermore, ENI innovated in the sharing of 
its profit with the host country by replacing the prevailing 50-50 profit 
sharing rule by a 75-50 in favour of the host country 20 Finally, to circumvent 
the cartel domination over oil supply, ENI started importing crude oil from the 
USSR which was accused of dumping its oil at low prices.21
Japan faced the same problems as other European countries. To avoid the 
cartel network, the Arabian Oil Company was set up and received an offshore
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concession in the neutral zone under the joint sovereignty of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. The Japanese party went further than ENI in destroying the traditional 
profit sharing rule. While offered 57% of the profit attributed to crude oil 
production, the host governments received the right to buy shares in the 
company thereby sharing profits coming from downstream activities situated in
Japan .22
Finally, the cartel domination was put at risk by independent US companies 
looking for cheaper oil outside the USA. The American independents resorted 
to an aggressive policy after World War II and spread all over potential oilfields. 
By the end of the 1950s they were present in the Middle East, North Africa and 
Latin America.23 The market share of the cartel gradually decreased in favour 
of non-integrated oil supplied by independent companies.
Table V.l: Percentage market shares of international oil companies in the
world market
1950 1957 1969 1972
Largest four (Exxon, 
Texaco, Gulf, Socal)
82.6 69.5 55.8 46.7
Largest seven (largest 
four, Mobil, Shell, BP)
98.3 89.0 76.1 7.0
All others 1.7 11.0 23.9 3.0
Source: Adelman, M.A. (1972) The World Petroleum Market, Johns Hopkins
University Press, London, pp. 80-81; Sampson, A. (1975) The Seven 
Sisters, Hodder and Stoughton, London, p. 202.
The Eastern block, on the other hand, kept on increasing its exports to the 
world market from 1950. Hence, from 10,000 b/d (0.003% of oil internationally 
traded) in 1950, Eastern block exports reached 36,000 b/d (0.005% of oil
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internationally traded) in 1957, and 510,000 b/d (3.12% of oil internationally 
traded) in 1966.^^
Finally, crude oil marketed outside the cartel's integrated framework kept on 
rising throughout the 1950s. While arm's length crude amounted to 231,000 b/d 
(6.9% of oil internationally traded) it reached 1.24 mb/d (17.7% of oil 
internationally traded in 1957.25
The changing structure of the oil market implied the spread of competitive 
pressures, outside the cartel influence, by independent companies seeking a 
share in the world oil market. It brought about, on the other hand, the 
emergence of non-collusive pricing among cartel members in order that each 
member might sell its surplus oil in the third party market.
In fact, by the mid-1950s, the real price of Middle East oil (arm's length 
price) started diverging from its posted price. The former fell from $1.93/b in 
1956 to $1.60/b in 1959 whereas the latter went down from $1.93/b in 1956 to 
$1.90/b in 1959.^0 The fall in the real price of oil was neither in the interest of 
the US economy nor in the cartel's interest. The former was operating 
relatively inefficient wells and the latter was facing a drop in the rate of 
surplus profit.
To avoid the collapse of their domestic oil industry, the US authorities then 
imposed a "mandatory programme" for oil imports on 11 March 1959.27 The US 
decision, however, meant more downward pressures on the Middle East oil price.
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The closing of the US market to Middle East oil implied that the price 
structure that hitherto equalised ail CIF prices in New York could be altered 
without damage to the US economy (in particular its domestic oil producers). On 
the other hand, the cartel could reduce the effect of the fall in real price only 
inasmuch as it reduced the posted price upon which taxes were levied by host 
countries.
From 1958 onward, all Middle East posted prices started falling and with them 
the amount of tax paid to host countries by the oil companies. The fall in their 
revenues triggered the first collective reaction from a set of oil-providing 
states: OPEC was born in September 1960 in order to stop the decline of the 
posted price of oil.
2. The emergence of OPEC in the oil industry
On Venezuela's initiative, five oil exporting countries^ gathered in Baghdad 
in September 1960. This gathering was concluded by the creation of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose basic aims could be 
summarised as follows:
1. To stop any further decline of the posted price of oil
2, To appropriate a larger amount of ground-rent through an appropriate 
taxation policy
However motivated they were, OPEC members confronted a decade (the 1960s) 
mostly characterised by a trend of falling oil prices. This situation stemmed 
from two basic factors:
1. A state of excess productive capacity of about 5 mb/d that could be used
in case of supply shortages from any area^9
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2. An increasing quantity of oil offered on the market by an ever- 
increasing number of oil companies and oil exporting states which 
could increase their revenues through more exports
The relative excess supply of the 1960s actually forced OPEC to accept a freeze 
in the posted price of oil (see Appendix V-2) and concentrate mainly on the 
erection of a new taxation system more favourable to the exporting states.
After three years of negotiation, a new tax system (the OPEC system) came 
into being and was gradually applied in all oil exporting countries. The main 
features of the OPEC system amounted to using posted prices as the tax base and 
considering the royalty as a cost to the producing companies instead of being 
tax deductible.
The OPEC system did not, however, reduce the oil companies' profit (the 
American ones in particular) to the extent that the "Golden Gimmick" assured 
them of a credit against their US tax liabilities.^ The growing demand from oil 
consuming countries, on the other hand, gave the cartel the opportunity to 
offset a declining profit rate by bringing more oil onto the market.
Table V.2: Major oil companies' profits
Year Net earnings($10^) production lO^b/d Net profit/b
1963 3.335 14,393 0.635 $/b
1968 4,781 21,375 0.613
1969 4,116 23,055 0.49
Source: Petroleum Press Service (PPS), Vol. 37,1970, p.164.
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Levying their taxes on stable posted prices, the oil exporting states were 
(contrary to the oil companies) assured of a steady income despite the decline in 
the real price of oil (see Table IV.2, PartB, Ch. IV). The fall in the real price of 
oil imported by consuming countries (OECD mainly) did not, however, trigger a 
decline in the prices of refined products sold to European consumers. On the 
contrary, European tax authorities increased the amount of taxes levied on oil 
products. From 6,181 million dollars (57% of the oil rent) in 1960, the OECD 
states (excluding the USA and Canada) levied 23,342 million dollars (61% of the 
oil rent) in 1970 31
By the end of the 1960s, therefore, and despite the emergence of OPEC as a 
new actor on the oil scene, the oil industry structure was still dominated by the 
oil cartel (see Table V.l above). Most of the oil rent, on the other hand, was still 
held by the oil consuming tax authorities. Although the oil exporting states 
kept on behaving as tax collectors, the premisses for future changes in the oil 
industry structure started appearing during the 1960s:
-  OPEC as an organisation imposed itself by avoiding further drops in the 
posted price of oil. Thus while the real price was falling on a world 
scale, OPEC's income did not follow the same pattern. The cartel could no 
longer behave as if the oil exporting authorities were non-existent
-  OPEC succeeded in setting up national c o m p a n ie s ,32 the long term aim of 
which was to gradually take control of national resources
-  Finally, the energy situation in the USA started deteriorating by the end 
of the 1960s:
• Unused production capacity which had been maintained at a level of 
30-35% dropped to 19% in 196933 and was expected to disappear by 
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• While imports covered 18% of domestic consumption in 1959, by 1969 
they covered 22%
The gradual aggravation of the US energy deficit actually meant recourse to 
more imports, thereby increasing oil demand on a world scale. On the other 
hand, the slump in oil supply due to the closure of the Tapline, the reduction in 
Libyan output and the freight crisis,35 triggered upward pressures on the price 
of Middle East oil. The old equilibrium whereby the oil exporting states 
obtained a steady income, the cartel a declining profit rate and the consumer 
countries' tax authorities increasing revenues, could no longer be sustained. 
The emergence of the USA as a net importer of oil was to require a new price 
structure of oil on a world scale.
3. The energy crisis of the 1970s
The relatively low price of Middle East oil benefited neither the oil exporting 
states nor the oil companies but improved the competitiveness of non-USA OECD 
countries with respect to the US economy. The gradual opening of the latter to 
Middle East oil, however, was beneficial only in so far as the price of Middle East 
oil was brought into line with the US domestic price. The strategic goal of the 
US authorities could only be achieved through a high price of oil on a world 
scale.
An increase (a tendency of the early 1970s) in the Middle East oil price 
would benefit not only OPEC members but the oil companies and the US economy
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as well. The oil exporting states (OPEC) could levy higher taxes from oil 
produced by the oil companies. The oil companies, on the other hand, could 
revalue their assets which were in the process of being nationalised^ and 
in crease their profit rate which dropped from more than 18% in 1957 to 11-12% 
from the mid 1960s o n w a r d  37
Finally, the USA could reach their strategic goal of independence from 
imported sources of energy by: (1) exploiting the expensive Alaskan oilfield 
which stayed idle after its discovery in 1968; (2) giving a new lease of life to 
stripper wells which were to close at a rate of 20,000 a year (from 1973 );38 and 
(3) by increasing the ratio of US reserves to production which dropped to about 
ten years.38
The convergence of interests among the three main actors on the oil scene, 
then, opened the way to a price increase that could have happened without the 
October 1973 Middle East war.
a The first oil shock
The war, however, constituted the apparent cause of the jump in Middle East 
oil prices.39 Hence by the 22nd December 1973, the Teheran OPEC meeting 
decided to set the price of the marker crude at $11.65/b (instead of the pre-war 
price of $2.591/b).^ The OPEC decision would then constitute a new feature of 
the Middle East oil industry to the extent that this organisation could set the 
price of oil unilaterally. Furthermore, this decision imposed the localisation of 
a larger share of the oil rent in the price of crude oil.
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Table V.3: Cost-breakdown of an average barrel of oil sold to French consumers 
1973-1974 ($/b)
1973 % 1974 %
Costs 2.42 16.0 2.8 11.7
Producing state tax 1.7 11.2 7.7 32.2
French tax 7.67 50.6 9.18 38.4
Company profit 3.36 22.2 4.23 17.7
Average price 15.15 23.91
Source: Chevalier, J.M. op. cit.t p. 11.
The increase in the amount of ground-rent from $1.7/b to $7.7/b actually 
increased the oil exporting states' share of the oil rent to 32.2%. The rest was 
still being divided between the oil companies (17.7%) and the consumer 
countries' tax authorities (38.4%).
Although OPEC could not capture all the oil rent, the 1973-74 oil crisis 
nevertheless allowed a more favourable distribution of the rent to the oil 
providing states. Because of the price rise, however, the increase in ground- 
rent did not happen at the expense of the oil companies’ profits which, in 
absolute terms, rose from $3.36b to $4.23/b. In fact, for the oil companies in 
general4*! and the oil cartel in particular, the years 1973 and 1974, despite OPEC 
involvement in the oil industry, constituted a turning point in the level of 
earnings.
1%
Table V.4: Net profits of the major oil companies ($10b)
Year Exxon Texaco ; Mobil Socal Gulf Shell BP
1972 1,532 889 574 547 197 282 71
1973 2,443 1,292 849 844 800 730 329
1974 3,142 1,586 1,047 970 1,065 1,161 487
% incr. (73-74) 28.6 22.8 23.3 14.9 33.1 59.0 48.0
Source: Petroleum Economist, Vol. 32,1975, p. 183.
In view of the increase in the oil cartel earnings, OPEC action cannot be 
considered as having been opposed to the cartel strategy. On the contrary, 
OPEC's decision to increase the oil price, while reflecting an ineluctable 
reorganisation of the oil industry, was to give the cartel the opportunity to 
generate more income in order to gradually step out of the first stage of the oil 
industry in the Middle East and to invest in other sectors of the energy sphere.
Finally, the increase of Middle East oil prices allowed the US authorities to 
forecast the marginality of imported oil and gas in US consumption by 1985.
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Table V.5: US 1985 energy forecasts (10& tons of oil equivalent)











1. Including synthetic gas and oil.
2. Most of the increase is due to the development of geothermal energy.
3. Including shale oil.
4. The new prices led to a 15% saving compared with the initial forecast. 
According to this, the US could be a net exporter of energy in 1985.
Source: Document circulated to the Washington conference (February 1974)
quoted in Chevalier, J.M. op. cit., p. 59.
The 1973 oil shock then materialised the converging interests of the three 
main actors on the oil scene. OPEC’s action, however progressive (from the 
developing countries' viewpoint), could have happened only in so far as it was 
in harmony with the oil cartel strategy and the interests of the US whose closest 
allies (Saudi Arabia and Iran) were acting as leaders for OPEC demands.
b The second oil shock
Despite the developing world-wide recession (mid 1974) and the decline of 
world demand for oil, the period 1974-1978 did not witness any collapse of the oil 
price.
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Table V.6: Evolution of the marker crude 1973-1978







Source: Sid-Ahmed, A. (1980) L OPEP, Pass&, PresentetPerspectives, OPU,
Alger, p. 121, and Seymour, I. (1980) OPEC, Instrument o f Change, 
Macmillan, London, p. 192.
On the other hand, taxes levied by the oil exporting states were increased 
from 55% of net profit (Teheran 15-2.71) to 85% (Abu Dhabi 10.11.74). To the 
extent that the oil cartel was still involved in the Middle East concessions (see 
Appendix V-3), a high price of oil constituted the only option (for the cartel) to 
offset the increase in the level of taxation. In view of the decline in world 
demand, OPEC and the cartel's interests resided in curtailing output. While 
world demand dropped by 6.05% (from 46,300 mb/d in 1973 to 43,500 mb/d in 
1975), OPEC's output declined by 12.9%.42 The decline in OPEC's output was, 
however, uneven among the members. Saudi Arabia (the dominant OPEC 
producer) and Kuwait cut their output by a much larger proportion (20% and 
18.4% r e s p e c t iv e ly )  42 The cartel strategy had therefore been implemented, 
thanks to its closest Middle East partners.
The oil cartel monitoring of the world market for oil, then, resulted in a 
period of relative price stability (up to the end of 1978) which witnessed a 
gradual recovery in world oil consumption. This balanced pattern was,
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however, to be disturbed by two basic factors:
1. The gradual decline in OPEC surplus (current account surplus)
2. The Iranian crisis which apparently created an oil shortage
OPEC's surpluses actually declined from a peak of 62.5 billion dollars in 1974 to 
around 5 billion in 1978.
Table V.7: OPEC current accounts (1973-1978), $106
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Exports 42 116 107 132 145 146
Imports -21 -39 -58 -69 -84 -104
Net service and transport -14 -17 -22 -28 -32 -37
Current surplus 8 59 27 36 29 5
Cumulative surplus 67 94 130 159 164
Source: OECD (July 1980) Economic Outlook, quoted in Seymour, I. (1980)
OPEC, Instrument o f Change, Macmillan, London, p. 181.
The decline in OPEC surpluses actually stemmed from different reasons; in 
particular:
1. The increase in imports which soared from 21 billion dollars in 1973 to 
104 billion in 1978
2. The stagnation of OPEC exports which amounted to 317 mb/d in 1971, 
reached a peak of 38.4 mb/d in 1973 and dropped to 29.2 mb/d in 1978
3. Finally, the deterioration of the terms of trade, which actually eroded the 
price jump of 1974
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Table V.8; OPEC terms of trade, base 100,1974
Year Price of oil Price of imports Terms of trade
1970-72 19 66 28
1973 31 84 37
1974 100 100 100
1975 98 111 89
1976 106 113 94
1977 114 124 92
1978 117 144 81
4th term 117 153 77
Source: World Financial Markets, June 1979, quoted In Sid-Ahmed, A. op. cit, 
p .141.
The relative stability of the oil price meant a loss of income for OPEC 
members whose action in 1973-74 had been gradually offset by deteriorating 
conditions within the world market.
The Iranian crisis then came at the right time (at least for OPEC) to disturb 
the pattern of falling revenues for OPEC countries. The decline in Iran's output 
(from 6 mb/d in September 1978 to 2.4 mb/d in December 1978)^3 had, however, 
been partially offset by higher production in Saudi Arabia and other countries. 
OPEC output was, nevertheless, around 4.5% lower in December than it was in 
September.
The signal of a tight market, however, came not from OPEC, which raised the 
marker crude posted price to $13 50/b (+5 5%) (see Appendix V-4) but from the 
spot market where price increases ranged from 40% for light products to 18% 
for crude o il/* 3  This tendency had furthermore been accentuated by a
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complete withdrawal of Iran from the world market by the end of December.44
The Iranian crisis did not actually create a real oil shortage but disturbed 
the functioning of the third party m a r k e t4 5 by preventing the oil cartel from 
honouring its contracts with independent oil companies. In this context BP 
suffered an estimated loss of 1.4mb/d, Exxon a loss of 0.4mb/d and Socal a loss of
0..3 mb/d 46 These losses had then to be dealt with in the spot market where 
prices soared to as high as $34.5/b in May 1979.
The first oil exporting states that followed the spot market trend were not, 
however, OPEC members but the United Kingdom and Norway, which increased 
their prices by $1.50b (+11%) and $1.65/b (+12%) respectively on 15 January 
1979 46 It was not until March 1979 (Geneva meeting) that OPEC decided on 
increasing the marker crude price to $14.55/b. At the same time, however, the 
spot market was witnessing a price of $21.50/b (see Appendix V-4).
From the OPEC viewpoint the substantial difference between official prices 
and spot prices simply meant that a portion of the oil rent that could be 
appropriated at source (within the price of crude oil) was being lost to the oil 
companies and intermediaries.
While the OPEC members were actually losing money, the oil cartel in 
general and the US majors in particular increased their net income by 75% 
(from 4,546.2 million dollars in 1978 - first three quarters - to 7941.6 million 
dollars - first three quarters - in 1979). The increase in their net earnings in 
their foreign operations, however, reached 89% .4?
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Throughout the years 1979 and 1980, official prices kept on lagging behind 
spot prices thereby indicating that OPEC was not a price leader but a price 
follower. It was only by the third quarter of 1980 that official OPEC prices and 
spot prices started converging. By that time (August 1980) the marker crude 
price had increased to $28/b while the spot market was witnessing a price of 
$32/b.
A drift was, however, separating Saudi Arabia from the rest of OPEC members 
which were using a slightly higher marker crude (see Appendix V-4). A price 
unification was, however, imposed by Saudi Arabia at the Geneva conference 
(October 1981) whereby a unique marker crude price ($34/b) was agreed upon. 
At that time the marker crude spot price amounted fo $34.26/b.
The relatively high price of oil that stemmed from the peculiar market 
conditions of the end of the 1970s actually meant that oil exporting states were 
appropriating a larger portion of the oil rent.
Table V.9; OPEC revenues






Source: 1977: Petroleum Economist 1982, p. 225; other years: Petroleum
Economist, 1983, p. 215.
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The localisation of a large portion of the oil rent in the price of crude oil 
may, however, have undermined OPEC strategy in that supply of oil on a world 
scale could gradually shift from OPEC members to non-OPEC oil exporting states. 
The latter could then exploit high cost oilfields and create an excess supply at 
the prevailing price. The signs of a slack market and downward pressures on 
oil prices actually emerged before the price unification of October 1981.
4. The decline of the price of oil
The emergence of excess supply within the world market actually stemmed 
from the entrance of new oil exporting states which struggled for a market 
share that could only materialise at OPEC's expense, in view of the falling oil 
demand on a world scale.
As in the 1979 oil crisis, the signal of an unbalanced market emerged in the 
spot market where, after having peaked at$41/b in November 1980, the marker 
crude price fell by 8 to 10 dollars by mid 1981.^ The year 1981, nevertheless, 
witnessed the maintaining of a high Saudi output (10.5mb/d) instead of its 
traditional ceiling of 8.5mb/d. Meanwhile other OPEC members had to curtail 
their own output in order to avoid a fall in the offical price.^  Finally, non- 
OPEC producers followed the spot market trend and cut their official prices in 
order to compete against the relatively low price of Saudi oil.
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Table V.10: Early 1981 official price cuts (selected countries)
Date Country ! % cut
April 1981 Ecuador -11%
15 April Egypt -6%
14 May USA -5%
1 June Mexico -10%
15 June USSR -8%
UK -11%
Brunei -11%
Source: Roberts, S. (1984) Who Makes the Oil Price? Analysis o f Oil Price
Movements 197S-19S2, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
The relative excess supply of 1981, however, turned into a substantial glut 
during the year 1982.50 Thus the spot market price of the marker crude 
reached as low a figure as $28/b (6 dollars below the official price). Non-OPEC 
producers, on the other hand, constantly undercut official OPEC prices;
-  The UK price cut (early March 1982) of its "Forties" crude put the latter 
at$3 5/b below its equivalent Nigerian crude
-  Mexico followed the same pattern in pricing its "Isthmus" crude at $2.5/b 
below the marker crude
-  Finally, the USSR exported its "Export Blend" at $5/b below the marker 
crude
The effects of price undercutting by non-OPEC exporters resulted in a 
gradual decline of OPEC's market share of the world market for oil. In 1982 OPEC 
was then producing at 59% of its recorded capacity (1976) while non-OPEC oil 
had been increasing throughout, despite the decline in world demand.
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Table V.ll: World crude oil output (103 barrels)
Year (1) Non-OPEC* (2) OPEC % ofOPEC in 
total (1 + 2)
1970 5,478,872 8,122,975 59.7
1972 5,353,900 9,895,034 64.89
1974 6,012,790 11,216,064 65.1
1976 5,968,690 11,252,108 65.34
1978 6.831,960 10,906,665 61.48
1980 7,593,300 9,838,245 56.44
1982 7,981,000 6,751,708 45.8
Source: 1970,1972: Petroleum Economist, Vol. 39, p. 10.
Other years: Petroleum Economist, 1984, p. 476.
^excluding Eastern block and China.
After having reached a peak of 65.34% of total world output in 1976, OPEC 
output fell to 45.8% in 1982. The emergence of non-OPEC oil producers (Mexico, 
the UK and Norway in particular) by the midl970s imposed a new market 
structure which actually increased competition among oil exporting states. This 
competition, however, could not be monitored by the oil cartel since, after 1976, 
the latter was no longer involved in Middle East oil concessions (see Appendix 
V-3). On the contrary, crude oil being (after 1976) a purchased input, the lower 
its price, the higher the profits that could be appropriated by the oil cartel.
Thus, whereas the early seventies witnessed a convergence of interests 
between the oil cartel and OPEC with regard to a high price of oil, the structural 
change that took place by the mid 1970s transformed an objective convergence 
of interests into its opposite.
The task of regulating oil supply was no longer a necessity for the oil cartel
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which, after having been nationalised, should have aimed at as low an oil price 
as possible. Being in control of downstream activities, the oil cartel in 
particular and the oil companies in general could locate their profits in the 
transport and refining stages.
The oil consuming countries’ tax authorities, on the other hand, thanks to 
their monopoly over their respective national markets, could levy higher taxes 
on petroleum products sold to final consumers. The major portion of the oil 
rent would then be relocated (as before 1974) within the price of refined 
products and appropriated by the oil companies and the oil consuming 
countries' tax authorities.
In view of the relative stagnation of their domestic oil production (around 
3.7mb/d) since 1978 and the level of their domestic consumption which started 
rising again by the second half of 1983,51 the USA may confront a contradictory 
situation 52 Strategic goals aside, the US economy would, however, benefit from 
lower oil prices, since the bulk of exploratory investment had already been 
realised in the most promising US region (Alaska). To avoid the collapse of the 
domestic oil industry, an oil import fee could be imposed, thereby allowing the 
US Government to offset its deficit by appropriating a portion of the oil rent.
Finally, as far as OPEC members were concerned, the decline in the price of 
crude oil, and the shrinkage of their market share, could only translate into a 
lower share of the oil rent.
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Table V.12: OPEC estimated oil exports and revenues
Net exports (lO^bd) Revenues ($10^) $/b
1981 20.8 252.9 33-3
1982 16.9 201.9 32.7
1983 154 160.4 28.5
1984 15.4 159.4 28.3
Source: Petroleum Economist, July 1985-
Due to competition among oil exporting states, the oil rent could no longer 
be integrated within the price of crude oil. Since OPEC members are not 
involved in downstream activities and national markets are under the control of 
their respective national authorities, the oil rent can only emerge at the final 
stage of the oil industry (in the prices of refined products sold to final 
consumers). The state of excess oil supply that has characterised the 1980s and 
the competition from non-OPEC exporting countries actually stems from the 
location of a larger portion of the oil rent within the price of crude oil (price 
jump of 1974 and 1979). This particular localisation of the oil rent was, 
however, the consequence of:
1. The convergence of interests between the oil cartel, OPEC and the USA
2. The control of a major part of the world market by the oil cartel which 
could regulate supply
Whereas the 1970s' state of the energy market created the conditions for 
OPEC to capture a larger portion of the oil rent, the same conditions (high price 
of oil) no longer exist in the 1980s. In fact the oil jump of the 1970s and the oil 
cartel loss of control over the oil market created the conditions for the decline 
in the price of oil through the emergence of new oil producers. The seller’s
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market of the 1970s therefore turned into a buyer's market in the 1980s.
In these conditions, OPEC members who basically rely on oil exports to 
balance their current accounts, are now facing a competitive market for crude
oil. Competition among oil exporting states in general, and among OPEC 
members in particular, then becomes the only feasible path to avoid the 
collapse of individual economies (some of them heavily indebted). Competition, 
on the other hand, requires a shrinkage of the oil exporting states' share of the 
oil rent and a loss of financial earnings to back the drive towards 
industrialisation.
While the 1970s witnessed implementation of industrial projects in the OPEC 
countries and the signs of diversification in non-efficient economic activities 
(thanks to the control over a larger portion of the oil rent), the 1980s may well 
witness a reverse trend whereby OPEC members might gradually go back to 
their previous state as enclave economies acting as swing producers within the 
world market for oil.
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NOTES
1. Adelman, M.A. (1972) The World Petroleum Market, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Washington, p.80.
2. The US Government and American oil companies argued that no area should 
be closed to free competition.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE INTERNATIONAL GAS INDUSTRY
Although oil and gas are both hydrocarbons, thus similar in terms of use of 
values, their "histories’' and the usages to which they have been put contain 
more differences than similarities. In fact while oil and gas often constituted 
joint products of the same reservoir, the former was directed towards the market 
whereas the latter, considered as a nuisance {gaz fatal) had been extensively 
flared.
Since the 1950s however, gas has constituted the third tangible energy 
source. But although it represented around 22% of world consumption of 
primary energy in 1982,* the total international gas trade amounted to only 12% 
of total world output.^ This discrepancy stemmed from the fact that, contrary to 
oil upon which industrial countries based their growth, gas was not exploited 
unless its resevoir was economically close to its market.
The ratio of reserve to production of the major gas consuming areas 
nevertheless suggests that if gas is to keep its share in energy consumption, the 
international gas trade is bound to grow. To that extent gas exports, as an 
alternative to oil exports from Algeria, would apparently become feasible and a 
gas rent (if any) may replace the oil rent as a means of financing the growth of 
the domestic economy.
The analysis of the prospects for international gas trade as well as the 
relevance of gas as a replacement for oil may then be undertaken in terms of
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the magnitude of the gas material base (on a world scale) as well as the likely 
strategy of the operators concerned within the gas industry.
1. The gas material base
From 8 tcm (trillion cubic meter) in 1950 the proved gas reserves increased 
to 40 tcm in 1970 and reached 82 tcm in 1982.3 The bulk of these proved 
reserves had however shifted from North America, which accounted for 66.3% 
of world proved reserves in 1950. to Eastern Europe which took the lead with 
39.34% of world reserves in 1982/*
The general trend of the world gas reserves' magnitude suggests that North 
America and Western Europe are likely to become more and more dependent on 
imported gas if no shift in the pattern of energy consumption takes place.
Table VI. 1: World gas reserves as of 1 January 1981 (bcm)
1980 Proved Reserve to Output
Production % Reserves % Ratio
West hemisphere 720.6 43 13,018 17 18
West Europe 202.0 12 4,246 5 21
Mid-East 121.9 7 18,3% 24 151
Africa 71.7 4 5,906 8 82
Asia-Pacific 71.9 4 4,259 5 59
CPE's 507.6 30 31,752 41 63
Total 1695.7 100 100 46
Of which OECD 849.7 50 17 16
Source: IEA, Natural gas, prospects to 2000 OECD/IEA, Paris 1982.
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Table VI.1 shows that the regions which are likely to run into a deficit in the 
near future are North America and Western Europe. In this context gas 
consumption seems to be inversely correlated to the amount of proved reserves. 
In fact while the bulk of gas consumption has been concentrated in OECD 
countries (especially the USA), the gradual depletion of the latter's reserves and 
the technical and economic difficulties facing intercontinental gas transport 
may translate into a shrinkage of gas consumption on a world scale.
Although uneven, gross gas consumption increased from 194 bcm (billion 
cubic meter) in 1950 to 1600 bcm in 1980 (see table VI.2 below). Gross 
production was however far higher than consumption. This fact indicates that 
an important amount of produced gas has not found its way onto the market. In 
fact flared or reinjected gas had constituted the bulk of the Middle East and 
Africa's gross production whereas the opposite holds for the OECD countries.










N. America 242 179.3 444 377 748 685 753 690
S. America 22 3.7 54 12 94 37 121 73
W. Europe 0.9 0.9 13 12 81 77 206 196
E. Europe 14 10 64 57 252 236 506 488
Africa - - 0.5 - 39 3 116 26
Mid East 12 0.1 31 3 90 22 124 47
Far East 3 0.3 9 4 32 25 102 80
Total 294 194 615 465 1336 1085 19281600
Source: World oil, oil and gas Journal, U.N. quoted in Gadjiev M.,
"Developpement du gaz natural, Premier seminaire d'economie du gaz 
natural, Boumertes (1982) p.27
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Whereas North America marketed output reached 91% of gross output in 
1980 (74% in 1950), Middle East marketed output amounted to 38% of gross output 
haying represented 0.8% in 1950. The discrepancy between Middle East gross 
output of gas and its marketed position does indicate the position of Middle East 
(and African) countries in the international divison of labour.
During the 1950s and 1970s the oil cartel sought to maximise its profit 
through oil exploitation while gas (economically worthless from the cartel’s 
viewpoint) was either flared or reinjected to enhance oil recovery. Because of 
the structure of the world economy (based on oil rather than gas) and the 
cartel’s strategy which focused on profit maximisation, with no regard to the 
host countries’ development, the gas industry could only emerge after the 
reorganisation of the Middle East oil industry (see Part B, chapter V).
The relative increase in the share of Middle East and African marketed gas, 
then, suggests that the states concerned have been taking steps towards 
integrating gas into the economic sphere rather than flaring it.
In the event that no major shift takes place in the energy consumption 
pattern of the OECD countries and in view of the ratio of reserves to output in 
different world regions, the Middle East, Africa and the USSR could gradually 
become the only net exporters of gas by the turn of the century. International 
gas trade would follow the oil trade in the direction of its flow from the Middle 
East and North Africa to OECD countries.
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2. The peculmritiesof the gas industry
In view of the relative proximity of Algeria to Western Europe, the latter 
ought to be the likely outlet for Algerian gas. The failure of Algerian gas to 
penetrate the US market (see section 4 below) may actually reinforce Algerian 
policymakers in their belief that the US market is. for the forseeable future, 
closed to Algerian exports.
The development of the Algerian gas industry is therefore highly related to 
Western Europe energy policy and could not evolve unless Western Europe were 
willing to depend on Algerian gas supplies in particular and on gas imports in 
general.
Unlike in America., however, Western European gas consumption only 
became tangible when the Groningen field (Netherlands) was discovered in 
1959. To that extent the Netherlands and Norway are likely to be the European 
net gas exporters for the rest of the century. The gradual increase in Western 
European gas consumption (Table VI.2) is however to be partly met by imports 
from non-OECD countries.
The import requirement of Western Europe actually results in the 
emergence of gas as an international commodity alongside crude oil. But 
whereas oil constitutes a world commodity, gas (with which it is often 
compared) may only qualify as an international commodity linking a few 
supplying to a few importing countries.
The disparity between oil and gas consumption, apart from historical 
reasons has mainly been due to the relatively high cost of bringing the latter to
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the final consumer.
On a thermal equivalent basis, the cost of transporting gas through 
pipelines has been estimated at roughly twice the cost of transporting crude 
oil.5 By the same token, the cost of transporting gas in LNG tankers was 
estimated at five times the cost of transporting oil in oil tankers 5 Finally for a 
10 bcm liquifaction plant the cost of liquifying natuml gas amounts to $5 
(1978) per barrel. 5
The equalisation of oil and gas prices on a thermal basis therefore reduces 
the gas rent encompassed in the price of gas supplied by exporting states. To 
supply gas to consumer countries, two means of transportation are competing:
- The pipeline system
- The L.N.G. chain
Although specific project circumstances require a case by case study in 
order to determine the actual cost of gas transportation (which depends on 
several variables: size of the projects, port facilities, size of the gas field etc.), a 
comparison of transportation costs would be visualised through the analysis of a 
hypothetical LNG and onshore and offshore pipeline system.
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Cost of natural Gas transport 
Values at April 1980 - referred to the outlet quantities




j LNG chain 
1 (liquifaction cost 
| 1.1 -1.4 S/MBtu 
1 Regasification 
! 0.3 - 0.4 S/MBTU
JL. -ft.
5,000 10,000 
Source: G. BonfigholiandF.Cima, Distance, km
"Economies of Gas Utilisation in Different fields" 1980 
quoted in IEA, op cit. 9125.
The figure above shows that the cost of natural gas transport is highly 
dependent on the distance between the gas source and the market. Onshore 
pipelines are the least expensive, provided the distance covered is less than 6500 
km. Beyond that point the LNG chain is the best alternative.
On the other hand a submarine pipeline could compete with the LNG chain if 
the distance concerned is less than 3500 km for conventional submarine
i
pipelines and 1500 km for deepwater ones. Both means of transportation, 
however, reduce the magnitude of the gas rent because of their relative high 
cost. Since within OECD countries gas primarily competes with fuel oil and
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diesel, its market price is determined and limited by the price of these 
competing energy sources.
The crucial elements in the determination of the price of gas (as in oil) 
reside within the energy sphere. However the price of gas is not determined 
within the world market but depends on conditions peculiar to national markets. 
Thus, depending on whether the targeted market is the US or European one, 
Algerian gas would command a different FOB price ($5.12 /MBtu for the French 
market and $3 94/MBtu for the U.S. market in 1982).6
Whether gas should command a premium price (as Algerian policymakers 
argue)? depends particularly on how the former is used:
- In residential/commercial markets gas, because of its material 
characteristics, may command a premium price. However high 
distribution costs, which stem from the number of outlets of low volume 
use and wide seasonal load variance, may more than offset the premium 
paid for the particular charactistic of gas.
On the other hand, some industrial and electricity generating markets 
(which may represent the largest share of the gas market) are profit 
maximisers and ultimately focus on the least expensive Btu with no regard to the 
material bearer. In fact because of economies of scale and the need to limit the 
impact of seasonal load variance in the residential/commercial markets, the 
industrial and electricity generating sector consumption could actually make 
the difference between a viable international gas project and an uneconomic 
one.8 Since the latter sectors are unlikely to consider a premium price for gas.
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the Algerian argument does not seem to be sound.
In fact the argument for high gas prices, in terms of its material 
characteristics, seems to stem from a confusion between the gas use value and 
its exchange value. While the latter intrinsically characterises gas as a good, it 
is however the former that determines the magnitude of the market price of gas 
as a commodity.
Being within the energy sphere, gas as a commodity must nevertheless 
compete with other energy material bearers (fuel oil and diesel in OECD 
countries) and its price ultimately depends on the structural features of each 
individual domestic market. For historial reasons, gas constitutes a newcomer in 
world energy consumption. As such it can only increase its market share by 
conceding a discount on its price vis A vis the price of well established 
competing fuels.
In view of the energy consumption pattern of Western Europe, the 
argument for a market premium over competing fuels does not hold. It is in fact 
the argument for a discount which is likely to prevail.
While from 1960 to 1973, European gas consumption increased at an annual 
rate of 21%, the period 1973-1980 witnessed the much lower figure of 5.1%. 
Energy conservation on one hand, and the trend in declining oil prices which 
has characterised the present decade (1980s) on the other, could likely 
constitute a strong argument (on the part of importing countries) for a lower
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price of gas. In this case the very existence of a gas rent is to be called into 
question.
3. On the magnitude of the gas rent
While suggesting that gas does not constitute a world commodity, the non­
existence of a reference price for gas on a world scale may indicate that the 
price of this product is largely determined within the market of each gas 
consuming country. In this instance the magnitude of the price of gas must be 
such that the latter can compete with alternative fuels at the burner tip if gas 
consumption is to increase in importing countries.
The upper limit for the price of gas in consumer countries is therefore an 
indifference price which equalises different sources of energy (on a Btu basis) 
for the final consumer. The indifference price is actually the maximum price 
that a buying gas company (from an importing country) could support without 
damage to its domestic market share.
Although the indifferenteprice is specific to each domestic market, a general 
formula could be set up in order to consider the likelihood of a gas flow in the 
international market.
Since in Europe gas mainly competes against fuel oil, the price of both 
energy sources can be linked by the following formula
Pg -*  Pf
where
P g  • P ^ c e  o f  g a s  (C .I  f )
Pf : price of fuel (C .IJF ) 
k : coefficient and 0 < k < 1
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If k is equal to one, the price of gas Pg is of the same magnitude as the price 
of fuel and the final consumer becomes indifferent between the two energy 
sources. On the other hand, if k is smaller than one, gas becomes less expensive 
than fuel and could increase its market share.
Finally, if k is greater than one, gas becomes more expensive than fuel and 
the buying gas company cannot compete within its domestic market. From the 
gas exporting state point of view however a coefficient k of magnitude less than 
unity is likely to reduce its income (in the form of gas rent), the formula for the 
rent being set as follows:
Rg =kPf-Cg
where
Rg = gas rent
Cg = cost and fair rate of return on capital invested
A lower limit for k beyond which no export is likely to occur is reached 
when the rent encompassed in the price of gas is equal to zero i.e.: 
koPf -Cg  =0 
or
ko = Cg/I*£
For international gas trade to be envisaged, the magnitude of the coefficient 
k must be set within the range lko.il. If k is less than k0, a negative rent 
emerges and the gas exporting state has no incentive to enter the international 
market.
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On the other hand if k is greater than one, the buying gas company has no 
incentive to import gas since it cannot compete against fuel oil. The struggle 
over the appropriation of the gas rent between exporting countries and 
importing ones actually materialises in the bargaining process over the 
magnitude of the coefficient k.
The closer k is to one, the larger share of gas rent is appropriated by the 
exporting country, but the closer k is to ko, the larger share of gas rent is 
appropriated by the gas importing company (which may have to share part of 
the gas rent that accrue to it with the tax authorities of the country it operates 
in).
The absolute magnitude of the gas rent however depends entirely on the 
price of competitive fuels which, in the European market, are fuel oils. 
Although derived from crude oil which is a world commodity with an accepted 
reference price (the OPEC market crude), fuel oils are not directly priced with 
reference to the price of crude oil. They can, in fact, be lightly or heavily taxed 
depending on the energy policy of individual governments.
Taking into account average prices within OECD Europe the IEA nevertheless 
constructed three scenarios for future gas consumption in the year 2000: a 
constant volume scenario, a constant share scenario and an increasing share 
scenario make up the three alternatives envisaged.^
For the three scenarios the maximum prices at the burner tip which could 
be accepted by a competitive market were predicted as follows (in 1981 US
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dollars).
constant volume scenario 6.08 $/MBtu 
constant share scenario 6.06$/MBtu
increasing share scenario 5.79 $/MBtu
By estimating capital, operating and storage costs for internal distribution, 
the IEA arrived at the maximum average C.IP. price that could be paid by an 
importing gas company to a gas producing state.
constant volume scenario 4.83 $/MBtu
constant share scenario 4.51 $/MBtu
increasing share scenario 4.37 $/MBtu
Although these figures are roughly equivalent to 25 $/barrel, they do not 
reveal the difference between the cost of producing a barrel of oil and the cost 
of producing a barrel of gas. In other words they hide the relatively small 
magnitude of the gas rent.
The latter could however be calculated by substracting the total cost of 
producing a MBtu from the maximum border price that could be accepted by a 
gas importing company.
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Table VI: 3: Illustrative infrastructure costs for national gas trade, $/MBTu
Algeria Algeria Arabian Gulf Arabian Gulf
N.Europe N.Europe Europe Japan
pipeline L.N.G. L.N.G. L.N.G.
Gas gathering 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Liquifaction 1.10 1.10 1.10
Transportation 1.53 0.55 1.45 1.45
Regasification 0.40 0.40 0.40
Total cost 1.78 2.30 3.20 3.20
Max. border price 
(Wellhead netbacks)
-






















(1) Scenarios mentioned above.
(2) In the absence of information required to construct this price, 
the average customs clearance CIF price for Nov. 1981 is used.
Source: IEA. National gas, prospects to2000
IEA, OECD, Paris 1982, p.127 (upper part of the table)
p.59 (lower part of the table)
Since the market price of gas is ultimately set up within the consuming 
country and transportation costs constitute a high percentage of the gas price, 
the viability of an international gas project is highly dependent on the distance 
between exporting regions and consumer ones. Table VI.3 shows that Algeria is 
relatively well positioned with respect to Europe, whereas the Arabian gulf 
countries should be expected to export gas to Japan rather than to Europe.
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The figures in Table VI.3, however, represent optimum figures for the 
exporting countries since the wellhead netbacks are derived from maximum 
border prices which, in the argument developed above, correspond to a 
coefficient k equal to one.
This coefficient actually constitutes the object of a bargain and can 
approach unity only insofar as the gas exporting states hold a relatively strong 
position in the international gas trade. On the other hand, the magnitude of the 
maximum border price, being highly correlated with the price of fuel oil, 
basically depends on the price of oil on a world scale.
Thus while the absolute magnitude of the gas rent depends on the price of 
competitive fuels in each particular market, the gas exporting states’ share of 
the gas rent is basically determined by their bargaining strength with each 
individual gas importing country (or company). ^
As a determinant factor in the price of gas, the price of crude oil becomes 
the central issue in the prospect for international gas trade. As such the 
unlikely collusion among gas exporting countries and the very peculiar nature 
of international gas trade (high investment costs, rigidity in supplies, etc.) 
suggest that gas exporting states can benefit from international gas trade and 
increase their share (wellhead netbacks) of the gas rent only inasmuch as they 
are able (or willing) to appropriate a larger share of the oil rent by imposing a 
high price of oil.
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The Algerian option for gas export came into being when signals for a tight 
market emerged in the international scene. Algerian policymakers then sought 
to complement oil revenues by gas revenues in order to speed up the growth 
strategy decided upon.
4. The Algerian gas export policy
The gas option as an alternative to oil export from Algeria had actually been 
predictable to the extent that, in view of the composition of its hydrocarbon 
reserves. Algeria would qualify as a gas economy rather than an oil economy.
The gas policy set up by Algerian policymakers would assume the existence 
of a potentially important gas market at the international level as well as the 
possibility of appropriating a substantial gas rent. To that extent a full 
development of the LNG (liquified natural gas) chain was planned in the 1970s 
(when the oil market became a seller's market) by the Bechtel Company (USA) 
which sought to lay down a thorough planning for the evolution of the 
hydrocarbon industry up to the year 2005.
4.1 The "Valhvd Plan” 12
The basic objectives of the Valhyd plan was to extract all known reserves of 
oil and gas over a period of 30 years (1976-2005). By the end of that period the 
Bechtel company assumed that the Algerian economy would be diversified 
enough so that export of hydrocarbons would not be needed any more. Export of 
gas was particularly stressed in view of the importance of Sahara reserves.
The Bechtel programme was furthermore confirmed by the ideology of the 
"Charte Nationale". the basic doctrinal text of the Algerian ruling party for the
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1970s. That text stressed that:
"Making available the sums (of money) provided by gas 
valorisation, is giving rise to a means of insuring the 
financing of the country’s development and building a 
basis for guaranteeing the financial independence of the 
state” 13
The Valhydplan then considered that annual output of gas would gradually 
reach 110 bcm (by 1985) to which 70 bcm would be destined for export, 20 bcm 
for the domestic market and the rest (20 bcm) constituted self-consumption (for 
equipments and plants) and losses.
To realise this level of output the Valhyd plan set an anticipated investment 
of 33.4 billion constant dollars covering the whole period of 1976-2005. The bulk 
of this investment however would be effective by 1985 in that 33 billions would 
have been invested by that time. Financing this investment, on the other hand, 
required the availability of 17.4 billion in foreign currency that were to emerge 
through export of hydrocarbons and international borrowings. The latter 
would actually amount to 3 billlion dollars for the period 1978-1980 (half the 
hydrocarbon sector income for the year 1978).
Although, concerning the whole hydrocarbon industry, the Valhyd plan 
mainly focused on the natural gas productive base in general, and the LNG 
chain in particular, the latter would have been extended by the implementation 
of more liquifaction plants.
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Table VI. 4: LNG complexes (on stream and planned)
Site Complex Builder Sterling year No. of trains Capacity 
1 O^therm/year
Algeria GL /^Z Technip (France) 1964 3 18
GLj/Z Bechtel (USA) 1978 6 105
GL2/Z Pullman Kellogg 1980 6 105
GL /^Z Foster Wheller 1981 9 155.5
GNL, 1982 3 52.7
Skikda GL|/K Technip 
1,2,3 trains
1973 3 37.5
Train 4 Pullman Kellogg 1977 1 14.35
Train 5,6 Pullman Kellogg 1979 O4m 31.45
Center
GNLEst 1982 6 105
ISSERS GNL Centre 1982 6 105
Source: Plan Valhyd, quoted in Mekkideche M.. le secteur des 
hydrocarbures, OPU, Alger 1983 p. 306.
 _______ project cancelled in 1980.
This productive base when complemented by the oil industry would, 
according to the Valhyd plan, generate an income of 250 billion dollars over 
the period considered (1976-2005), of which 200 billion represented foreign 
currency earnings.
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The basic hypothesis upon which Bechtel arrived at a magnitude of 250 
billion dollars as income for Algeria concerned the anticipated price of LNG: the 
latter was set at $1.325/MBTu while the price of crude oil and refined products 
were respectively priced at S 109.66/ton and $ 110.50/ton (Condensate was priced 
at $116.08/ton).
According to Bechtel, crude oil would insure an income of around 95 billion 
dollars, of which 58% would be in hard currency, whereas natural gas would 
generate an income of 156 billion, 97% in hard currency. Finally, whereas 
crude oil would realise 46% and natural gas 28% of total income generated for 
the period 1976-1985, natural gas would take the lead for the rest of the period 
and realise 45% of total income from 1986 onward.
In view of the price set by Bechtel for crude oil, natural gas was (on a 
calorific content basis) underpriced by 1.47 $/MBTu. The latter figure would 
actually represent a loss of a portion of the gas rent which could be 
appropriated by the Algerian state if the price of gas was indexed to the price of 
crude oil (as happened in the 1980s). The underpricing of gas by Bechtel did not 
however prevent the optimistic forecast about the income generated by LNG 
exports.
Thus, for the year 1979, Bechtel predicted a turnover of 947 million dollars 
for LNG exports, whereas the actual turnover could only reach a maximum value 
of 751 million dollars if the LNG plants were functioning according to design.
Although the international oil market (and thus the international energy 
market) had been a tight one for the whole of the 1970s, Bechtel had been over
231
optimistic with regards to LNG export results. In fact Bechtel's analysis failed to 
consider three basic constraints:
1. Bechtel had actually confused the Algerian environment with its 
counterpart in a developed economy. Whereas, in a developed 
economy, a plant could reach its optimal production level, the analysis 
of the Algerian scene does not militate in favour of the likelihood of 
attaining the designed capacity (see Part A, ch. III).
Cost overrun has, in fact, been a constant feature of the Algerian 
industrialisation process.
2. A second feature of the Algerian experience had been totally missed by 
Bechtel's analysis. This relates to important delays in the 
implementation of the productive basis.
Concerning the LNG chain, Bechtel did not anticipate delays (at least 2 
years) in the building of the No. 4, No. 5 and No. 6 trains of the Skikda 
complex (GL1/K).
3. Finally the price of gas (1.325 $/MBtu) envisaged by Bechtel did not 
materialise in 1979 since the negotiations between El-Paso and 
Sonairach ended up with a price of 1.15 $ /MBTu in July 1979. *5
Besides the basic constraints mentioned above, the Bechtel analysis (set up 
at Sonstrach’s request) had ultimately missed the fact that the hydrocarbon 
industry was part of the national economy. In this instance the evolution of the 
former had not been directly connected with the rest of the economy. On the 
contrary, the level of exports envisaged by Bechtel stemmed from the expected 
demand at the international level and did not consider the burden (on the 
national economy) of the important investment required to implement the 
Valhyd plan.
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On the other hand, setting up a gas productive basis materialising a total 
output of 110 bcm/year reduced the ratio of reserves to output to around 30 
years. This short life span implied by the Bechtel corporation, could have 
firmly been imposed on the Algerian economy since the rigidity of the LNG 
chain would not have allowed a reassessment of the level of export.
Furthermore, in a relatively unstable market as the energy one, envisaging 
a 30 years plan, through a rigid productive basis as the LNG chain, implicitly, 
assumed the non-emergence of downward pressure on the price of oil (hence 
on the price of gas) which could jeopardise the whole export policy.
Algerian policymakers may actually have avoided a crisis by calling into 
question the Valhyd plan which was put aside by the early 1980s. Although the 
Valhyd plan was called into question and the former export policy officially 
criticised, export of natural gas as a hard currency earner was not cancelled. 
On the contrary, the change from the previous era (Pr Boumediene’s) only 
amounted to abandoning the LNG option, which was considered too costly, and 
focusing on the pipeline option which required less investment and generated a 
higher rent (netback value). The gas option as such was still alive despite the 
energy market conditions of the 1980s.
4.2 Prospects for gas exports
The pipeline system as an alternative to the LNG chain neverless emerged at 
a time (1983) when the oil market was witnessing a state of excess supply on a 
worldscale.
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The increase of gas exports on a world scale in general and from Algeria in 
particular had actually been hampered by the state of the oil market which 
constituted the ultimate reference for the price of gas. Thus European 
customers (Belgium. France and Italy) agreed upon a relatively high price of 
gas which was equated with the oil price on a FOB basis. American customers 
(El-Paso in particular) decided to cancel their contracts with the Algerian 
company Sontrach.
Thus by early 1981, El-Paso (U.SA.) cancelled its El-Paso-I 10 bcm/year 
contract which started operating in 1978 and was reviewed in July 1979.16
Panhandle/Trunkline (U.S.A.) on the other hand, at first accepted a price of 
3.92 $/MBtu in its deal with Sontrach (September 1982) but after claiming a 30% 
fall in profits, decided upon a unilateral suspension of its contract by January 
1984.17
Finally the last U.S. company (Distrigas of Boston) to deal with Sontrach. 
claiming financial problems, stopped importing Algerian gas as well.*8 By the 
end of 1985. the withdrawal of U.S. companies as importers of Algerian gas. left 
Sontrach dealing with four European partners.
Italy started receiving Algerian gas through the "Transmed” pipeline by 
June 1983. The flow of Algerian gas exported to Italy then rose from 2.13 
bcm/year in 1983 to 6.56 bcm/year by 1984.^ LNG exports however fell to 12.04 
bcm in 1984 whereas they amounted to 15.67 bcm in 1983. The fall in LNG 
exports actually stemmed from the cancellation of US deals and the spreading 
out of deliveries to France.^O
234
"Gaz de France", however, was expected to import 9.3 bcm/year at a price 
agreed upon in 1982. The latter agreement could nevertheless be called into 
question since France achieved price reductions from its Netherland and Soviet 
suppliers.21
Belgium, on the other hand, had been expected to lift 5 bcm/year in its 1981 
contract with Sontrach. The flow of gas had, however, been rescheduled 
downward, thus slowing down deliveries.22 Finally, the year 1985 witnessed the 
settlement of a long standing dispute between Algeria and Spain.23 Whereas 
the 1973 agreement required Spain to lift 4.5 bcm/year, of which no more than 
1.5 bcm/year had ever been taken, the new agreement arranged for 60 bcm of 
gas to be imported by Spain over the years to 2004.
The price agreed upon ($3.90/MBtu) was of the same magnitude as the price 
paid by France and Belgium and resulted in an increase (+$1.01/MBtu) in the 
netback value appropriated by Algeria. Furthermore the price of gas was 
indexed against a basket of OPEC crude oil prices. Although the Algerian policy 
of reaching full (or almost full) parity between the price of gas and the price of 
oil seemed to have materialised with its European customers, the amount of gas 
exported by Sontrach does not show any steady trend.
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1985 12.67 + 5%
* LNG Liquified Natural Gas
* bcm billion of cubic metres.
Source: 1978 to 1981, Petroleum Economist, 1983, p.454.
1982 to 1984 Petroleum Economist, 1985, p.431.
1985 Petroleum Economist December. 1986, p.437.
Thus, whereas contracted volumes with its LNG European partners amounted 
to 18.6 bcm/year, Sontrach had not been able to export the latter figure. On the 
other hand Sontrach was facing an excess capacity in its LNG plants since 
installed capacity amounted to 30.5 bcm/year.24
The choice currently facing Algerian policy makers seems to be 
straightforward: they either stick to a price of gas equivalent to the price of oil 
and gradually lose their customers, or renounce the previous formula and set 
the price of Algerian gas at a competitive level against other sources (the 
Netherlands and the USSR). In both policies, however, the price of Algerian gas 
is bound to move to a lower level than the one agreed upon in 1982 (with the 
European importers).
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If the 1970s witnessed a state of "Euphoria" on the part of Algerian 
policymakers as far as gas exports were concerned (cf. Valhyd Plan), the 
conditions characterising the 1980s may require an opposite attitude towards 
gas exports.
The basic problem facing gas exporting states in general stems from the 
non-existence of a world market of gas as such. In this context any deal with 
any importing country constitutes a specific deal with no general validity. The 
price of gas on the other hand has not shown any uniformity. Thus depending 
on the targeted market, a gas exporting country could realise several gas prices 
(hence different netback values).
In 1979, for instance, the Netherland faced GIF prices ranging from 1.25 to 
$3.65/MBtu in five different markets. The USSR on the other hand sold its gas or 
prices ranging from 1.15 to $2.70/MBtu. 25
The two countries mentioned above actually constitute the main competitors 
for Algeria, the latter however confronts a higher production cost since its gas 
must be carried either by LNG tankers or submarine pipelines. In this context 
the magnitude of the gas rent that could be appropriated by Algeria can only be 
lower than the one appropriated by its competitors.
The prospects for Algerian gas exports in general and the appropriation of a 
gas rent that could gradually replace the oil rent may therefore be highly 
questionable.
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Two basic factors seem to hinder the realisation of a gas price encompassing 
a substantial rent (a coefficient k close to unity):
1. The trend of declining oil prices that has characterised the 1980s
2. The non-existence of a world gas market upon which gas exporting 
countries could decide on a collusive strategy
The indexation of the price of gas against the price of crude oil actually 
represented a breakthrough from the gas exporting states point of view in so 
far as it increased the magnitude of the gas rent appropriated by the latter. The 
gas exporting states* action however took place (in 1980) when the oil price was 
still relatively high ($30/b on average) thus implying a price of gas of about 
5/MBtu and a netback value of around $2.50/MBtu (see Table VI.3).
Although relatively smaller than the oil rent, the gas rent encompassed in 
the early 1980s gas price constituted an important improvement on what had 
been happening during the 1970s. In these years, instead of appropriating a 
potential rent, the Algerian state actually lost 290 million dollars (up to 
December, 1979) in its LNG sales to the US market because of the low price 
($0.305/MBtun) agreed upon with its LNG customer, El-Paso. 20
The year 1979 nevertheless witnessed a small improvement since Algeria 
could net around $1.25/MBtu which represented about one third of the rent 
derived from oil exports. 27 The 1970s and the early 1980s however were 
favourable years for gas exporting countries since the oil market in particular 
had been a seller's market. The present market conditions (1980 onward), on 
the other hand, while imposing downward pressure on the price of oil are likely 
to damage the economics of gas exports.
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Within the indexation policy, the current price of oil (around $l5/bl) 
actually implies a price of gas at a level of $2.5/MBtu which, according to Table 
VI.3, is of the same magnitude as the cost of liquifying gas and leaves around 60 
cts/MBtu as gas rent for piped gas.
The likelihood of a price of gas in the neighbourhood of its production cost 
may in fact be on the agenda for the negotiations that Algeria is currently 
(1986) holding with its European partners.28 This magnitude of the gas price 
would however call into question the whole gas export policy. The latter, as a 
means of financing economic growth within the whole economy, would at this 
stage be reduced to repaying the cost of implementing the gas productive basis.
The claim about the replacement of oil export by gas export for the 
financing of the Algerian growth strategy would be unsubstantiated and may 
stem from a misapprehension of the functioning of the energy market.
Beyond the state of the oil market, the ability of gas exporting states to 
appropriate a substantial gas rent may reside upon a collusive strategy (of the 
OPEC type) that would reduce the bargaining power of the importing countries. 
This aspect (the collusive strategy) is however unlikely to emerge since:
1. The non-existence of a world gas market separates the interests of 
different exporters:
Japan's suppliers (Alaska. Brunei. Indonesia. Malaysia and Abu Dhabi) 
face an economy more dependent upon gas than Western Europe or 
USA suppliers.^9
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2. On the other hand, Western Europe, the objective market for Algerian 
gas, is much less dependent on imported gas since it is 80% self- 
sufficient.^
In this instance Western Europe would remain a buyer's market for the 
foreseeable future and a collusion between the two main European suppliers 
(the Soviet Union and Algeria) is unlikely to emerge, not least because of their 
different level of development and the perceptions they may have of gas 
exports in their overall economic development.
The prospects for gas exports, and the appropriation of a substantial gas rent 
by Algeria in particular, seem therefore to depend ultimately upon an 
improvement of the price of oil on a world scale. The 1980s do not, however, 
show any trend towards such an improvement and the price of gas is likely to 
remain at the level of its cost of production. In this case, export of gas cannot be 
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CHAPTER VII
THE OIL RENT AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR STAGNATION
If the gas rent does not seem to have been substantial, the oil rent, however, 
constituted the bulk of the Algerian state-foreign currency earnings. The 
appropriation of the oil rent, however important, could only be grasped as, the 
first stage in the development process which was supposed to take place within 
the Algerian scene. The use of the oil rent or, in other words, the process which 
transforms money capital into productive capital, was to constitute the second 
stage in the integration of the economy.
However, in view of the content of the successive plans, the increase in the 
portion of the oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state seems to have 
gradually pushed the hydrocarbon industry towards the world market, 
therefore limiting the emergence of productive capital outside the hydrocarbon 
sphere.
The impact of the oil rent may, however, be considered as a negative one to 
the extent that, contrary to what had been constantly claimed, the motivating 
function assigned to the hydrocarbon industry had in effect been replaced by a 
financing function directed towards inefficient sectors of the economy. By 
giving substantial leeway to the Algerian state, the appropriation of the oil rent 
actually impeded the implementation of a radical policy that would have tackled 
the essential problems facing the rest of the economy. Inefficient industries 
had been implemented with no regard to conditions prevailing either 
domestically or on the world market (see chapter VIII below).
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The agricultural sector in particular faced constant pressures, with no 
means for responding to domestic demand (thereby putting a substantial burden 
on the trade balance).
1. The "1971 agrarian revolution- : causes and objectives
Despite the official view which emphasised the necessary link between the 
development of industry and the development of agriculture, the actual 
evolution of the latter went in the opposite direction of what had been officially 
planned.
The period 1962-1971 (see Part A. ch.. II. section 2.1) witnessed a tangible 
decline of the state controlled sector and a thorough lack of policy concerning 
the private sector which evolved within the same framework as that of the 
colonial era. The state policy, or more precisely the lack of policy towards the 
agricultural sector would actually constitute a source of impediment since the 
necessary connection required by the adopted growth strategy (see Part A, ch. 
I, section 5) could not take place without a restructuring of the agricultural 
sector in general and its privately owned part in particular.
The restructuring of the agricultural sector would nevertheless happen at 
the expense of the "national solidarity" which constituted the official political 
slogan since 1965. To implement the restructuring of the agricultural sector, 
some social groups had to be confronted and eliminated from the agricultural 
scene. In this confrontation, however, the Algerian state felt confident 
enough, for the nationalisation of the hydrocarbon industry (February 1971) 
not only strengthened its economic base but re-enhanced its political power: 
the struggle against an external enemy was still on the agenda, while the
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internal struggle against large landowners and absentees could still be 
presented as an original act of "national solidarity" wealthy Algerians would 
donate part of their wealth - land in this case - to the poor.
The nationalisation of the hydrocarbon industry and the so-called 1971 
agrarian revolution may then be considered as two complementary conditions 
for the realisation of an integrated economy. The agrarian revolution, as a 
response to the agricultural sector crisis, took shape via a distribution of public 
and nationalised privately owned land to small and landless peasants.
What had characterised the agricultural sector up to 1971 was the 
continuation of a colonial policy without the French colonists: while the 
colonists' sector came under the Algerian state's control under the guise of a 
self-managed sector and followed the production pattern (see Appendix VII.1) it 
has been subjected to during the colonial era, the private sector kept on being 
marginalised with respect to the growth strategy.
This marginalisation would, however, constitute a source of disequilibrium 
(both economically and politically) since the main feature of the privately 
owned agricultural sector would emerge as a highly skewed land distribution.
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Table VII.l: Structure of the agricultural private sector, 1971
Size of area Number of farms % in total area
0 -5  hectare 308995 8.8
5 -10 ha. 114275 13.8
10 - 50 ha. 147043 50.8
+ 50 ha. IC530 ZU
Source: Benissad M.E., Economic du developpement do 1'Algerie, sous-
developpementetsocizlisme, Economica, Paris, 2nd edition, 1982, p.94.
While 2.9% of large landowners controlled 26.6% of the privately owned 
agricultural sector, 61.7% of small peasants (less than 10 hectares) had to 
survive on 22.6% of the land. Due to the colonisation process, these small 
peasants were however confined to less fertile lands and responded rationally to 
their peculiar environment by selling their labour force either to more 
affluent peasants or in non-agricultural activities in order to sustain their 
reproduction.
Added to 500,000 landless peasants, the 425.000 small peasants would 
therefore put pressure on non-agricultural activities which, because of the 
adopted growth strategy, could not adequately respond to this supply of labour 
force.
The rationality behind the so-called agrarian revolution would therefore 
stem from a number of premisses of which the most important could be 
synthesised as follows:
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1. Due to the skewed distribution of the land, a large portion of the 
peasantry was excluded from the industrial market because of a lack of 
adequate income
2. While the small peasantry could not accumulate (because of its narrow 
material base), large landowners did not invest in agriculture but acted 
as rent collectors investing in non-agricultural activities
3. The stagnation of agricultural output since independence and the 
growing share of imported agricultural products in domestic 
consumption would create inflationary pressures and limit the impact of 
the oil rent upon the accumulation process
The agrarian revolution, then, sought to eliminate the negative impact of 
these premisses upon the industrialisation process. By arguing that the 
agrarian revolution aims first of all at modernising the agricultural sector by 
intervening as much on the size of the farms as on the techniques of 
production, Algerian policymakers assumed that a redistribution of land in 
favour of the small and landless peasants and at the expense of large 
landowners was all that was needed to move out of the crisis. Hence the "Charte 
de la revolution agraire (1971)" stated that "the modernisation of agriculture 
and a higher living standard in the rural world will widen the domestic market 
and favour the growth of industry. The creation of production units using 
modern methods of cultivation will increase demand towards chemical and 
mechanical industries. Finally the reorganisation and growth of agricultural 
output will develop around the production zones a whole network of processing 
industries" %
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To the extent that the agricultural crisis was seen as a technical problem, 
the direct participation of the peasantry in its formulation was not required. 
Hence the agrarian revolution emerged through two phases^  which had 
successively been carried out by the state:
1. The first phase concerned the distribution of public land to small and 
landless peasants who were generally gathered into co-operatives
2. The second phase, however, dealt with large landed property and land 
owned by absentees
The result of the two phases carried out by the state bureaucracy can then 
be seen from the table below.
Table VII:2 Redistribution of land under the agrarian revolution
No. of beneficiaries No. of co-operalives Area (ha.)
1973 46,910 2,600 630,000
1975 78,700 4,903 894,000
1977 83,606 5,859 1,119,054
1980 97,955 6,029 1,337,815
Source: 1973 and 1975, BenhouriaT., I'economie delAlgerie, Maspero , Paris, 
1980, p. 201.
1977, SEP, DSCN, L'Algerie en quelques chiffres Alger, 1978.
1980, Commission nationale de laR.A. (22.5.80) quoted in Bedrani S.,
L Agriculture algerienne depruis1966, OPU, Alger 1981, p.397.
By 1980, 97955 small and landless peasants were involved in the agrarian 
revolution sector which covered 1337815 hectares. While the latter figure 
approached the total amount of land recouped by the state (which amounted to 
1463499 hectares)4* the first figure (number of beneficiaries) fell far short of
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the magnitude of the set of small and landless peasants (more than one million).
Thus despite the agrarian revolution the bulk of the peasantry would 
continue playing the role it had been confined to since the colonial era, i.e. a 
reserve army that would be called upon when needed either in the agricultural 
sphere (as seasonal labour force) or in non-agricultural activities.
The agrarian revolution did not therefore tackle the problem of 
unemployment which could become more acute in view of the capital intensive 
industrialisation process taking place within the Algerian scene. Its main 
objective, however, was a rationalisation of the agricultural sector, in the sense 
that a market for industrial commodities had to emerge with an effective 
demand deriving from the restructuring of the agricultural sphere.
That restructuring on the other hand was to imply a higher productivity 
hence a higher level of output, that would reduce the impact of food imports on 
the accumulation process financed by the oil rent.
2. The performances o f the agricultural sector
Despite the use of the phrase "agrarian revolution" for characterising the 
state's actions towards the agricultural sector from 1971 onwards, the actual 
restructuring of the sector concerned touched upon a small portion of the 
latter. In fact, whereas the privately owned part had hardly been transformed, 
the "self-managed" sector was not affected at all. although it had been in a state 
of gradual decline since independence (see Part AII.2.1). Finally, a large part of 
the agrarian revolution sector covered infertile land that could hardly respond 
to the objectives of increasing the level of output.5
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In this context the agricultural sector of post-independence Algeria actually 
retained ... the same physical structure as it had been during the colonial era 
(See Appendix VII.1). The constantand important share of fallow land from the 
end of the colonial era to 1977 may, then, point to a state of under-equipment 
both in terms of means of production and intermediary products (fertilisers in 
particular).
The fact that the physical structure of the agricultural sector had not been 
changed by the agrarian revolution suggests that the impact of the latter on 
production and productivity of labour within the agricultural sector would be 
insi gnificant unless the portion of the agricultural sector which was actually 
cultivated witnessed a high productivity of labour. The high productivity of 
labour could then compensate for the lack of new cultivated land. The actual 
level of agricultural output would not however militate in favour of the 
previous argument.
Table VII.3: Agricultural output, 1963-1980 (1000 quintals)
Year Hard wheat Soft wheat Dry veg. Vegetables Citrus fruits
1963-64 12280 3215 390 6105 4836
1967-68 10630 4707 439 7088 4316
1972-73 6985 4595 416 9304 5071
1974-75 11810 6668 744 12473 5000
1978-79 7104 3725 532 11669 4550
1979-80 8892 5640 522 11990 3600
Source: Benissad MJE. op. cit. p.106.
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The fluctuations in the level of output of different products over the years 
suggest the non-mastering of the production process in the agricultural scene 
on the one hand, and the high impact of natural conditions as explanatory 
variables on the other hand.
Despite a better mechanisation and greater use of fertilisers, the yield per 
hectare of different products could not even reach the level experienced during 
the colonial era (see Appendix VII.2). The overall picture of the agricultural 
scene had in fact been marked by either stagnation or decline. In this instance 
the fast growing population (which doubled between 1962 and 1980) could only 
be fed by importing foodstuffs with revenues derived from hydrocarbon 
exports. In this instance the ratio of agricultural exports to agricultural 
imports witnessed a gradual decline from independence onward, with no sign of 
a change in direction.
Table VII.4: Algeria International Trade in agricultural products 
(Million dinars)
Import Export Export/Import (%)
1963 766 1151 150
1966 713 931 131
1967-69 731 717 98
1970-73 925 736 80
1974-77 4049 612 15
1978 5028 584 12
1979 5174 467 9
1980 7781 496 6
Source: 1963: Benissad. M.E., op. c it.. pp.189.191
1966-1973: SEP, Annuaire Statistiques de l'Alg6rie 1970-1975 
1974-1977: SEP. Statistiques du Commerce Extdrieur. 1977. 
1978-1980: MPAT, L'Algerie en Quelques Chiffres, 1982.
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Whereas, up to 1969, the agricultural sphere was self-sufficient in terms of 
foreign currency earnings, by 1974, 85% of agricultural imports had to be paid 
by means other than via agricultural exports. Furthermore, whereas Algeria 
imported a yearly average of 618.4 thousand tons of cereals (index 100) for the 
period 1967-69, it imported a yearly average of 1642.6 thousand tons (index 265) 
for the period 1974-77 and 1952 thousand tons (index 316) for the year 1980. An 
identical trend had been present for all agricultural products (Appendix VII.3).
In this context the burden of food imports on the balance of trade could only 
be faced by using hydrocarbon exports as a financing means since the latter 
had constituted the bulk of Algerian exports since independence.
Imports in general and agricultural imports in particular witnessed a 
stagnation, then a slight increase from 1963 to 1973. The year 1974, however, 
constituted a turning point vis & vis the Algerian imports policy (food imports 
jumped from 1042 million in 1973 to 3507 million dinars in 1974)6
At first sight, the decline (if not the stagnation) of the domestic agricultural 
sector may, apparently, be explained in terms of the Dutch disease discourse. 
The latter would argue that the resource boom (a higher share of the oil rent 
appropriated by the Algerian state) resulted in de-agriculturisation. However 
the premisses upon which Dutch disease economics develops the argument of 
de-agriculturisation does not hold for the Algerian scene. For within the Dutch 
disease model (Part A.I.4) de-agriculturisation would emerge if the agricultural 
sector belonged to the traded good sector. In the Algerian context agricultural 
output was mainly directed towards the domestic market.
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Hence the agricultural sector would rather qualify as a non-traded good 
sector and should thrive under a resource boom. What seems to have stopped the 
Algerian agricultural sector from behaving like the non-traded good sector of 
the Dutch disease model can only be the Algerian state's policy of administrative 
prices for the major component of agricultural output. Under these 
circumstances and despite an increase in demand for agricultural products (as a 
consequence of the spending effect) the prices, set artificially low by the 
administration, hampered a potential resource movement effect but responded 
to the state's policy of keeping wages down (thus favouring the industrial 
sector) and limiting the social tensions which may have risen because of high 
food prices.
The 1974 oil crisis would then give the Algerian state not only the possibility 
of speeding up the accumulation process but would constitute a means (for the 
Algerian state) to stick to a policy of low food prices (despite an excess demand 
with respect to domestic output), fill in the agricultural deficit and finally avoid 
the question of a radical transformation of the agricultural sphere. Thus, by 
1980, the quantity of imported cereals amounted to 24 million quintals which 
represented 138% of domestic output produced that year" .6
In this context the oil rent contributed indirectly to the continuation of the 
agricultural crisis and, in so doing, hindered achieving the claimed goal of 
building an independent and national economy.
This use of the oil rent could, in this instance, be interpreted as the easiest 
(in terms of social and political costs) means in confronting the crisis in 
Algerian agriculture. Although usually analysed as a deficit problem with
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respect to cereal demand on a national scale, the crisis may to some extent be 
rooted outside the economic sphere but within the political scene.
3. The crisis of agriculture and the peasantry strategy
At the quantitative level, the crisis in agriculture could be understood as the 
sector's inability to feed the Algerian population in general and the urban 
population in particular.
In the context of building an independent and national economy, however, 
this particular dependency on the world market could:
1. Jeopardise the Algerian state's will to implement a growth strategy 
which was (at least officially) opposed to the prevailing international 
division of labour
2. Affect the rate of investment by diverting a substantial portion of the 
oil rent towards final consumption (through imports of foodstuff)
3. Accentuate the magnitude of rural exodus which would create economic 
and social tensions in both rural and urban areas
In this instance the growth strategy adopted by the Algerian state had not 
responded to the agricultural sector's need for an appropriate investment 
programme (see Part C.IX.3). On the other hand, the state's lack of policy 
regarding the agricultural sphere in general and the privately owned part of it 
in particular, brought about an almost complete demobilisation of the peasantry 
with its different components:
The emphasis in the official discourse and in the investment policy on 
the state sector implicitly assumed that the privately owned agricultural sector
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had no opportunity to accumulate and expand
The agrarian proletariat and the reserve army (see section 1 above), on 
the other hand, had no material base and did not receive any incentive (from 
the state) to provide their livelihood
At a high level of abstraction the behaviour of these two social groups on 
the one hand, and the state strategy on the other, could explain the state of the 
agricultural sector.
The first social group which could be called the agrarian bourgeoisie ?, has 
actually remained outside the market of means of production controlled by the 
state. The latter had as amain target the state sector, which received the bulk of 
the agricultural equipment 8.
The state’s credit policy, on the other hand, brought about a distinction 
within the agrarian bourgeoisie (between large and small landowners). 
Whereas large landowners could receive loans from the banks and buy 
equipment, small landowners were not considered as worth lending money to. 
To that extent the depreciation of agricultural labour on a national scale (which 
stemmed from the emphasis on industrial development) pushed large and small 
landowners into developing appropriate counter-strategies. This behaviour 
may be qualified as rational from the viewpoint of the landowners but 
irrational within the state’s growth strategy.
Due to a lack of agricultural equipment within the private sector, large 
landowners gradually moved away from the productive sphere to invade the
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service sector thereby limiting (by their move) the increase in the agricultural 
output on their own land. Finally because of the state's control over cereal 
prices, both large and small landowners had no incentives to continue 
producing wheat (the basic produce in the Algerian diet), but were forced to 
invest in vegetables (table VII.3), the output of which went to urban middle and 
upper classes who would pay non-controlled prices.
The privately owned part of the agricultural sector then became more and 
more involved in speculative activities (taking advantage of the discrepancy 
between supply and demand for certain products) and less and less in 
productive labour which was less rewarding within the Algerian context.
The agrarian workers, on the other hand, although objectively divided in 
two social groups (depending on whether they relate to the state sector or the 
private one) nevertheless faced the same fate within the domestic economy.
Since independence, agricultural workers in state farms faced relatively 
lower wages than their counterparts in other activities.
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Table VII: 5 Evolution of the daily minimum wage in agriculture and 
industry (Dinar/day)







1980 * 33.00 33.68
Source: 1961-1974, Bedrani S., op. cit. p. 131
1976-1980, M.P.A.T., L'AIgerieen Quelques chiffres Alger ed1982.
* in an attempt to reverse the trend of rural exodus, the minimum wage in 
agriculture was equated with its counterpart in industry.
Confronting lower wages, the state sector workers, deprived of any 
autonomous organisation (which would defend their interests) had no 
alternative but to expand their working hours and (or) hire members of their 
families as seasonal workers. The magnitude of the output however was not 
affected since neither total output nor the yield per hectare had actually 
improved since independence. 9
The workers of the state sector then responded to their lack of autonomy vis 
& vis the state's institutions by acting as rentiers waiting for a monthly wage 
bill, the magnitude of which bore no relation to the output generated within 
state farms.
Workers of the private sector, on the other hand, faced lower wages 
than workers of the state sector, for no minimum wage could be guaranteed to
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them.
Although no statistical data on their income are a v a i l a b l e , ^  the existence of 
around one million occasional workers and the magnitude of rural exodus (5% 
per year for the 1970s decade)^ suggest that downward pressures on the wage 
rate of workers in the private sector must have been substantial.
Furthermore, the emphasis on industrial development (since 1967) 
accentuated the mobility of the agricultural labour force (in particular the 
qualified one) towards urban areas and resulted in;
A hypertrophy of the urban areas which could not be fed by an 
agricultural sector in decline
An increase in the average age of agricultural workers as the younger 
workers had fled the countryside
A contempt on the part of the rural population towards agricultural 
labour which was seen as degrading when compared to industrial and service 
activities
The agricultural sector's decline therefore seemed at first sight to stem from 
a lack of commitment on the part of the Algerian state to allocate an appropriate 
amount of investment to that sector.
The crisis of Algerian agriculture could not however be confined to a 
technical problem (lack of resources) but may be interpreted as a direct 
consequence of the state's conception (mis-conception to be precise) of the 
peasantry as a homogenous social class.
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On the side of the state sector, the thorough control (upstream and 
downstream) over the state farms was coupled with a heavy rhetoric about self­
management and workers' control over the labour process. These two 
contradictory aspects actually resulted in the "transformation" of the workers 
of the state's sector into state rentiers with no motivation for increasing output.
On the side of the private sector, the large landowners who benefited from
bank credits and equipment loans from the state pulled out of the productive
sphere and entered the low-risk area of the s e rv ic e s .^  Finally small
landowners supplemented their agricultural income by revenues generated
12through non-agricultural activities.
In this context the crisis of Algerian agriculture could be comprehended as 
a direct response of the peasantry (in its different components) to its own crisis, 
the latter being the result of state policy (the root of the crisis could 
nevertheless be traced to the colonial era).
This state policy did not however lead to an explosive situation thanks to the 
oil rent which constituted the means by which imports of foodstuffs (cereals in 
particular) was made possible, and questions about the nature of the state's 
social project could be left aside.
4. The agricultural sector crisis and the oil rent
Although the particular use of the oil rent by the Algerian state contributed 
to a deepening of the agricultural crisis, the latter actually emerged as a 
consequence of the French government's colonial policy towards Algeria 
(especially during the 1950s). In this context the reconstruction of the French
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economy on the one hand, and the fadicalisation of the Algerian struggle for 
independence^ on the other, imposed a nev strategy on Metropolitan France.
In order to decrease the discontent of the Algerian population and open up 
the Algerian market to French industrialists, the French government set up a 
development programme, the basic feature of which would be constituted by a 
more important involvement of the French metropolitan authorities within the 
Algerian scene (see Part A.II.1.4).
From 1954 onwards the involvement of French metropolitan capital became 
substantial and responded to three fundamental aspects which had 
characterised the Algerian scene:
The year 1954 witnessed the start of the independence war which the 
French government fought (aside from the use of guns) by trying to bring 
about the emergence of a third force (through some kind of development) 
which would oppose the FLN's call for independence.
The third force, in this context, would take shape in the form of a 
hypertrophy of the service sector which represented 47% of GDP by 1958.^
The discovery of gas and oil in the same year as the beginning of the 
war required a new strategy on the part of the French government which had 
to involve itself in the oil industry in order to prevent the major oil companies 
from controlling this new source of supply and to secure controllable flows of 
oil to Metropolitan F r a n c e .*5
Since an increase in the level of taxation on the Algerian population 
was neither economically nor politically feasible, the French government 
adopted the unique option of financing the Algerian economic growth by using
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French taxpayers' money.
However, while responding to the French state's long term interests, the 
adopted policy constituted the essential premiss which would shape the future of 
post-independence Algeria.
In this context the flow of money capital from an external source, and with 
no productive labour counterpart within the Algerian scene, imposed a trend 
which would develop after Algeria gained its independence in 1962:
At the economic level, the consumption pattern of the dominant social 
groups would reach a standard unrelated to the level of the forces of production 
existing within the Algerian economy.
At the political level, on the other hand, the external flow of capital
would bring about the emergence of a middle class taking the form of a relative
16hypertrophy of the service sector (in particular the state administration ), the 
size of which would bear no relation to the performances of the productive 
spheres (industry and agriculture).
It is, then, upon these colonial features that the Algerian state seemed to 
have based its so-called strategy of building an independent and national 
economy.
The Algerian state's use of the oil rent would therefore represent a linear 
continuation of the French colonial power policy with much more emphasis on 
the injection of money capital (the oil rent) into the Algerian economy. In the 
context of post-independence Algeria, the oil rent had actually replaced the
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flow of money capital from Metropolitan France without calling into question 
the structural features of pre-independence (colonial) Algeria.
In the case of the agricultural sector, the peculiar use of the oil rent 
actually reinforced the trend which emerged during the 1950s under the 
colonial rule. Two main features would then be emphasised.
1. The appropriation of the oil rent by the Algerian state allowed it to 
develop the industrial and service sector independently of the performances of 
the agricultural sector.
The emphasis on the former sectors (industry and service), however, meant 
as a consequence the decline of the agricultural sector in both its parts (state 
and private land):
Concerning the state's sector, the discrepancy in the levels of income 
between agricultural workers and industrial and service workers resulted in a 
demobilisation of the former which were indirectly pushed aside from the 
adopted growth strategy.
The state’s focus on the state sector (as opposed to the private one), despite its 
decline, could however be grasped as a highly political act in the sense that the 
very existence of the former (the state sector) required state intervention in 
the agricultural sector and justified the magnitude of the state bureaucracy 
surrounding it.
In view of the performances of the agricultural sector, however, the state 
bureaucracy *7 existed only insofar as it was paid by the oil rent. Furthermore 
the institutional structure, within which the state sector had been inserted.
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constituted one of the main obstacles facing an improvement of productivity 
and production (see section 3 above). In this instance, the oil rent, by allowing 
the existence of state institutions controlling the agricultural sector, hindered 
greater involvement of the direct producers in the running of their farms.
The states lack of policy towards the private sector, therefore, pushed it 
towards adopting strategies which were opposed to the goal of the official 
growth strategy.
Thus, instead of intensifying cereal production in order to lessen the burden 
of food imports on the trade balance, the private sector adopted two 
complementary strategies:
* Part of it (large landowners) pulled out of the agriculture sphere and 
invested in the service sector.
* The rest oriented the production pattern towards produces ,the price of 
which were not controlled by the state.
The two strategies, mentioned above, would be characterised as speculative 
activities that stemmed from the fact that the private agricultural sector had no 
space within the adopted growth strategy. In this instance the non­
development of the agricultural sector as a whole constituted a feasible path 
only inasmuch as the oil rent could be used to overcome the economic and social 
tensions that had to occur within the Algerian scene.
2. The second feature which evolved within the adopted growth strategy 
materialised in the form of more absorption of industrial commodities (means of 
production and intermediary products) by the agricultural sector. This sector
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had. however, been witnessing a high level of unemployment and under­
employment^ that could only be increased by the state's policy of 
mechanisation.
This mechanisation had actually been made possible only inasmuch as the 
appropriation of the oil rent by the Algerian state sustained the injection of 
industrial products into the agricultural sector and inhibited the search for 
alternative production systems. The latter would however have required 
questioning the structural features of the agricultural sector (land ownership 
and relations between the state, the state and private sector).
The lack of support from the peasantry (section 3 above) for the imposed 
state policy would then result in a stagnation of agricultural output, the 
negative effects of which would nevertheless be minimised by imports of 
foodstuffs (see section 2 above) financed by the oil rent.
Within this framework the oil rent and its particular use by the Algerian 
state could, then, be interpreted as a straightforward continuation of the 1950s' 
colonial policy which sought to develop the Algerian economy without the 
active participation of the Algerian population.
The oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state seemed therefore to have 
served as a basis, not for the growth of the domestic economy, but for the spread 
of the domination of the state administration which controlled a source of 
income (the oil rent) beyond the reach of the productive sphere.
The "autonomous" life of the service sector (and the state administration in 
particular) would actually generate the ideology of the rentier upon the whole 
Algerian social formation and inverse the traditional value of labour being the 
source of wealth into the current dominant value of a thorough contempt for 
productive labour.
The rentier mentality would not be confined to the agricultural sphere but 
became an integral part of the process of implementing the industrial base and 
may partly explain the lack of performance of the latter.
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1. Benissad, MB. (1982) Economie du d&veloppement de 1‘Algdrie, sous- 
d&veloppement et so cialisme, Economica, 2nd edition, Paris, p.95.
2. Charte de la Revolution Agraire, MARA, Revue Algdrienne, (RASJEPJ, No. 1, 
Mars, p.196.
3. A third phase was to concern the limitation of the size of the livestock 
privately owned, but its implementation does not seem to have actually 
happened.
4. Bedrani, S. (1981) L 'Agriculture Alg6rienne depuls1966, OPU, Alger, p.397.
5. Before being limited, large landlords had the opportunity to give up the 
parcel of their choice; they would obviously keep the best land for 
themselves.
6. Bedrani, S. 1983, L Agriculture AigdrienneFace Au Marche Mondial, in Les 
Politiques Agraires...., op. cit. p.78.
6*. Molina, J. (1983) La politique agraire: integration inter-sectorielle et 
evolutions structurelles, in Les Politiques Agraires en Alg&rie, vers 
lAutonomieoulaDdpendance? CREA, Alger, p.306.
7. The agrarian bourgeoisie is, however, differentiated to the extent that large 
and small landowners do not necessarily have the same strategy.
8. Bourenane, N. (1983) Les causes structurelles de la crise de l'agriculture 
alg6rienne, in Les Politiques Agraires... op.cit, p.153.
9. The yield in cereal cultivation dropped from 8.1 q/ha in 1967-69 to 8.0 in 
1978-80 and in vegetables from 71.3 q/ha to 44.8 p/ha.
10. In some areas, workers are paid in kind.
11. Benissad, ML. op. cit., p.291.
12. Benachenhou, A. (1983) Rente mintere et d^veloppement agricole, in Les 
Politiques Agraires... op. cit., p.8.
13. In 1945. clashes between the Algerian population and the French Army 
resulted in thousands of Algerian deaths (45,000, according to Algerian 
sources).
14. Molina. J. op. cit, p.356.
15. Investment in the hydrocarbons industry amounted to 8.5% of total 
investment in 1954 and reached 40% in 1959.
16. Molina, J. op. cit., p.361.
17. Various institutions with overlapping prerogatives surrounded 
agricultural sector: OFLA, OAIC, CAPCS, COFEL, SEMPAC.
18. The rate of under-employment had been estimated at 63% in 1976-77.
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CHAPTER V III 
INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE OIL RENT
The adoption by Algerian policymakers of the theoretical framework 
developed by De Bernis and Amin, while stemming from an apparent rejection 
of the colonial features of the Algerian economy, assumed the possibility of 
implementing a complete productive system. The latter would be defined as the 
one which would minimise the dependency of the Algerian economy vis & vis 
the world market.
The accumulation process which would realise the independent and national 
economy was to require, as a first priority, the implementation of heavy 
industries which would motivate the creation of downstream activities (thus 
"blackening" the inter-sectoral matrix).
Implementation of heavy industries would, however, require imports of 
means of production as a starting point in the accumulation process. In the 
Algerian context, exports of hydrocarbons was to be the essential means by 
which the Algerian growth strategy would be realised. Even though presented 
as temporary, the opening of the Algerian economy to the world market (both 
in terms of exports and imports) may, nevertheless, face constraints which 
were not explicit in the official discourse; in particular:
- The contradictions between the spread of capitalist social relations (due 
to the Algerian economy’s integration into the world market) and the socialistic 
rhetoric developed by the state ideological apparatus and
- The likely relationship between Algerian policymakers’ apparent will to
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implementan introverted economy and the process of internationalisation of 
capital supported by transnational firms.
In this framework, the Algerian growth strategy’s success and the 
consequent state social project seem, at first sight, to be intimately tied to the 
magnitude of the oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state.
1. On the implantation of the industrial productive base
Since the financing of the Algerian growth strategy has been based on 
hydrocarbon exports, the reduction in the magnitude of the oil rent 
appropriated by the Algerian state during the present decade may certainly call 
into question the rationale behind the adopted strategy and require a 
rethinking of the 1970s investment policy (Part A, ch. III).
With the magnitude of the oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state during 
the 1970s, any growth strategy could have been implemented: exports of 
hydrocarbons and the difference between their actual cost of production and 
their price on a world scale (the oil rent) may be used to hide any inefficient 
policy. Thus the 1970s offered no ground for testing the viability of the 
Algerian growth strategy.
On the contrary, the 1980s may constitute an appropriate historical period 
for assessing the growth path chosen and implemented by Algerian 
policymakers. In the Algerian context, the building of an independent and 
national economy assumed a gradual withdrawal from the world market 
through the implementation of an integrated productive system.
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The latter would reduce the dependency of the Algerian economy by 
internalising the conditions of the production of:
- The subjective element (labour force) and
- The objective element (means of production) of the labour process
In view of the performances of the agricultural sector and the share of 
foodstuffs in total imports (ch. VIII), the reproduction of the subjective element 
of the labour process had actually been based on imports financed by the oil 
rent. In terms of the basic goal of the Algerian growth strategy, the incapacity 
of the Algerian economy to feed its own population would stem from the 
Algerian policymakers' failure to implement the conditions for an autonomous 
reproduction of the Algerian labour force, and, more generally, the Algerian 
population.
The existence of the oil rent would, however, allow the Algerian state to 
disregard the agricultural sector and avoid the question of a radical 
restructuring of that sector. On the other hand, the conditions for an 
autonomous reproduction of the objective element of the labour process may not 
be realised unless the technology imported to implement the productive 
apparatus could be mastered, then reproduced internally, by Algerian 
technicians.
Implementing an autonomous productive system upon imports of 
technology controlled by transnational firms, then, constituted a contradiction 
the overcoming of which would necessitate a dynamic consumption of that 
technology. *
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Having rejected direct foreign investment/Algerian policymakers sought 
formulas whereby transnational firms were excluded from direct ownership as 
such, but were called upon to realise plants and complexes for Algerian domestic 
firms.
For the planned period 1967-1977, three basic formulas linking Algerian 
domestic firms to foreign operators emerged, with different weights at the 
beginning and at the end of the period.
Table VIII. 1: Types of contracts with foreign firms (1967-1977)
Formula Decomposed Turnkey Product in hand
Industry A* B* C* AL B C A B C
Hydrocarbons 10 10 3 4 18 24 0 0 1
E.M.S.I. ** 14 18 13 1 6 5 0 1 7
Building Mat. 0 9 2 1 3 12 0 0 2
Chemical 5 2 0 0 0 6 0 0 0
Mining, Energy 17 10 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
Light industry *** 18 16 7 0 0 11 0 0 6
Total 64 65 37 6 27 58 0 1 16
Source: YACHIRF., Technologic et industrialisation en Afrique, O.P.U.,
Alger 1983, p. 326.
* A. B and C. first plan (67-69), Second plan (70-73) and third plan (74-77)
** Electrical, mechanical and steelwork industries.
*** Textile, food and wood industries.
The gradual decline of the number of decomposed contracts and the increase 
in the number of turnkey and "product in hand" contracts constitute the most 
noticeable trend emerging from the above table.
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The transition from the first to the second plan does not, however, appear to 
be of the same nature as the transition from the second to the third plan. 
Whereas the first transition witnessed a higher number of turnkey contracts, 
the number of decomposed contracts remained of the same magnitude.
The second transition, however, saw a fall in the number of decomposed 
contracts but an important increase in the number of turnkey and product in 
hand contracts. Thus, whereas the first transition stressed the fact that 
domestic means of conception and realisation (being fully stretched) had to be 
complemented by foreign intervention in order to realise the second plan 
(1970-73), the second transition suggest a non-capitalisation of know-how 
during the previous period and a greater involvement of transnational firms in 
the transformation of the Algerian scene (hence a withdrawal of domestic 
firms).
These particular features of the second transition can only impede the 
emergence of domestic skill that would gradually replace foreign operators. 
Although the implementation of some industries (petrochemical, mechanical 
and electrical industries in particular) may have required the use of turnkey 
and product in hand contracts, the emergence of the latter in the light 
industries (food and textile in particular) cannot be explained in terms of the 
complexity of the processes.
Indeed, if for the first group of industries the complexity of the processes 
involved, and the degree of their monopolisation and homogenisation on a 
world scale, left no other choice (for Algerian policymakers) than turnkey and
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product in hand contracts, the second group of industries, having already 
existed in the Algerian scene and being less subject to monopolisation, could 
have been implemented with more involvement on the part of domestic firms.
The transition from decomposed contracts supervised by a domestic firm to 
turnkey and product in hand contracts entirely controlled by a foreign 
operator seems to stem from two basic features: 1) the lack of national policy 
towards the problem of imported technology 2 and 2) the financial ease which 
stemmed from the oil crisis of 1974.
The first feature resulted in non-con trolled (by the Ministry of Planning) 
decisions taken by individual domestic firms which imported technologies 
without reference to the productive system as a whole. This situation led to 
highly integrated plants (Appendix VIII.1) characterised by an autonomy with 
respect to the domestic productive system but highly dependent on the services 
of the foreign conceiver or builder.3
In this context each domestic firm used specific means of production and 
devices, the specifications of which were completely alien to other domestic 
firms. Thus, the reproduction of each domestic firm's productive structure 
required a constant link with a foreign operator but no tangible relationship 
with other domestic firms.
If the first feature resulted in the implementation of autonomous (from the 
rest of the economy) industrial complexes which could not motivate the creation 
and development of upstream or downstream activities (thus favouring a 
process of learning by doing), the second feature emphasised the
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autonomisation process which stemmed from the first one.
The second transition (from the 2nd to the 3rd plan) actually emerged at the 
same historical period as the oil crisis, which allowed the oil exporting states to 
appropriate a higher share of the oil rent. In the case of Algeria the oil crisis 
allowed Algerian policymakers to revalue the 3rd plan investment programme 
which jumped from 54 billions to 110 billions dinars/*
That jump, however, could only be realised through a greater involvement 
of transnational firms within the Algerian scene. The financial ease 
confronting Algerian policy makers, then, emphasised the autonomy of 
individual domestic firms which, instead of checking the domestic market as a 
first step, tended to rely heavily on transnational firms for the implementation 
of their particular productive base.
In this framework, the appropriation by the Algerian state of a higher 
share of the oil rent inhibited the search for domestic alternatives to formulas 
(turnkey and product in hand) which left no room for the Algerian labour 
force to confront (in order to master) the process of implementing the domestic 
industrial base. By the end of the 1970s the latter emerged as a set of 
autonomous industrial plants, the reproduction of which depended entirely on 
imports while their contribution to new industrial investment would only 
qualify as marginal.
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Table VIII.2: Estimation of the contribution of domestic output to 
new industrial realisations (1978)
Category
Origin of Resources
Import (%) Domestic output %
Engineering Studies 70 30
Mechanical equipment 90 10
Electrical equipment 90 10
Frame 80 20
Source: Thierry S.P. Les biens d'equipement dans iIndustrie algerienne, 
seminaire du Crea Oran., Mai1979, p.12.
The high degree of integration of each individual project, while impeding 
an inter-sectoral integration, could not favour technological exchange among 
domestic firms. Having been excluded from the engineering and realisation 
processes of their own projects, the Algerian firms could neither comprehend 
nor memorize the rationality of their own productive apparatus. Thus the 
reproduction of their own means of production (the objective elements of the 
labour process) could not be internalised. On the contrary, the formulas adopted 
by the Algerian firms insured the quasi-idleness of the Algerian labour force 
but favoured the involvement of transnational firms in shaping the Algerian 
productive system. The technology policies of Algerian firms seem then to have 
contradicted the claimed goal of the Algerian growth strategy.
The discourse advanced by the Algerian state did not however envisage the 
confinement of the domestic economy to this position (a non-integrated 
economy). On the contrary, the ultimate aim being the building of an 
independent and national economy, Algeria would not, according to the official
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view, evolve towards a "banana republic".
The implementation of a set of industrialising industries would then be 
undertaken on the grounds that only these industries were capable (according 
to the official view) of transforming a disarticulated economy and filling in the 
inter-sectoral matrix. Thanks to the oil rent, an objective constraint (the 
required financial resourceslcould apparently be overcome.
Hence the implementation of De Bernis' model basically became dependent 
on the Algerian state’s political will to carry out the process to its ultimate goal 
(the building of an independent and national economy). In this context the 
Algerian experience of the 1970s may be questioned at two levels: 1) the 
conformity of this experience with the theoretical model and 2) the theoretical 
pertinence of the model with respect to the Algerian conditions (political in 
particular).
2. The Algerian growth strategy and the integration of the 
economy
According to the De Bernis' model (Part A.I.5.2), within the set of 
industrialising industries, the “global sector" which produces means of 
production (industrial equipment, machine-tools, engines, etc.) appears as the 
industrialising agent par excellence. By favouring forward linkages with the 
rest of the economy, this sector would directly participate in the filling in of the 
inter-sectoral matrix. Its pre-eminence should then have emerged in the 
industrial investment structure which characterised the 1967-77 planned 
period.
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Table VII1.3: Industrial investment spending (planned and actual) 
1967-77 (106 current dinars and %)
Sectors 1st plan 1967-69 2^  plan (70-73) 3fd plan (74-77)
P A P A P A
1 Hydrocarbons 42.6 51.1 37 47 40.6 48.6
2 Heavy 
industries 40.7 32.3 42 36.1 45.6 38.4
- Steel 23-5 22 17.3 16.5 13.3 13.5
- EMMI * 3.9 1.6 11.6 8.8 14.1 10.1
- Chemicals 11.3 7.9 4.6 4.9 9 5.7
- Building 
material 2 0.8 8.5 5.9 9.2 9.1
3 Mining and 
Energy 7.4 9 11.3 10.5 5.4 6.2
4 Light 
industries 9.3 7.6 9.7 6.4 8.4 6.8
Total (10  ^dinars) 5400 4890 12400 20820 4800 74150
Source: M.P.A.T. Syn these du Bilan de la D£cennie 1967-78, Alger, 1980, p.22.
Ecrement, M. Independence Politique et Liberation Economique, OPU, 
Alger, 1984, p.8l.
* Electrical, Mechanical, Metallurgy industries.
The set of heavy industries (which covers the global sector mentioned 
above) appears pre-eminent at the level of the drawing board (within the 
planned investment structure). However, the actual investment structure 
exhibits a distortion towards higher (than planned) investment in the 
hydrocarbon industry which seems to draw resources from all other sectors of 
the economy.
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Importantly, the discrepancy between planned and actual investment in 
heavy industries does challenge the implementation of De Bernis' theoretical 
model. To the extent that these heavy industries were presented as having the 
potential to fill in the inter-sectoral matrix and bring about linkage effects, the 
loss of priority, which emerged in the actual investment structure, put a 
question mark on the relation between the actual Algerian experience and De 
Bernis' model.
Furthermore, within the set of heavy industries, steel industry held the 
major share of investment spending and was the least affected by the distortion 
in the investment structure. Insofar as the bulk of this industry's output was 
directed toward the hydrocarbon industry (tubes for pipelines and steel sheets 
for fuel tanks), its motivating effect on the rest of the economy becomes rather 
questionable.
TheE.M.M. (Electrical, Mechanical and Metallurgy) industries, on the other 
hand, which encompassed the machine-tools industry, seem to have been the 
least favoured by the shift in the investment structure towards a higher share 
of the hydrocrbon industry in overall investment. The marginal share 
attributed to the E.M.M. industries, in planned investment and stressed within 
the actual investment structure, emerges as a paradox when it is related to the 
claimed objective of implementing an autonomous productive system.
This "paradoxical" situation does, however, indicate that the industrial 
productive base was dependent on the world market for its erection as well as its 
reproduction. Hence the Algerian productive system appears as the
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"juxtaposition of a sector of valorisation of hydrocarbons and a sector of 
intermediary goods (steel, building material, energy)" 5. These two sectors did, 
however, evolve outside De Bernis* model to the extent that the quasi-non­
existence of a sector producing means of production leaves the likelihood of its 
supposed snow-ball effect untested.
At a global level, then, the sector producing means of production appears to 
have been marginal whereas, in theory, it was to constitute the core of the 
Algerian growth strategy (by ensuring the reproduction of the objective 
elements of the labour process). The hydrocarbon sector, on the other hand, 
does not seem to have exhibited any of the virtues attached to the industrialising 
industries' concept. The implementation of this sector's base took place through 
imports of means of production and produced backward linkages outside the 
Algerian economy. Its output being mainly directed towards the world market, 
the emergence of forward linkages remains limited and becomes problematic 
when the industries (the fertiliser industry in particular) oriented toward the 
domestic market cannot operate at normal capacity (see Part A.III.2.3 ).
While the investment structure does not support any substantial relation 
between De Bernis' model and the Algerian experience, the evolution of the 
input-output matrix does not show any clear trend towards integration of the 
economy.
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Table VIII. 4: Gross output, import and export of industrial branches.
Branches Gross Output 
10^ dinars
Available resources * 
10^ dinars
Import/AR Export/AR
Hydrocarbons 1969 3502 443 13.5 704
1974 22879 4653 8.0 400
1979 46900 11657 4.3 307
ESMMI 1969 1256 3576 68 3
1974 2786 11575 78 2
1979 8623 27962 69.6 0.5
Chemicals 1969 493 1061 56 2
and plastics 1974 1396 3420 62 2.5
1979 2010 4602 59 2.5
Building 1969 310 381 19 2.6
Material 1974 510 1038 51 -
1979 2158 2849 24.3 -
Light
Industries 1969 5504 5930 21.5 1.4
1974 9050 11803 24.6 1.3
1972 21112 26592 20.8 0.2
Source: S.E.P., MPAT, Tableaux Entrees-Sorties 1969, 1974, 1979. 
* Available resources (A.R.) - Gross output + (Import-Export).
Apart from the substantial increase in gross output of all branches and the 
major role of hydrocarbons in the export sector that the table exhibits, the 
striking feature which emerges from the latter, is the minor role played by the 
ESMM (Electrical, Steel, Metallurgy and Mechanical) and chemical industries in 
supplying the domestic market.
Imports, had then, apparently represented two thirds of the industrial 
equipment supplied to the domestic market for the years 1969, 1974 and 1979. 
Thus at first sight, one third had been supplied by the domestic industry. The 
weight of the steel industry (which does not appear in this aggregate figure)
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which produced tubes and steel sheets would, however, inflate the magnitude of 
domestic output and cover the quasi-irrelevance of the domestic sector which 
produces means of production (as noticed from the investment structure).
The chemical industry, on the other hand, exhibits the same pattern as the 
ESMM industries. Imports had constituted the major supply source for the rest 
of the economy. Hence the core of De Bernis' model (1. a global sector 
producing means of production and 2. the chemical industry) does not seem to 
have been given priority despite the claimed goal of reaching an autonomous 
accumulation process.
While the Algerian experience does not seem to constitute the appropriate 
testing ground for De Bernis' model, the absence of the basic sector of the model,
i.e. a sector producing means of production, may be related to three main causes:
The first cause appears as the spread of turnkey and product in hand 
contracts (Part C.VIII.l) which did not favour the emergence of a demand for 
domestically produced means of production.
The second cause, of the other hand, emerges as a lack of co-ordination 
among various domestic operators which dealt directly with the world market 
instead of at first investigating the domestic market.
Finally, the third cause relates to the strategy of international capital which 
tended to favour the development of export oriented industries (hydrocarbons 
in particular) through its willingness to accord credit facilities for the 
implementation of these particular industries. These three causes seem,
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nevertheless, to be ultimately linked to the appropriation of the oil rent by the 
Algerian state and to the appropriate strategy of international capital to recoup 
most of it.
3. Industrialising industries, oil rent and the Algerian experience
In terms of the internationalisation of capital, the Algerian experience may 
constitute a remarkable example of transnational firms benefiting from an 
apparently nationalistic state which had rejected foreign ownership within its 
boundaries.
1. At the level of the implementation of the industrial base, delays in the 
realisation of projects had constantly been present.
Table VIII.5: Delays in the completion of projects engaged in 1973.
Delay 1 to 1.5 years 2 to 2.5 years 3 years 4 years
No. of projects 8 7 4 2
Branches Steel, Metallurgy Steel Mechanical Metallurgy, Mech. Electrical 
Electrical Contruction Construction Construction. Mech.
Construction
Source: Yachir F., op c i t . p.266.
Although all branches experienced delays, the latter seem more pronounced 
in those branches that relied heavily on turnkey and product in hand contracts 
(elecrical and mechanical construction). Delays in these kinds of projects can 
only bring about a longer involvement of foreign firms and higher investment 
costs supported by Algerian firms.
2. At the macro-economic level, implementation of the three successive 
plans would cost 217.21 billion dinars instead of the anticipated cost of 66
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billions.
3. Finally the productive apparatus which had been plagued by cost 
overruns could not even produce the level of output implied by the design.
Table VIII.6: Ratio of actual output to installed capacity (1978)
Sector Rate of utilisation % *
Mining industry (Sonarem) 56.67
Steel industry (SNS) 71.6
Metallurgy industry (S.N. Metal) 44.3
Mechanical industry (Sonacome) 59.2
Electrical industry (Sonelec) 59.2
Hydrocarbon industry (Sontrach) 55.5
Light industries 2 78.8
Source: Benachenhou A., Planification et developpementen Algerie,
GREA, Alger 1980, p. 61,62,63.
1. average for various plants
2. average for various branches.
The outcome of these three factors would emerge as a non-competitive 
industrial productive system which can neither envisage producing for the 
world market nor confront international competition in the domestic market.6
The non-competitiveness of the Algerian productive base would however 
benefit transnational firms to the extent that:
- Their technical assistance would be called for, hence the possibility of 
collecting more profits
- Algerian firms cannot compete in the world market, thus the
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impossibility for them to disturb transnational firms market shares
- Finally, the Algerian accumulation process can only be supported by a 
continuous flow of hydrocarbon exports, hence ensuring transnational 
firms' in particular and international capital in general a supply of a 
strategic commodity
The appropriation of part of the oil rent (by the Algerian state) through the 
export of hydrocarbons thus made possible the implementation of a productive 
base, the inefficiency of which could be hidden by further export of 
hydrocarbons.
As in the case of agriculture, this particular use of the oil rent constituted a 
means of divorcing an (investment) decision from the economic consequences 
(profitability in particular) of that decision.
The oil rent, then, served:
- To finance the implementation of a productive system, the inefficiency 
of which pushed the Algerian economy towards a greater specialisation 
in hydrocarbon exports
- To finance the internationalisation of capital which took the shape of a 
flow of commodity sets (turnkey and product in hand plants) which, 
because of their particular form of penetration, had been supplied at 
monopoly prices and could not be reproduced internally
Specialisation in hydrocarbon exports and the lack of integration among 
domestic firms may signify that the building of an independent and national 
economy as a social project represented more of an ideological rhetoric (by
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Algerian dominant social groups) than a palatable reality.
The magnitude of the oil rent during the 1970s coupled with the possibility 
of obtaining loans (guaranteed by hydrocarbon reserves) then sustained:
- At the economic level, the fiction of a possible withdrawal from the 
international divison of labour
- At the political level, the spread of the populist ideology which negatesd 
internal class contradictions while emphasising the so-called anti­
imperialist struggle
Thus, contrary to the claimed goal of implementing Amin's autocentred 
model, Algerian policymakers seemed to have produced neither that model nor 
the extroverted one. Indeed the only palatable connection that emerges from 
the Algerian scene is the one that relates the export sector (the hydrocarbon 
sector) to the rest of the economy. The latter can efficiently produce neither 
luxury goods (as in the extroverted model) nor mass-consumption goods (as in 
the auto centred model).
The autocentred model, however, required a necessary connection between 
a sector producing capital goods and a sector producing mass-consumption 
goods. This connection appears essential to the existence of an autonomous 
accumulation process whereby external relations become subject to the logic of 
the internal accumulation.?
The non-emergence of this connection in the Algerian accumulation 
process may, then, to a certain extent mean that the Algerian experience had
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not been supported by an autonomous decision-making process. On the 
contrary, this process may have materialised a variant of the extroverted model 
with one special feature: the export oriented sector (hydrocarbons in this case) 
had generated a surplus profit (the oil rent) of such a magnitude that the 
connection between this sector and the rest of the economy could take any 
shape chosen by the operator (the Algerian state in this case) controlling the 
oil rent.
Thus, at variance with the extroverted model, where an export sector is 
connected with a luxury goods sector (hence materialising an articulation of 
various domestic sectors supporting and supported by a specific classes- 
aliiance), in the Algerian case, the straightforward connection emerges as the 
one which links (but officially opposes) the export sector (hydrocarbons) with 
international capital. In this context the (Algerian) export sector provides 
international capital with hydrocarbons while transnational firms (the 
apparent form of international capital) provides the export sector in particular 
and the rest of the economy in general with the required commodities (for the 
reproduction of both elements of the labour process).
At first sight, the tight connection between the Algerian hydrocarbon 
sector and international capital suggests that the variant of the extroverted 
model implemented upon the Algerian scene would favour a greater insertion 
of the domestic economy into the world capitalist market. Within this context, 
the Algerian state (as the manager of the export sector) would have little 
autonomy and could not envisage the implementation of an independent and 
national economy. Hence the connection mentioned above would "normally" 
bring about a necessary alliance between international capital and the social
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groups dominating the Algerian state.
The appropriation of a substantial share of the oil rent by the state would, 
however, give Algerian policymakers enough leeway to appear to be 
confronting international capital over Algeria's position within the 
international divison of labour. Thus the existence of the oil rent would 
apparently allow the Algerian state to advance an "anti-imperialist" discourse 
while, at the same time, relying on international capital for the building of an 
autonomous (from international capital) or autocentred economy.
To overcome this paradox would nevertheless require, besides the 
objective condition, i.e. the oil rent, an essential ingredient: the political will 
(on the part of the state) to implement a social project which was to negate its 
very premisses (the necessary link with international capital).
The Algerian experience does not however exhibit any trend towards the 
emergence of an autonomous accumulation process. On the contrary, the 
Algerian economy has become more dependent (for the reproduction of both 
elements of the labour process) on the world market; and to that extent the 
Algerian state’s claim of building an autocentred economy remains at the 
rhetorical stage.
Hence while Amin's autocentred economy still belongs to the future (if it 
ever emerges), De Bernis' model does not seem to have been implemented. The 
discrepancy between the social project advanced by the Algerian state and the 
actual Algerian experience ought, then, to be questioned as a first step, in terms 
of the pertinence of the concept of industrialising industries for the Algerian
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social formation.
On a global scale, the implementation of De Bernis' model remains ultimately 
dependent on two basic conditions: 1) the first, i.e. that priority is given to 
heavy industries, stems from the assumption that these industries would 
motivate the filling in of the inter-sectoral matrix and bring about an 
autonomous accumulation process. Implementing the industrialising 
industries- productive base, however, requires imports of means of production. 
Thus, at the beginning,rather than limiting Algeria's dependency on the world 
market, these imports would translate into the so-called technology transfer and 
reinforce transnational firms involvement in the domestic economy. 2) To 
overcome this dilemma calls for the second condition, which emerges as the 
omnipotent role taken by the state. The latter would act as the main 
entrepreneur, ensure the mobilisation of funds (the oil rent in this case) and 
co-ordinate (at least in the abstract) the process of implementing an 
autocentred economy.
The requirement that the state be wholly involved in the economic sphere 
does, nevertheless, appear as less problematic than the first condition which 
involves a non-passive agent i.e. the transnational firm.
Under these circumstances, the first condition (the implementation of the 
industrialising industries-productive base) emerges as the one which may be 
used to test the realisation of De Bernis' model and to assess the Algerian state's 
involvement within the Algerian scene.
288
In view of the structural features of the investment programme as well as 
the input-output matrix (section 2 aboveJ, the core of De Bernis* model does not 
appear as a leading component. Hence the answer as to what impeded the 
emergence of that core (despite the existence of the oil rent) may partly reside 
in the Algerian state's understanding of the development process.
At first sight, De Bernis' model has some resemblance with the strategy 
Soviet policymakers implemented by the end of the 1920s. In both cases the 
stress is put on the development of heavy industries as a top priority. But 
whereas the Soviet policymakers' argument stems from a political will to master 
the "commanding heights" (the strategic sectors) of the economy and to reduce 
the effects of a clearly hostile environment (capitalist encirclement), De Bernis 
exhibits a model whereby the process of industrialisation appears to be 
determined and motivated by some types of industries with no particular regard 
to the social and political environment.
Hence, while in the Soviet case the political will and the class struggle 
aspects are emphasised, in the Algerian experience the dynamism of the social 
formation remains dependent on the virtue of the so-called industrialising 
industries. To that extent, De Bernis' model, as implemented in Algeria, exhibits 
the same economistic view as the one developed by other seemingly opposite 
discourses (industrialisation by substitution of imports, and export led growth, 
in particular). While the latter put forward the role of the so-called market 
forces, the former develops the mechanistic argument about the inner 
dynamism of particular industries.
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Within these various approaches, however, the particular internal 
conditions (the class structure especially) are not taken into account; and 
rather than being the outcome of conflicting interests among various social 
groups, industrialisation appears as a neutral process potentially beneficial to 
the whole society.
At the concrete level, however, the Algerian growth strategy seems to have 
missed its claimed goal of building an independent and national economy. 
Hence the feasibility of De Bernis’ model (which is technically similar to the 
Soviet model) may reside, not in its internal logic (the snow-ball effect of the 
industrialising industries) but on political parameters reflecting the class 
nature of the state.
Under this assumption, the illusion developed by the state ideological 
apparatus (about the gradual implementation of an autocentred economy) would 
be explained by the existence (and its appropriation by the Algerian state) of 
the oil rent. The latter would, in the Algerian context, have been used to erect 
industrial segments without the political will to gradually separate their 
functioning from the dynamic of the capitalist system on a world scale.
Hence, apart from the lack of political will which must stem from internal 
conditions (ch. IX below), the non-implementation of De Bernis' model may be 
comprehended as the outcome of external pressures generated by the process of 
internationalisation of capital on a world scale.
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4. Internationalisation of capital and the AGS
The growth strategy chosen by Algerian policymakers seemed to reflect at 
its beginning an opposition to the prevailing international divison of labour in 
general and to the process of internationalisation of capital supported by 
transnational firms in particular.
The building of an integrated economy in essence contradicted the ideology 
of comparative advantage and apparently represented a challenge to the 
imposed international division of labour.
The path chosen by Algerian policymakers, however unorthodox, seemed to 
have anticipated a new type of international division of labour. The latter 
would emerge as a delocalisation of some segments and types of industries (steel 
and petrochemical) towards peripheral economies.
In this context, industrialisation of peripheral economies in general and of 
Algeria in particular, would be interpreted as a new stage in the relations 
between central and peripheral economies. This new stage would then be 
characterised by the centre's specialisation in engineering studies and new 
industrial activities (electronics, computers, etc.) and the periphery's 
industrialisation through implementation of obsolete industries.
The obsolescence of some industrial segments and the ascendency of the 
development ideology over the ruling classes of peripheral countries had 
therefore been responsible for the redeployment of these segments towards the 
periphery. Hence delocalisation of industrial activities which used to be
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concentrated in central economies, allowed transnational firms to sell their 
technology (and to experiment with it in the case of Algeria) and maintain a 
supply of primary products (in a more elaborate form) from the periphery.
Algerian policymakers seemed to have taken advantage of the delocalisation 
process in order to implement industrial activities. Their strategy (contrary to 
the official claim) could not (at its early stages) contradict the transnational 
firms' policies. On the contrary, both sides seemed to fulful their aim: 
maximising profits and guaranteeing hydrocarbon supply on the one hand, 
implementing industrial activities on the other.
However, Algerian policymakers claimed aim of building an integrated 
economy went beyond transnational firms' strategy. Algeria's economic 
opening to the world market, from their viewpoint, constituted a temporary 
period and represented a necessity which could not be avoided. Implementation 
of particular industrial segments therefore, represented a possibility to utilise a 
new form of dependency (technological and financial) to create an integrated 
economy by a dynamic consumption of technology.
The integrated economy would, in these circumstances, emerge as a 
consequence of the snow-ball effects of these industrial segments which belong 
to the so-called industrialising indutries.
Paradoxically these industrialising industries seem to be the ones that tend 
to be exported by transnational firms towards the periphery.** The process of 
internationalisation of capital and the industrialisation process taking place in 
Algeria could, therefore, be understood, not as two contradictory aspects of the
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same unity but as one aspect reflecting the process of capitalist development on 
a worldscale.
This process seems to have been accentuated by the economic slowdown of 
the central economies during the 1970s. Thus, whereas the 1970s witnessed 
stagnating central economies, the opposite seemed to hold true for the 
peripheral economies which experienced an increase in the flow of foreign 
investment.
Table VIII. 7: Private foreign direct investment and bilateral portfolio 
Investment flows from D.A.C. * countries to developing 
countries (U.S. $ billion)
Private Foreign Direct investment (F.D.I.) Bilateral Portfolio 
Currents Constant $* Investment ($ current)
Year
1960 1.77 4.69 0.63
1962 1.49 3.78 0.15
1964 1.57 3.77 0.854
1966 2.17 4.90 0.48
1968 3.03 6.50 0.91
1970 3.69 7.11 0.70
1972 4.23 6.% 1.99
1974 1.10 1.40 3.81
1976 7.68 8.35 10.21
1978 11.26 9.65 21.05
1980 9.47 6.81 11.70
1: Calculated in 1977 dollars using the G.N.P. deflator
Source: OECD, DAC estimates, quoted from Oman C., New forms o f international
investment in developing countries, OECD, Paris 1984, p. 28
* D.A.C: Development Assistance Committee of OECD.
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While increasing in absolute terms, foreign direct investment did not grow 
at the same rate as the flow of financial capital flowing towards peripheral 
economies. The 1970s then, witnessed a change of emphasis (on the part of 
international capital) from direct investment to portfolio investment which 
encompassed, along with traditional bank loans, new forms of investment such 
as joint ventures, licencing agreements and turnkey contracts. The emergence 
of these new forms of investment alongside foreign direct investment actually 
constituted a noticeable feature in the extroactive industries (in particular the 
oil industry).
The growing importance of these new forms of investment during the 1970s 
could then be comprehended as the materialisation of a convergence of interest 
between two essential forces within the world capitalist system:
1. Transnational firms which had to respond appropriately to the economic 
slowdown that plagued the central economies during the 1970s and to the 
nationalistic rhetoric developed by some peripheral ruling classes during the 
same period.
2. Some peripheral ruling classes which would legitimise their power only 
insofar as they appear to control the accumulation process taking place within 
their respective social formation.
Depending on the internal conditions of the host country, transnational 
firms would engage in direct investment or adopt formulas which allowed some 
form of involvement on the part of the host country. Whether the host 
country's involvement constituted a second best alternative for transnational
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firms, however, becomes irrelevant as long as the monopolistic control over 
technology is not called into question by the widening of its world market 
through diverse formulas.
Thus, whereas direct foreign investment does not seem to expose 
transnational firms to a loss of control over their activities, the new forms of 
investment may be comprehended as stemming from an updated and 
appropriate strategy on their part (the T.N.C.) to hinder the emergence of any 
non-controlled production process. Consequently, the new forms of investment, 
while responding to nationalistic attitudes on the part of some peripheral 
ruling classes would:
- Reject part (if not all) of the cost of a particular project on the host 
country's operators (public or private)
- Limit, for transnational firms, the financial risk of being nationalised
£ nsure, for the same firms, a market for a technology at the upstream 
level and create the conditions for an uninterrupted flow of commodities 
coming from the peripheral economies at the downstream level
The extreme case of transnational firms' apparent withdrawal from 
ownership of projects implemented in peripheral countries could be 
exemplified by OPEC countries in general and Algeria in particular (where 
turnkey and product in hand contracts have been widely used).
The withdrawal of transnational firms from ownership of plants 
implemented in Algeria may be apprehended as the second alternative (the first 
one being F.D.I.) left to them to widen the market for technology.
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If turnkey and product in hand formulas exclude foreign control over 
domestic output, they do transfer to transnational firms (engineering firms in 
the Algerian case) the decision process over the choice of equipment and their 
combination in the production process.
That transfer of prerogatives could constitute the basis upon which 
transnational firms would create a captive market in terms of maintenance, 
renewal and extension of the installed productive apparatus. Furthermore, 
firms involved in the Algerian scene could charge monopoly prices to their 
Algerian customers without risking the loss of the market.^
In terms of financial returns, turnkey and product in hand formulas may 
then, be as rewarding for transnational firms as F.D.I. (Foreign Direct 
Investment). Moreover, these formulas may constitute the appropriate 
response of transnational firms to the emergence of nationalistic movements in 
peripheral countries and to the economic crisis that spread over the central 
economies in the 1970s:
- The withdrawal of transnational firms from direct ownership but their 
real control over the production processes implemented in peripheral 
economies would apparently, reduce their involvement to a technical 
level (the so-called transfer of technology) which stands as politically 
more acceptable to some peripheral ruling classes
- While ensuring export of equipment by transnational firms to 
peripheral countries, turnkey and product in hand projects do not need 
to be viable from the foreign operator's viewpoint. On the contrary, the 
less viable these projects are the more rewarding they become for the
2%
transnational firms which can perpetuate their involvement in the 
peripheral economies concerned.
In this context the reluctance of transnational firms to commit themselves 
to entering joint ventures in "friendly" countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Iran** (before 1979) could support the argument about the non-profitability of 
oil related industries (in particular the Petrochemical Industry) implemented in 
the oil exporting countries.
The 1973 oil crisis and the increase in the magnitude of the oil rent 
appropriated by the oil exporting states had furthermore allowed transnational 
oil firms to redefine their strategy towards the former:.
- Firstly, the price increase would allow transnational oil firms to revalue 
their assets and claim higher compensation against their gradual 
nationalisation, secondly, the same event pushed the oil exporting states towards 
prevailing their development plans, hence opening up a wider market for 
transnational firms 12 and increasing their absorptive capacity (for fixed 
assets formation as well as the capacity to consume goods and services).
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Table VIII.8: National expenditure of six capital surplus oil exporting 
countries* 1973-1978 (billion U.S. current dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Average growth rate
Total GDP 50.9 84.4 95.4 117.1 132.9 138.9 22.2
Non oil GDP 14.6 22.5 31.5 42.2 53.5 63.6 34.2
Investment 5.8 11.7 20.2 26.4 35.1 41.1 47.2
Consumption 16.1 25.2 36.0 45.8 59.2 63.7 31.7
Investment 
as % of Non 
oil GDP
19.7 51.8 64.2 61.6 65.6 64.6
Investment 
growth rate
102 73 31 33 17
Source: World Bank estimates, quoted in Development prospects o f the capital 
surplus oil exporting countries, World Bank Staff, working paper No. 483, 
August 1981, p.12. *Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, S. Arabia, Qatar,, UAE.
Thus, the accumulation process financed by the oil rent not only pushed the 
investment/GDP ration in the non-oil economy to unprecedented records but 
was coupled by an important increase in consumption:
- The first aspect materialised the process of internationalisation of 
capital under the control of transnational firms and under the fictitious 
ownership of the states concerned
- The second aspect, on the other hand, would develop a consumption 
pattern which bore no relation to the state of the forces of production 
prevailing in these countries and would accentuate the features of a rentier 
economy depending on external resources to sustain its living standards
- Finally, the oil crisis permitted transnational oil firms to offset the 
increase in costs due to higher oil prices and excess capacity in central 
economies by exporting plants - refineries and petro chemical complexes and 
services rather than investing in obsolete industries. Furthermore, while the 
whole cost of particular projects had been supported by the host country
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(thanks to the oil rent), their viability remains questionable insofar as they 
would compete with industries (situated in central economies) owned and 
controlled by the very transnational firms which implemented these projects
Consequently the viability of the projects implemented in the OPEC countries 
had been questioned, although the OPEC states benefited at the time (1970s) from 
an apparently comparative advantage (relatively low cost of feedstock).
The fall of the oil price in the present decade would then suppress any clear 
comparative advantage for the oil exporting states. The latter must, however, 
continue exporting hydrocarbons because the installed capacity cannot stay 
idle and some states must repay their debt. Hence contrary to De Bernis' 
presentation of his model, international capital (through its apparent form, the 
transnational firm) develops a counter-strategy towards those (some peripheral 
ruling classes) who would, apparently, try to call its hegemony into question.
Algeria's state as a mono-exporter of hydrocarbons and the non-emergence 
of an autonomous accumulation process would, then, reflect international 
capital's success in keeping the Algerian economy within the appropriate (for 
international capital) international division of labour.
Thus, as an external cause the strategy developed by international capital 
may (partly) explain the current state of the Algerian economy. However the 
failure of the Algerian state to move away from the apparently imposed 
international division of labour (despite the oil rent) may stem from an internal 
cause which belongs to the political sphere rather than the economic one. As 
such, the comprehension of the Algerian experience would ultimately depend 
on an analysis of the emergence of the Algerian state.
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CHAPTER IX 
THE ALGERIAN STATE’S SOCIAL PROJECT(S)
In 1954 the FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) proclaimed that:
"Our renovation movement presents itself under the name:
Front de Liberation Nationale, hence it moves away from all 
likely compromising and offers the opportunity for all 
parties and purely Algerian movements to join the liberation 
struggle without any other consideration
By calling for independence with no other consideration, the FLN 1954 
declaration ensured that the independence war would involve the majority of the 
Algerian population. To that extent, the principal contradiction emerged as the one 
that linked and opposed the indigenous population (grasped as a non-contradictory 
unity) to the French colonisers. Hence various Algerian political parties could take 
part in the war against the French without renouncing their essential political 
tendencies.
Under these circumstances the FLN. which emerged primarily from one party 
the MTLD (Movement pour le Triomphe des Libert6s Democratiques). enlarged its 
base through the rallying of other political parties. The widening of its base 
increased the quantitative strength of the FLN. but at the qualitative level, the FLN's 
discourse was reduced to a single slogan, calling for independence from France.
1. The emergence of the Algerian leadership
Since its foundation in 1926 (under the name of "Etoile Nord Africaine" - ENA -) 
the MTLD, as the main component of the FLN. had always vindicated independence
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for Algeria. However, in view of the colonial system, the gaining of independence 
through legal means did not appear realistic to some members of the MTLD. 
Consequently the FLN call for armed struggle and the insurrection of November 
1954 (while surprising both the French authorities and the other Algerian parties) 
sealed the fate of any peaceful means for changing the Algerian society.
Unlike the MTLD, the three Algerian parties which rallied the FLN after 1954, 
had not been asking for independence. On the contrary, the main requirements of 
their discourses appeared to be a closer collaboration between Algeria and France 
and the abolition of any segregation between Algerians and Frenchmen.
The first of the three parties, the Oulamas (a religious organisation founded in 
1931), had been putting the stress on an Islamic revival which would safeguard the 
"Muslim and Arabic personality" of Algeria. Hence the Oulamas organisation 
vindicated the autonomy of Algeria but within some form of union with France. To 
this extent, the Oulamas do not seem to have had any social project apart from a 
return to an idealised Muslim past. In terms of its social structure, on the other 
hand, the Oulamas' organisation had represented the traditional bourgeoisie^ 
(wholesale merchants, landowners and some literate "nobility") which had been 
witnessing its gradual destruction by the penetration of the capitalist mode of 
production into the Algerian social formation.
The French colonisation, however, brought about the emergence of an Algerian 
upper middle class (doctors, pharmacists, solicitors) which came to be politically 
represented by the UDMA (Union D6mocratique du Manifeste Algerian, founded in 
1943). This party which appears to have represented another wing of the same 
class position^ as the Oulamas, had developed a similar discourse and intended to 
struggle for some kind of autonomy within a larger union with France.
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Finally the Algerian communist party (PCA), which was founded in October 
1936,3 had suffered from its close links with the French communist party as well as 
its European membership. To that extent the "national question" had not been 
properly understood by the Algerian party which found itself outside the 
leadership of the national movement. The Algerian communists, however, 
participated in the liberation war but suffered (physically and politically) from the 
historical mistake of their party.
Thus the heterogeneous composition of the FLN organisation could operate 
under the simplest common denominator - the struggle for independence - and 
postpone to a later date the definition of any social project. Under these 
circumstances the common denominator constituted the strength of the FLN as w^ ell 
as its weakness.
By sticking to the simple requirement of independence for Algeria, the FLN 
(with its heterogeneous composition) proved its correct assessment of the principal 
contradiction of the moment (the contradition between colonised and coloniser) 
and projected the image of a monolithic organisation. This apparently monoiolhic 
organisation however, reflected essentially the aspirations of two distinct (if not 
opposed) social categories.
The petty bourgeoisie which led the independence war faced a division of 
labour according to the origin of its components. Consequently, the urban petty 
bourgeoisie tended to concentrate on the political structure (FLN and provisional 
government) whereas its rural counterpart would dominate the military structure.
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The large masses, on the other hand, mainly of peasant origin, constituted the 
backbone of the liberation movement and represented the ultimate force of the 
anti-colonial struggle. Because of their rejection by the colonial system, these 
masses represented the most radical category in terms of overthrowing the colonial 
rule. Their radicalism, however, remained of a superficial nature to the extent that 
no autonomous organisation existed to synthesise their basic aspirations. Hence the 
peasantry bore the liberation war but its deepest aspirations could hardly 
materialise with the departure of the colonists.
The two social categories which formed the national liberation movement were, 
consequently, united in their confrontation with the colonial ruler. Independence 
would, in this context, bring about change for both categories. However, wiiereas 
the need for political change emerged as a theme of unity, the question of social 
change could not be raised during the independence war. For social change could 
not have covered the same meaning for the various categories struggling under the 
FLN umbrella.
The frontist nature of the FLN would indicate the existence of various political 
tendencies (see the FLN composition above) within the leadership; and among 
these tendencies, a bourgeois tendency which would aim at replacing the French 
colonists by an indigenous bourgeoisie (the UDMA and the Oulamas would represent 
this tendency).
At the other extreme and still within the petty bourgeois leadership, a  socialist 
tendency showed its existence through the production of the wartime official 
discourse. Hence as early as 1956, Ben M'Hidi would claim that the Algerian people 
were struggUng "for a socialist system involving, in particular, revolutionary and 
deep agrarian reform, for a decent material and moral life and for peace in the
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Maghreb" .4
Ben M'Hidi's message would again re-emerge within the "programme de Tripoli" 
(June 1962) which was elaborated by “left wing" in te llectual and unanimously 
accepted by the ruling body (conseil national de la r6volution AlgGrienne, CNRA) of 
the FLN. The programme would advance the notion of "a popular and democratic 
revolution" defined as "the conscious building of the country in the framework of 
socialist principles and of power in the hands of the people".** The programme 
would also envisage the setting up of heavy industries as a priority 7
However, the socialist discourse of the war period remained limited in its class 
analysis of the Algerian society. Hence it kept silent about the likely contradictions 
which would emerge in post-in dependence Algeria. Under these circumstances, 
the socialist rhetoric appears (in retrospect) as the dream of some intellectuals 
rather than the outcome of the "concrete analysis of a concrete situation".
In this respect, the large masses (of which the majority were of the peasantry) 
who might have (in theory) responded positively to a socialist message, were 
ideologically one step behind. For the massive participation of the small and 
landless peasantry in the liberation war did not aim at destroying the essence of the 
colonial system (the reproduction of capitalist social relations of productions), but 
concentrated on a more concrete (apparent) goal, i.e. the repossession of the 
"stolen" land.
The mobilisation of the large masses around the objective of repossessing the 
"stolen" land, could hardly be replaced by a more abstract (the socialist ideology) 
discourse. For those who advanced socialist themes were outside the battlefield (the 
Algerian territory),** and the isolation of the Algerian territory (brought about by
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the erection of a barricade of electrified barbed wire and minefields at the Tunisian 
and Moroccan borders) could not favour the spread of a radical ideology from 
abroad.
Under these circumstances, the FLN commanders of the six military districts, 
which covered the Algerian Territory, became more and more autonomous from the 
national leadership and from each other as well7 The relative autonomy of the 
military districts consequently favoured and reinforced the ever-present pre­
bourgeois (tribalism and regionalism, in particular) ideology among the masses. To 
that extent, and despite the socialist rhetoric of some members of the leadership, the 
socialist discourse had little impact (if any) on the large masses which bore the 
liberation war. These masses, however, witnessed the gradual rise of the district 
commanders as supreme chiefs of their respective areas.^
The lack of co-ordination among the various military districts as well as the 
quasi-autonomy of these districts from the national leadership, would, to some 
extent, create a new factor of division among the Algerian leadership (the first 
factor being the frontist nature of the FLN). The consensus around the call for 
independence could, under these conditions, last as long as the duration of the 
liberation war. The end of the war, however, would exhibit the basic weakness of 
the FLN.
Insofar as the large masses had not been mobilised for the implementation of a 
particular social project and to the extent that the FLN remained a "multi-headed" 
(or headless) organisation, the withdrawal of the colonisers would move the 
principal contradiction back inside the national formation.
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Independence meant a crisis** inside the Algerian leadership whose various 
parts started struggling in order to dominate the newly independence state. The 
power vacuum that followed the French withdrawal would, then, show the 
ideological deficiency of the FLN and reveal the absence of a strong social class 
capable of imposing its hegemony (in Gramsci's sense) on the rest of society. 
Hence the FLN. as an organisation which led the independence war. collapsed after 
the French departure from Algeria.
To the extent that no other political organisation existed outside the FLN, the 
collapse of the latter meant that a vacuum had to be filled at the leadership level. In 
this context, the period 1962-1965 (Ben Bella's years as president) may he interpreted 
as an interlude in the process of the state s consolidation under the control of the 
"army of the frontiers".
2. Development Ideology and the rentier state
Constituted, at the beginning of the war by various independent units of the 
frontier districts, the army of the frontiers^ (mostly based in Tunisia) gradually 
moved towards the model of a conventional army, with a central command led by 
Colonel Boumedtene. Compared to the interior units which confronted the fire 
power of the French army, the army of the frontiers faced a rather quiet situation. 
Being isolated from the Algerian territory by the various barbed wire barrages. 
Boumediene's army could hardly claim to have participated in the war.
Thus, while the units of the interior had been gradually decimated by the 
successive military operations*^ of the French army. Boumediene's army, being 
outside the danger zone, benefited from the recruitment of ex-French army officers 
(of Algerian origin) who deserted from the colonial army during the years 1959 and
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I960.*4 Well-trained and well-equipped, the army of the frontiers had not 
performed its logical task (the war against the French army), ft did, however, 
intrude into the political scene by producing its own populist discourse and 
presenting itself as the "guarantor of the revolution"
At the end of the war. the self proclaimed guarantor of the revolution emerged 
as the only organised (and armed) force left among the various contenders for 
power. The army of the frontiers started its war by crushing dissident units*6 of 
the interior and moved closer to power by supporting Ben Bella in the race for the 
presidency.
To the extent that Boumediene was not known as a national figure, its alliance 
with Ben Bella represented the appropriate springboard for the control of post­
independence Algeria. Ben Bella, on the other hand, lacking a power base, could 
envisage a tactical alliance with Boumediene in order to eliminate other contenders 
for power.
Hence, both men, being rejected by an important part of the leadersh ip ,used  
the military might of the army of the frontiers (and the national stature of Ben 
Bella) to gain power after the departure of the French colonists. The alliance 
between the two men took shape when Ben Bella was "elected" president in 
September 1962 thanks to the support of Boumediene.
The honeymoon between the two men was. however, shortlived to the extent 
that Boumediene coup d'etat (19 June 1965) put a halt to Ben Bella's reign. By 
attempting to undermine the power of the army (and of Boumediene in particular) 
through the revival of the FLN and the creation of a popular militia,*8 Ben Bella
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became a de facto adversary of Boumediene.
The coup d'etat accelerated the militarisation process of the regime and 
favoured the constitution of the army as a dominant group controlling the state 
and using the moribund party (the FLN)^ as a tool for propaganda. The seizure of 
power by the army, then, saw the emergence of a new political structure, i.e. the 
"conseil de lar6volution” (C.R.) which was to replace all other previous institutions 
(the national assembly and the political bureau of the FLN, in particular). The 
"conseil de la revolution" as the supreme authority was composed of 26 members of 
which 24 were (or had been) army o f f ic e r s .2 0
The C.R., however, faced the same dilemma as the FLN to the extent that, coming 
from various social origins, the CR.’s members could only agree about the removal 
of Ben Bella. Hence some form of minimal programme had to be implemented in 
order to justify the military coup.
Under this constraint, the military regime would develop an essential (and 
apparently neutral) theme, i.e. the building of the state apparatus at the political 
and economic levels. In this context, Ben Bella s populist rhetoric was played down 
while the reconstruction of the economy, under the state's control, became the 
means by which the new regime would seek its legitimacy.
Dominating the state's apparatus and controlling the basic sectors of the 
economy (through the creation of various state's firms) the military group could, 
then, claim to be pursuing the anti-imperialist stance. The political complexion of 
the military regime could not, however, be other than populist. For in view of the 
burden which was supported by the large masses during the war, the only 
appropriate ideology (to maximise the number of allies) had to place the people at
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the centre of any discourse.
Consequently, using the same device as Ben Bella, the military regime developed 
a public sector and took decisions in the "name of the people". The "people", 
however, had been completely absent from the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, the building of an independent and national economy would 
apparently respond to the people’s aspirations and increase the welfare of the 
majority (if not the totality).
Under these circumstances, the priority given to the heavy industries, would be 
interpreted as stemming from nationalist parameters (the rejection of the essential 
feature of the colonial economy) and the simplistic understanding^* of the world 
economy as a reality divided between industrialised and non-industrialised 
countries.
The building of an independent and national economy, which was equated, in 
the official discource, with a transition towards a socialist society, would, however, 
emerge without reference to an internal class struggle. The only recognised 
struggle remained the one that the Algerian society, as a whole, was waging against 
"imperialism". In this context, even the domestic bourgeoisie was called upon to 
contribute into transforming the Algerian econom y.22
Building a "socialist society" without a leading socialist party but with the help 
of the domestic bourgeoisie would, at first sight, constitute a challenging paradox 
indeed. The historical development which characterised the Algerian society 
suggests, to some extent, that the socialist rhetoric had been strongly correlated 
with the amount of oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state.
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Hence the (theoretical) paradox mentioned above loses (in practice) its 
paradoxical feature insofar as an appropriate use of the oil rent could (i) 
strengthen the state and the military under cover of a populist discourse and (ii) 
allow the emergence and consolidation of a domestic bourgeoisie under cover of 
national solidarity.
The strengthening of the state emerged, in the Algerian context, as the process 
of its autonomisation from civil society (in Marx’s sense). The appropriation of the 
oil rent by the state would, to that extent, create the illusion of a political power 
above all social classes. This same appropriation would put forward the 
entrepreneurial destiny of a nationalist state which could function outside and, to 
some extent, independently of the inner logic of the economic structure. 
Consequently, the state did not need to create the conditions for the appropriate 
exploitation of the labour force (in order to produce a surplus and ensure the 
reproduction of the system). On the contrary, the oil rent (understood as a transfer 
of value from outside the domestic economy) would ensure an accumulation process 
without the exacerbation of the conflictual relation between capital and labour.
However, the autonomisation of the rentier state might be seen as one aspect 
(the phenomenal form) of a more complex (and contradictory) reality. Another 
aspect of this reality would be reflected in the exteriorisation of civil society from 
the historical development to which the Algerian social formation was subject. 
Under these conditions the rentier state became the (apparent) active agent, and 
civil society the passive one.
Consequently, the rentier state performed not only the task of the entrepreneur 
but used and created a multitude of institutions in order to permeate and control
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civil society. Hence direct control was maintaind by the conventional police, the 
"gendarmerie", " the military security" and the party machine (whose members 
acted more like informers than an ideological vanguard). The indirect control, on 
the other hand, emerged through the creation (initiated by the state) of various 
'unions' (workers, lawyers, economists, doctors, peasants, etc.) under the control of 
the FLN. These unions, however, did not act as conventional unions (by defending 
their members’ interests) but were geared towards selling the policies of the 
supposedly infallible state to their "audiences".
This one-way movement (from the state to civil society) did, to some extent, 
create the illusion that civil society could be nothing but the passive recipient of 
the various state policies. The rentier state emerged, in this context, as the ultimate 
performer in terms of developing the Algerian economy.
Under these conditions (the apparent passivity of civil society, in particular), 
development would be visualised as a process of importing from, the “industrialised 
countries" the "modern technology" in order to transform the Algerian economy* 
and the success of this transformation appears totally dependent on the so-called 
transfer of technology.
However, this understanding of development of the Algerian state (as a rentier 
state) precluded any decisive role for the direct labourers (the Algerian 
technicians) in the production process and in mastering the imported technology. 
For the direct involvement of the labourers would create a potentially new type of 
performer (apart from the rentier state) who could claim its autonomy from the 
rent and compete for power with the dominant social groups (those who distribute 
the rent).
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Hence/the rentier state tended to rely on foreign technology as well as foreign 
technicians for the reproduction of the productive base. The rentier state, did, 
through the same movement, downgrade the potential role of the domestic 
technicians (and the working class, in general) who became attracted by 
administrative functions (i.e. those functions which were closer to decision 
centres) and ended up as rentiers participating in the sharing of the oil rent..
To ensure the reproduction of the system under its domination, the rentier state 
tended to downgrade productive labour and reduce the labourer to the mere 
recipient of a salary. The labourer's salary, however, remained completely 
disconnected from the result of his labour and as such, part of it may be visualised 
as a portion of the oil rent. At the economic level, the labourer appeared as a 
rentier benefiting from the state's kindness while, at the political level, the same 
labourer became a "client"23 of the rentier state.
In this context the rentier state produced the populist discourse as an effective 
means for the (political) control of those (the direct labourers) who were 
objectively rejected by the rentier system.
Through the same movement, the populist discourse tended to hide the 
convergence of interest between the rentier state and the domestic bourgeoisie (as 
a class in the process of being constituted). For the process that created the state 
sector under the military group command, produced a domestic bourgeoisie which 
entered into a patron-client relationship with the social groups dominating the 
state.
Hence, while the military group focused on the strengthening of the state 
sector, increased the number of its clients (by distributing the oil rent) and
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advanced its populist discourse, the domestic bourgeoisie quietly, accumulated by 
privately appropriating part of the oil rent (through subsidies and "gifts" accorded 
to ex-FLN or army members and members of their extended fam ily/to start 
businesses; overevaluation of contracts with the state, inflated prices, e tc J ^
The objective alliance and convergence of interests between the rentier state 
and the domestic bourgeoisie could not however emerge within the political scene. 
For the independence war could not result (from the large masses' viewpoint) in 
the replacement of the French colonists by "indigenous colonists". The 
manufacturing of a populist discourse as well as the emphasis on the building of an 
independent and national economy would, consequently, serve as compensatory 
devices for the rejection of the direct producer from the decision-making process 
and the presence of the domestic bourgeoisie within the state apparatus.
However, insofar as the domestic labour force did not fully confront the labour 
process (and the foreign technology, in particular), and to the extent that the 
rentier state would not perform its own suicide (by reintroducing productive labour 
as the central category), the question of implementing an independent and 
national economy seemed to have no answer within a rentier economy. That 
question nevertheless remained an ideological slogan which could enhance the 
legitimacy of the rentier state and provide a scapegoat, i.e. the imperialist 
conspiracy, for the fiasco of the state's policies.
The illusion of building an independent and national economy as well as the 
transition towards a socialist economy would have stemmed from the appropriation 
of the oil rent by a state which did not carry any coherent social project. The 
reduction of that rent in the 1980s would then require a reformulation of the
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Algerian growth strategy at the economic level, and the manufacturing of a new 
ideological discourse at the political level.
3. Rent reduction and the "new" growth strategy
The reduction in the magnitude of the oil rent appropriated by the Algerian 
State would necessarily put an end to the latter's role as collector and distributor of 
that rent, and under these circumstances two interrelated aspects must be 
confronted.
At the economic level, the internal and external conditions of the accumulation 
process must be reappraised and adapted to a situation where the existence of 
industries must stem from their viability as economic units.
At the political level, on the other hand, the disappearance of the oil rent, can 
only result in a re-activation of the internal contradictions of the Algerian social 
formation. In particular the populist ideology developed during the 1970s would 
become obsolete, hence requiring the production of a new discourse to justify and 
legitimise a new set of actions.
The accumulation process which was financed by the oil rent, could no longer 
be sustained in the present decade. In this context the slowing down of the 
investment programme started materialising as early as 1980.25, Thus, out of a 
planned investment expenditure of 400 billion dinars (1980-1984 plan), only 30% 
had actually been sp e n ^ . Although not completed, the 1980-84 plan nevertheless 
developed a new perspective in terms of sectoral distribution of investment
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Table IX-1. Sectoral distribution of investment, successive planned periods, billion 
dinars
1967-69* 1970-73* 1974-77* 1980-84** 1985-89**
Hydrocarbons 27.5 26.9 29.7 15.7 7.2
Industry (ex 
hydrocarbons) 26.1 30.4 31.5 22.7 24.4
Agriculture + 
irrigation work 20.5 12 7.4 11.7 14.4
Others 25.9 30.7 31.4 49.9 54
TOTAL 9.16 36.31 121.12 400.6 550***
* actual investment: ** planned investment: *** constant 1984 prices
Source: 1967 to 1977, MPAT Synthese du Bilan Economique et Social de la M cienne 
1967-1978, Alger 1980 p. 7
1980-1984, MPAT, General Report on th e1980-84Five Fear Plan , Alger 1985, 
p. 41
1985-89, MPAT, Deuxieme Plan Quinquenal 1987-89, Rapport General, Alger 
1985, p. 135
The second five year plan, on the other hand, emphasised the trend towards 
more investment in sectors other than the industrial sector in general and 
hydrocarbons industry in particular. This new feature of the investment 
programmes may have meant that the industrial sector in general, and the 
hydrocarbon industry in particular, reached an ‘'optimal'' phase in terms of the size 
of their productive base.
However the lack of integration of different sectors of the economy (see 
chapter VIII), the state of mono-exporter of the Algerian economy^? and the 
incapacity of the industrial sector to ensure its autonomous reproduction would 
suggest that the reassessment of the Algerian growth strategy constituted more
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than a mere continuation of the process which started with the first plan in 1967. In 
fact a fundamental shift in the growth strategy seemed to have taken place by the 
end of the 1970s.
While at the economic level the Algerian growth strategy seemed to go far away 
from its goal of building an independent and national economy, at the political 
level the Algerian scene witnessed the emergence of the domestic b o u r g e o i s i e ^  
(which up to then was not involved in the growth strategy).
The absence of the domestic bourgeoisie in the Algerian growth model and the 
1970s official discourse did not however mean its non-existence in the Algerian 
reality. On the contrary, the domestic bourgeoisie seemed to have been present in 
the economic sphere since 1962 onward. Although ignored in the political 
discourse, the Algerian bourgeoisie had nevertheless managed to a c c u m u l a t e ^  in 
branches outside the so-called strategic ones. Thus, by 1980, its contribution to 
gross domestic production became rather substantial.
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Table IX-2, Share of the private sector in GDP (1980) (Million dinars and 
percentage)
Output % of Private Output
Agriculture 10178.33 78.8
Industry (except Hydrocarbons) 3989.1 25
Hydrocarbons 9551.0 18.6






Source: ONS, Annuaire Statist!ques de lA lgerie 1983-84, ed. 1985, Alger, p. 318
Hence 36% of the Algerian gross domestic production in 1980 had been provided 
by the private sector although the latter had no defined role in the Algerian 
growth strategy.
The effective role of the private sector however emerged within a particular 
domestic division of labour stemming from the Algerian growth strategy. Since the 
latter emphasised the need to implement a set of heavy industries (the so-caHed 
industrialising industries), necessarily under state control, the domestic 
bourgeoisie oriented its investment towards final consumption branches thereby:
Positioning itself at the downstream level of the state sector and
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- Facing a market in rapid expansion due to the distribution of the oil rent by 
the State
Table IX-3. Turnover of the private sector according to activity (1980) 
(million dinars)





EMMS I* 8000** 2000** 25
Building Material 3506.215 460.554 13.11
Food Industry 8170.285 1056.167 12.9
Textile Industry 4529.938 2837.185 62.6
Leather-shoes 1187.689 487.998 41.1
Chemistry 2096.965 901.018 42.9
Wood and Paper 2250.527 741.572 32.9
TOTAL 29741.619 8484.494 28.5
Source: MIL., ML. quoted in Liabes, D., Capital Privd e t Patnms i f  Industrie en 
Algerie1962-19S2, CREA, 1984 p .425.
* Electricity, mechanics, metallurgy, steel industries: in this case they comprise, 
metal frames, sheet metal work, nails and screws production, automobile 
accessories etc 
** Estimation of the Ministry of Heavy Industries (ML).
Thus, despite its being officially excluded from the Algerian growth strategy, 
the private sector managed by 1980 to dominate the agricultural sector, the textile 
industry and the trade and service industries. However, contrary to the state 
enterprises which confronted non-mastered "territories" (modern technology in 
particular) and faced losses (partly because of administratively imposed prices of 
their output),30 the private sector activities seemed to have been rather efficient
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Table IX-4. Evolution of profit in the state and private sectors (million dinars)
1969 1974 197$
Branch State Private Total State Private Total State Private Total
EMMSE -2 73 71 -275 474 159 359 62 421
Building Mat. 38 3 41 - 27 45 1$ 75 20 95
Chemical Ind. 10 37 47 51 54 105 -89 74 -15
Food Ind. 69 55 124 135 42 177 -255 370 114
Textile Ind. 15 53 68 - 67 133 66 112 259 371
Leather Ind. 1 26 27 - 8 46 38 53 57 110
Wood Ind. 15 37 52 20 37 57 -80 41 -39
Others 7 1 8 9 I 10 5 14 19
TOTAL 153 285 438 -162 832 670 180 897 1077
Source: Comptes economiques 1967/197$ quoted in Liabes D, op.cit. p, 42$
It is, then, upon this apparent profitability of the private sector and the 
apparent inefficiency of the state sector that the 19$0s witnessed the emergence of 
a discourse acknowledging the existence of the former and developing the 
argument about the necessity for the State to integrate the private sector within the 
growth s tr a te g y ^ ! .  The reduction in the magnitude of the oil rent appropriated by 
the State and the apparent efficiency of the private sector would, then justify a 
shift in the economic as well as political aspects of the State s presentation of the 
growth of the Algerian economy.
In this context, the private sector was presented as antagonistic to the state 
sector (charte d'Alger 1964), then tolerated within the so-called "non exploitive
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ownership''^2 (charte nationaie 1976); finally in 1981 the private sector was 
congratulated by the ruling party (the FLN) for its role in the economic 
development of the Algerian scene and recognised as an equal partner to the state 
sector.
The state shift (in the offical discourse) towards a new presentation of the 
domestic bourgeoisie's role as complementing the state sector may, however, be 
comprehended:
- Firstly as an implicit recognition of the failure of the state's industrial base 
to reach the goal of building an independent and national econom; hence 
the calling into question of the Algerian growth strategy as implemented 
during the 1970s
- Secondly as an explicit end to the populist rhetoric developed by the state 
apparatus thanks to the oil rent
- Finally as a first step towards the transformation of the Algerian economy 
from a "distribution economy" to a "production economy": in view of the 
apparent efficiency of the private sector, this transformation would 
give more weight to the domestic bourgeoisie in the decision making 
process
This new comprehension of the Algerian growth strategy in general, and the 
role of the domestic bourgeoisie within it. may then constitute the ideological veil 
under which the abandonment of the strategy of building an independent and 
national economy (the implementation of Amin's autocentred model) would proceed 
and be replaced by a more orthodox policy within the prevailing international 
division of labour. The emphasis, in the 1980s official d i s c o u r s e d  on increase of
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output and productivity within all sectors of the economy with no reference to the 
beneficiaries of that increase, would suggest that the domestic bourgeoisie is being 
called upon to gradually play a leading role in the growth of the Algerian economy 
on one hand, and in the export market on the other.
In this context the building of an independent and national economy through 
implementation of a set of industrialising industries would become a slogan of the 
past, which is already being superceded by an appeal to the domestic bourgeoisie 
and to international capital:
The appeal to the domestic bourgeoisie would then emphasise the weight of 
light industries and the agriculture sector (the private sector domains of 
specialisation) which may replace the hydrocarbon sector as export 
sectors^4
- Although the government experienced a setback^? when it tried to 
introduce legislation allowing foreign firms to own a majority stake in joint 
ventures, the very fact that such a legislation had emerged, points to the 
need (from the Algerian States viewpoint) for a greater involvement of 
international capital in the evolution of the Algerian economy
The Algerian State seems, then, to have declared the failure of the 1970s growth 
strategy by rejecting some economic (the particular virtue of some set of industries 
over others) and political (the virtue of State over private ownership of the means 
of production) dogmas. The success of the alternative approach (outlined above) 
would, however, depend on international as well as internal parameters.
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At the international level, the export of commodities other than hydrocarbons 
must face international competition which neither the State nor the private sector 
have ever been in touch with (because of the State monopoly over international 
trade and the limitations imposed upon imports of foreign commodities).
At the internal level on the other hand, after twenty years of socialistic 
rhetoric (supported by the oil rent), the implementation of the more ‘'pragmatic" 
approach advanced by the State may require measures:
To restore confidence to the domestic bourgeoisie in a state that keeps 
on claiming fidelity to "irreversible options"
- To m o b ilis e 3 6  the labour force around the new growth strategy (hence the 
slogan "work and rigour to ensure the future") which, in accordance with 
the 1970s one, keeps on avoiding the question of the political and social 
implications of the development of the forces of production
The neutralisation of economic development in the Algerian official discourse 
may, then, be considered as a sign of the presence of the domestic bourgeoisie 
within the State which remains a stake for various social groups (holding various 
social projects).
The reduction in the magnitude of the oil rent appropriated by the State would, 
however, require the production of a more radical discourse. This process seems to 
have been on its way since 1980: the rehabilitation of the domestic bourgeoisie may 
constitute the first step towards the affirmation of the latter as the leading force 
within the Algerian social formation.
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The continuation of this process would thereafter, signify that the problem of 
introverting the domestic economy and the realisation of an autonomous 
accumulation process would become an emptiness to be filled by the search for an 
optimal (from the domestic bourgeoisie’s viewpoint) integration into the world 
market in alliance with international capital.
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After twenty five years of independence and despite the official claims 
about building an independent and national economy, Algeria seems to have 
experienced a change in degree rather than a change in nature.
From a mono-exporter of agricultural products (wine in particular) during 
the colonial era, the Algerian economy has become a mono-exporter of 
hydrocarbons. The similarity between pre and post-independence Algeria does 
not however remain at the level of its position as a mono-exporter but can be 
comprehended as stemming from a more fundamental aspect: in both historical 
periods, the evolution of the domestic economy was based upon and determined 
by the existence of a flow of money capital generated outside the Algerian 
economy.
In pre-independence Algeria, the functioning of the colonial economy 
relied heavily on its close relationship with Metropolitan France and on the 
subsidies, which had constantly been present since the beginning of 
colonisation. If, at the beginning of the colonisation process, the development 
of the colonial (capitalist) sector had been subsidised by the indigenous (pre­
capitalist) economy, at the end of the colonial era. subsidies came directly from 
Metropolitan France in order to keep the colonial economy afloat.
In post-independence Algeria, on the other hand, the growth of the 
domestic economy had been mainly supported by the distribution of the oil rent 
appropriated by the Algerian state. The colonial features of the Algerian 
economy would re-emerge as a direct consequence of the particular use the oil
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rent has been put to. Like the subsidies (which characterised the colonial 
period) the oil rent served as a means of financing the rest of the economy as 
well as attenuating the impact of social and political tensions which necessarily 
emerges along any process of change.
Hence in both eras (pre and post-independence Algeria) the accumulation 
process was not based on the realisation (and investment) of a surplus (in 
Baran's sense) generated from within the system, but on a quantity (subsidy or 
rent) generated outside the domestic economy.
The use of the oil rent by the Algerian state did not, however, stem from the 
same logic (at least officially) as the subsidies coming from Metropolitan France 
during the late colonial period. Whereas the French Metropolitcan government 
had had as its main purpose the revitalisation of the Algerian economy and its 
greater integration with the French economy and the world market in general, 
the oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state was supposed to finance a 
gradual withdrawal (of the Algerian economy) from the world market by 
favouring the materialisation of an autocentred economy.
The 1980s has not, however, witnessed the implementation of an integrated 
economy. On the contrary, the Algerian experience seems to have evolved 
according to the colonial logic rather than a logic of autonomy. To that extent 
the appropriation of the oil rent by a state without a social project favoured a 
process of autonomisation at two particular levels.
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At the structural level, the military group in particular and the dominant 
social groups in general could reproduce themselves (as dominant groups) 
without the existence of an internal surplus.
At the superstructural level, on the other hand, a state without a social 
project could "manufacture" a socialist discourse and, at the same time, promote 
directly (through the state's sector) and indirectly (through the private sector) 
the spread of capitalist social relations.
The global process of autonomisation would emerge as a state disconnected 
from civil society (in Marx's sense) in broad terms, and from the productive 
spheres specifically. Under these circumstances the functioning of the 
productive system would have no influence over the reproduction of the 
dominant social groups.
On the contrary those (within the state apparatus) who control the 
distribution of the oil rent emerge as the apparent direct producers (they 
monopolise and distribute the oil rent); and paradoxically those who perform 
direct labour within inefficient productive spheres appear as rentiers 
benefiting from the kindness of the state.
Hence, in the Algerian context, the relationship of civil society to the state 
seems completely "blurred" to the extent that the state does not seem to emanate 
from the internal contradictions of society; but it is society which looks like an 
extension of the state.
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Under these circumstances it is not productive labour which performs the 
task of reproducing materially the society, but it is the rent (appropriated and 
distributed by the state) which exhibits this particularity.
Productive labour, then, loses its role as a central category upon which civil 
society could realise its extended reproduction. By holding this role the oil rent 
operates a practical and theoretical reversal.
The building of an independent and national economy becomes quasi- 
independent of the functioning of the productive spheres. To that extent, the 
apparent inefficiency of the Algerian economy in general and the state’s sector 
in particular would (partly) stem from the "rational" behaviour of the direct 
producers who could not enhance their status (and their wages) by improving 
their productivity.
Within this framework the process of building the Algerian economy 
exhibits a first noticeable aberration: development does not stem from an 
appropriate mobilisation of the labour force around productive labour but is 
offered to civil society by an autonomous (from civil society) state whose 
income depends on its greater integration within the world market.
To cover this aberration, a state without a social project could (thanks to the 
oil rent) manufacture a discourse whereby the non-participation of the 
"people" in the political sphere (where decisions are taken) is compensated for 
by the presence of the word "people" in most (if not every) ideological 
productions (decisions are always taken in the name of the people and for its 
benefit).
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Hence the populist discourse advanced by the state does signal the existence 
of a second aberration; the building of an independent and national economy 
becomes equated with a transition towards a socialist society. Yet the process 
evolves without the active participation of civil society but with a thorough 
involvement (at various levels) of international capital.
The movement that attempts to realise an independent and national economy 
without recourse to productive labour emerges, as a process whereby the 
development of society is bought from outside thanks to the oil rent. The 
internal contradictions are not therefore overcome in order to move towards a 
higher qualitative stage. But these contradictions are concealed or attenuated; 
and rather than being transformed by the various economic realisations, the 
dominant ideology remains of a pre-capitalist nature (clanism and clientelism 
remain the dominant forms of social relations).
The existence of the oil rent and its appropriation by a state without a social 
project appears then as having frozen the historical movement of the Algerian 
social formation. Or, in other words, the process of building an independent and 
national economy stands as an alien phenomenum to civil society; and as such 
the likelihood of its realisation seems as remote as the building of a socialist 
society without a socialist leadership.
The oil rent had therefore constituted the material base upon which both 
illusions (the building of an independent and national economy and the 
socialist transition) could be marketed by the state's ideological apparatus.
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Under these conditions the reduction (in the 1980s) in the magnitude of the 
oil rent appropriated by the Algerian state would imply the collapse of both 
illusions and the production of a new discourse to keep the current system 
afloat.
From an economic viewpoint, the Algerian economy has to move away from 
a distribution economy (rentier economy) towards a production economy. The 
state sector, plagued with cost overrun and functioning according to political 
rather than economic criteria, seems unlikely to undertake the required 
transformation in the near future. On the contrary the private sector which 
has evolved along the logic of profit maximisation becomes the likely candidate 
for leading the transformation of the Algerian economy.
A shift from the problematic of introversion of the economy (wrapped by 
socialist discourse) to a problematic of increasing output and productivity 
(covered by a nationalist discourse) actually emerged in the early 1980s. This 
new discourse may constitute the ideological veil under which the domestic 
bourgeoisie could capitalise and justify its ascension.
The emergence of the domestic bourgeoisie in the political scene and the 
materialisation of its social project would, however, have to evolve without the 
support of the oil rent but with the support of the state’s apparatus which must 
find devices for the mobilisation of the Algerian labour fource. The re- 
emergence of productive labour as a central category would paradoxically call 
into question the very foundation of the hitherto autonomous state. To that 
extent the likely outcome of the whole process basically depends on the 
strength of various social classes and on their ability to dominate the state.
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Algerie, op. c it. p. 368.
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APPENDIX I I I . l
MAP OF THE HYDROCARBON PRODUCTIVE BASE 





Region d e  Hqssi R me!
\\  x i  Region de Hassi \  
^  M essaood  '•Region deH assiR  me) e s t 
Expedition da g a r  e t con d en sa t 
non stabilise vers Hassi R’mel
Region d e  Hassi M e u a o u d  ooest 
Expedition de g a r  e* condensat 
non stabilise vers H ast! 
M essaoud
r .Region d  Alror .  y 
Traitem entde g a rV u m io t 
Reinjection d e  g a r  ipc
\-+  V  10  *
Region d e  Rhourde Nous* 
Traitem ent de  g a r  
Kumide
Region d In Salah
Region d e  Tin Fouy 
Traitem ent d e  g a r  
hum ide
r  p h as
.  A l .Region d In A m Lnai
Traitem ent d e  g a r  
hum ide
2 phase  C&
o  st /  ol • . _  \  _ /
e n s a f /  ^  Region d e  Go sh  Tooil
i /  g r  Trait«m «ntaegoxnutr>io«»
^  Reinjection de  q k r  tec  .  ./i
LEGENOE
.  C ham p d e  g a r
• O iom p de petro le
— -G axoduc
— - — Pipe condensa t 
A .  Unite d e  liguL lartion
* -Unite simple d 'ex trac tio n  d u  b ru t e t  condensa t 
f*  • S ta tion  d 'in jec tion  gisem ent g a s
•  .S to c k ag e  at cK argem ent b ru t e t condensa t 
«l .S to ck ag e  sep a ra tio n  ef cKargem ent GPL
 Pipe GPL
- - — -O U oduc
_  Unite d e  tra item en t. G a r  d e  specification 
**G a r  d e  pipeline*
I Unite d e  GPL. G a r  d e  specification 
G a x  d e  pipeline*
AX . R affinerie
» •  .C om plexes pe trochim iqoes 
t  .Unite transfo rm ation  p lastiques
342
APPENDIX III.2 
DATA ON THE OIL INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVE BASE
1. The Hassi Messaoud Refinery
Structure of Output (1967) tons
Diesel 40,000 Butane 4,000
Petrol 12,000 Propane 2,000
Source: MazriH., Les Hydrocarbures dans 1'Economie Alg&rienne, 
SNED, Alger p.54
2. The Algiers Refinery
Structure of Output
Fuels 2.5 mt/year 
LPG 110,00 t/year
Source: Mekkideche, (1983) Le Secteur des Hydrocarbures, OPU, 
Alger, p.83.
3. The Arzew Refinery
Structure of Output (tons)
LPG 84,000 Fuel Oil 888,000
Petrol 130,000 Lubricants 50,000
Premium 220,000 Asphalt 60,000
Naphtha 387,000 Bitumen 50,000
Jet Fuel 15,000 Grease 2,600
Diesel 588,000 Paraffin 5,000
Source: Mazri, H. op. t i t ., p. 124.
4. The Skikda Refinery
Structure of Output (tons)
Propane 100,000 JetFuel 46,000
Butane.... 390,000 Diesel 3 x l0 6
Naphtha 35 x 106 Peroxylene 38,000
Petrol 720,000 Xylene Mixture 247,000
Benzene 90,000 Fuel Oil 4.68 x 10®
Toluene 5,000 Bitumen 25,000
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Oil taxes levied by Algerian government (10  ^dinars)
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 (est.)
257.3 295.0 376.7 631.7 800.4 1133-9 1320
Source: St&tlstiques Financi$res1968, edits par la Direction GSnSrale du Plan et des 










ALFOR 51% Inc.SELSO 1966 Drilling
ALGEO 51% Independentex 1967 Geophysic
Studies and
Research
ALDIA 51% Dresser Ind. USA 1970 Exploration
ALTEST 51% Baker Oil Inc. 1970 Exploration
ALFLUID 51% Davins and
Chemical Inc. 1969 Mud Work
ALDIM 51% Christensen Inc. 1970 Diamond
Tools
2. Civil Encineer in c
Pipeline
ALTRA 100% - 1969 Civil Engin­
eering





ALLOTRA 51% Incica 1975 Civil Engin­
/ eering
ALCIP 100% 1974 Pipe Work
SEGAMO 50% Gaz de France (25%) 1976 Pipes
ENAGAS (25% )
3. Mechanic
ALEIP 100% 1974 Pipeline
Engineering









10 November 1970: 
24 February 1971:
APPENDIX IV.3 
EVOLUTION OF SONATRACH ASSETS
Acquisition of BP network
Nationalisation of ESSO - Algerie 
ESSO - Africa 
ESSO - Saharienne 
MOBIL
Nationalisation of the domestic distribution network. 
Nationalisation of Shell 
Nationalisation of Sinclair
Nationalisation of SOFRAPEL, AMIF, Phillips Petroleum Co. 
Algerie, and Shell Petroleum NV.
Nationalisation of Newmont Overseas Petroleum
Government decision to take a majority control over all 
hydrocarbon activities in Algeria.
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APPENDIX IV.4 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE SAHARAN OIL INDUSTRY 
AS PERCENTAGE OF INVESTMENT
1962 1965 1969 1972
a. Crude oil production
Algerian Companies 10.0 11.8 25.0 77.0
French Companies 70.0 70.4 70.0 22.7
Non-French Companies 20.0 17.8 5.0 0.3
Pipelines
Algerian Companies 9.0 9.0 52.0 100.0
French Companies 75.0 60.9 34.0 0.0
Non-French Companies 16.0 30.1 14.0 0.0
Refineries
Algerian Companies 4.0 10.0 56.0 97.3
French Companies 38.0 32.0 20.0 2.7
Non-French Companies 58.0 58.0 24.0 0.0
Domestic Distribution
Algerian Companies 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
French Companies 35.0 35.0 0.0 0.0
Non-French Companies 65.0 65.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Brogini, M. (1973) L'Exploitation des Hydrocarbures en Algerie,
(Montpellier) p.231. quoted in Himberg, H. op.cit., p.256.
APPENDIX IV .5 
INDEMNIFICATION! OF FRENCH COMPANIES (10& d o lla rs )
Company Indemnification
CFP 60
ERAP and others 40
TOTAL 100
Source: Madelin, H. op.cit., p. 184.
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APPENDIX V .l 
CiF PRICES EQUALISATION
T a b le  a :  E q u a l i s a t i o n  i n  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  ( e n d  o f  1 9 4 7 )
3 6 °  I r a n i a n  ( A b a d a n ) 3 6 °  ¥ .  T e x a s  ( G u l f  C o a s t )
P o s t e d  p r i c e 2 .2 2 $ / b 2 .7 5 $ / b
U SM C  f r e i g h t 1 .5 5 1 .0 2
C iF p r i c e  (G B ) 3 .7 7 3 .7 7
T a b le  b :  E q u a l i s a t i o n  i n  U S A  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  ( e n d  1 9 4 8 )
N e v  Y o r k S o u t h a m p t o n
V .T e x a s  S o u r  O f i c i n a O f i c i n a A r a b i a
3 6 °  G u l f  3 6 0  P l a  C ru z 3 6 °  P .  L a  C ru z 3 6 ° R . T e n u r a
P o s te d  p r i c e 2 .7 5  2 .6 5 2 .6 5 2 .0 3
U SM C  f r e i g h t 0 .3 8  0 .3 8 0 .8 7 1 .4 5
U S f a x .1 0 5
Q u a l i t y * 0 .0 4
CiF p r i c e 3 .1 3 5  3 .1 3 3 .5 2 3 .5 2
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Table c :  Equalisation at Nev York (end 1949)
V .  T e x a s  S o u r  
3 6 0  G u l f
O f i c i n a  
3 6 0  P .  L a  C ru z
A r a b i a  
3 6 °  R . T e n u r a
P o s te d  p r i c e 2 .7 5 2 .6 5 1 .7 5
U S M C - 3 5 %  f r e i g h t 0 2 5 0 .2 5 1 .1 0
U S  T ax .1 0 5 .1 0 5
Q u a l i t y -
C iF p r i c e 3 .0 0 3 .0 0 5 2 .9 9 5
S o u r c e :  R i f a i t ,  T . ( 1 9 7 4 )  LePrix JuPetFOlePrut Economie du Marche an 
Strategie <ie Puissance.. E d . T e c h n i p ,  P a r i s ,  p .7 5 .
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APPENDIX V.2 
EVOLUTION OE THE POSTED PRICES ($/t>)
S a u d i  A r a b i a U SA A l g e r i a V e n e z u e l a
1 9 4 8 2 .0 6 2 .6 8 2 .6 5
1 9 4 9 1.81 2 .6 8 2 .6 5
1 9 5 0 1.71 2 .6 8 2 .6 5
1951 1.71 2 .6 8 2 .6 5
1 9 5 2 1.71 2 .6 8 2 .6 5
1 9 5 3 1.81 2 .9 8 2 .1 0
1 9 5 4 1 .9 3 2 .9 8 2 .9 0
1 9 5 5 1 .9 3 2 .9 8 2 .9 0
1 9 5 6 1 .9 3 2 .9 8 2 .8 4
1 9 5 7 1 .9 9 3 .3 8 3 .0 5
1 9 5 8 2 .0 6 3 .2 8 3 .0 5
1 9 5 9 1 .9 0 3 .2 8 2 .8 4
1 9 6 0 1 .8 7 3 .2 8 2 .8 0
1961 1 .8 0 3 .2 8 2 .6 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 2 1 .8 0 3 .1 0 2 .6 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 3 1 .8 0 3 .1 0 2 .3 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 4 1 .8 0 3 .1 0 2 .3 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 5 1 .8 0 3 .1 0 2 .3 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 6 1 .8 0 3 .1 0 2 .3 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 7 1 .8 0 3 .1 0 2 .3 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 8 1 .8 0 3 .1 0 2 .3 5 2 .8 0
1 9 6 9 1 .8 0 3 .3 0 2 .3 5 2 .8 0
1 9 7 0 1 .8 0 3 .4 0 2 .6 5 2 .8 0
S o u r c e :  M a z r i ,  H . op. oits. p .8 0 .
APPENDIX V.3
EVOLUTION OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES* PARTICIPATION
C o u n t r y P a r t i c i p a t i o n  % C o m p a n y D a te
A b u  D h a b i 2 5 A D PC , A D M A O ct. 1 9 7 2
6 0 A D PC , A D M A O ct. 1 9 7 4
1 0 0 G a s  e x p l o i t a t i o n J a n .  1 9 7 6
S a u d i  A r a b i a 2 5 ARAM CO O ct. 1 9 7 2
6 0 ARAM CO J a n .  1 9 7 4
1 0 0 ARAM CO M a r c h  1 9 7 6
K u w a i t 2 5 KOC O ct. 1 9 7 2
1 0 0 KOC D e c . 1 9 7 5
1 0 0 A m i n o i l J u n e  1 9 7 7
Q u a ta r 2 5 QPC O ct. 1 9 7 2
6 0 QPC A p r i l  1 9 7 4
1 0 0 QPC S e p t .  1 9 7 6
S o u r c e :  S i d - A h m e d ,  A . ( 1 9 8 0 )  L Vpep, Pass#. Present et Perspective. O PU , A l g e r ,  
p .1 1 3 .
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APPENDIX V.4
COMPARISON OF SPOT AND OFFICIAL PRICES 1978-80 ($ /b )
Gulf - Arabian Light (34°) Libyan Zuetina (41°)
Year Spot 0ff.(l) 0ff.(2) Diff.(l) Diff.(2) Spot Off. Diff.
1978
Jan. 12.65 12.70 12.70 -0.05 -0.05 13.85 14.0 -0.20
Feb. 12.65 12.70 12.70 -0.05 -0.05 13.85 14.0 -0.20
March 12.65 12.70 12.70 -0.05 -0.05 13.75 14.0 -0.30
April 12.67 12.70 12.70 -0.03 -0.03 13.75 13.90 -0.15
May 12.72 12.70 12.70 +0.02 +0.02 13.75 13.90 -0.15
June 12.72 12.70 12.70 +0.02 +0.02 13.75 13.90 -0.15
July 12.77 12.70 12.70 +0.07 +0.07 13.75 13.90 -0.15
Aug. 12.79 12.70 12.70 +0.09 +0.09 13.85 13.90 0.05
Sept. 12.80 12.70 12.70 +0.10 +0.10 14.00 13.90 +0.10
Oct. 13.00 12.70 12.70 +0.30 +0.30 14.50 13.90 +0.60
Nov. 14.90 12.70 12.70 +2.20 +2.20 16.25 13.90 +2.35
Dec. 15.00 12.70 12.70 +2.30 +2.30 16.75 13.90 +2.85
1979
Jan. 17.50 13.40 13.40 +4.10 +4.10 19.75 14.74 +5.01
Feb. 23.00 13.40 13.40 +9.60 +9.60 26.00 15.42 +10.58
March 21.00 13.40 13.40 +7.60 +7.60 24.00 16.12 +7.88
April 21.50 14.55 16.35 +6.95 +5.15 24.50 18.30 +6.20
May 34.50 14.55 16.95 +19.95 17.55 36.00 21.31 +14.69
June 34.00 18.00 18.00 +16.00 +16.00 36.50 21.31 +15.19
July 32.00 18.00 20.00 +14.00 +12.00 36.00 23.50 +12.50
Aug. 34.00 18.00 20.00 +16.00 +14.00 36.00 23.50 +12.50
Sept. 35.00 18.00 20.00 +17.00 +15.00 37.00 23.50 +13.50
Oct. 38.00 18.00 22 DO +20.00 +16.00 40.50 26.27 +14.23
Nov. 40.00 24.00 26.00 +16.00 +14.00 43.00 26.27 +16.73
Dec. 39.00 24.00 26.00 +15.00 +13.00 41.50 30.00 +11.50
1980
Jan. 38.00 26.00 28.00 +12.00 +10.00 41.00 34.72 +6.28
Feb. 36.00 26.00 28.00 +10.00 +8.00 38.50 34.72 +3.78
March 3600 26.00 28.00 +10.00 +8.00 38.00 34.72 +3.28
April 35.00 28.00 28.00 +7.00 +7.00 37.50 34.72 +2.78
May 35.50 28.00 30.00 +7.50 +5.50 38.50 36.72 +1.78
June 36.00 28.00 30.00 +8.00 +6.00 37.50 36.72 +0.78
July 34.50 28.00 32.00 +6.50 +2.50 36.50 37.00 -0.50
Aug. 32.00 28.00 32.00 +4.00 - 33.50 37.00 -3.50
Off.(1): Official sale price set by Saudi Arabia for Arabian Light marker crude. 
0ff.(2): Theoretical official price for marker crude used by other Gulf 
producers.
357
MARKER CRUDE PRICES 1978-80 ($/t>)
1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 % i n c r e a s e
D e c . J a n .  D e c . J a n .  J u l y J u l y  *80 D e c . *78
S a u d i  A r a b i a 1 2 .7 0 1 3 .4 0  2 4 .0 0 2 6 .0 0  2 8 .0 0 1 2 0 .5
O t h e r s 1 2 .7 0 1 3 .4 0  2 6 .0 0 2 8 .0 0  3 2 .0 0 1 5 2 .0
S o u r c e :  S e y m o u r ,  I .  ( 1 9 8 0 )  OPEC.. Instrument of Change.. M a c m i l l a n ,  L o n d o n ,  
p p .1 9 2  a n d  1 9 3 .
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APPENDIX V II .l
STRUCTURE OF SOIL OCCUPATION IN THE STATE AGRICULTURUAL
SECTOR (in  percentage)
End of colonial period 1966-69 1973-74 1974-77
Fallow 28.7 29.9 25.6 251
Cereal 30.7 31.3 34.2 34.9
Vineyard 12.3 12.3 7.8 7.8
Other Fruit Trees 1.3 1.9 2.9 3.5
Citrus Fruit 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.7
Fodder Plant 2.3 1.7 7.5 7.2
Market-garden produce 1.0 1.4 1.8 1.9
Dry vegatables 0.8 1.5 2.2 2.0
Industrial produce 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5
Others 21.2 17.9 15.5 12.8
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Statistiques agricoles A et B, quoted in Bedrani, S. (19 ) L'agriculture 
algdrienne face au march6 mondial, in Les Politiques Agraires en 
Alg&rie, versJAutonomieoulaD&pendance?, CREA, Alger, p.56.
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APPENDIX VII.2:
YIELD FOR VARIOUS PRODUCES (quintal/hectare)
1955-59 1974-77
Cereals
Hard wheat 6.6 5.94
Soft wheat 8.5 6.38
Barley 6.0 6.96
Market-garden produce 100 66.81
Citrus fruit 120.5 102.55
Vineyard 42.1 16.61
Source: Tableaux de l'fcconomie algSrienne et serie stat. A et B, quoted from




EVOLUTION OF IMPORT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
(quantity, base period, annual average 1967-69)
Product 1966 1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978
Meat 100 100 - 1500 3900
Milk products S0.2 100 127.6 129.5 158.5
Vegatabies - 100 175.6 286.5 556.5
Coffee, tea spices 62.5 100 89.4 315.7 300.0
Oil and fat 83.0 100 132.8 238.2 286.0
Sugar 88.7 100 113.0 173.9 194.5
Wood - 100 144.1 235.6 259.1
Wool - 100 200.0 211.1 406.6
Cotton 32.1 100 123.8 160.7 130.0
Source: Douanes Alg6riennes, quoted in Bedrani, S. (19 ) L'Agriculture
algerienne face au marche mondial, in Les Politlques Agraires en 
Algerie, versl Autvnomie ou la Dependence?, CREA, Alger, p.76.
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APPENDIX VIII.1
DEGREE OF INTEGRATION OF SOME INDUSTRIAL 
UNIT IN EASTERN ALGERIA
Unit degree of integration




public work material 80%
welding and drilling 50%
material 50%
Source: Djeddour, M. (1978) Industrialisation et organisation de 1‘espace dans 
l’est algerien - les principaux traits d'un developpement regional 
polarise. These, 3eme cycle, Urbanlsme■ Grenoble, November, p.232, 
quoted in Hamel, B. (1983) Svstime Product!f Algerlen et Independence 
Netlonale, OPU, Alger, p.400.
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